

THE PARADOX OF KIAI POLITICS
*(Role of Kiai in the 2019 Presidential
Election in Madura)*

A Thesis

Submitted to the Master's Study Program of Political Science at the
Faculty of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for
the degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)



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Masduri
M.A. In Political Science
The Faculty of Social Sciences Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia
(UIII)
masduri.masduri@uiii.ac.id

ABSTRACT

Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat and Prabowo-Sandi's victory in Madura in the 2019 presidential election cannot be separated from the political role of the kiai. The kiai is included in the cosmological figures, *Bhuppa Bhabhu*, *Ghuru* and *Rato* (Father-Mother, Teacher and King), who are highly respected by the Madurese people. The kiai is the representation of the teacher, whose teachings and orders must be obeyed by the *santri* (students) or society in general. For this reason, the political choice of kiai in Madura in the 2019 presidential election influenced the choices of many *santri* and voters in general. What happened in Madura emphasizes the concept of the "selectorate" (Mesquita et al, 2003) in electoral political contestation, which can influence the composition of the ruling coalition and the population in a broader sense, as well as voters in a special sense. The kiai's strategy, support and active involvement will determine the position and victory of the candidate he supports. Even though in the 2019 presidential election there was a cultural paradox of kiai politics, where the Jokowi-Ma'ruf candidate pair, who represented the kiai and NU, lost in Madura, which is a base of the kiai and NU. This paradox occurs because of at least four things, the issue of identity politics (1), the domination of social media (2), the influence of political ideology (3), and the political aggressiveness of the kiai (4). There is obvious Islamic devotion in the Madurese community, where candidates who are supported by the majority of the *habaib* and kiai receive much greater support than candidates from the kiai themselves or the NU structural representation.

Keywords: *politics, kiai, elections*

PREFACE

I am very happy and proud to have received direct guidance and direction from my thesis supervisors, Djayadi Hanan, Ph.D and Aan Suryana, Ph.D. Guidance, direction, and encouragement from both of them continued to motivate me to complete this thesis as best I can.

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This thesis is for my parents, Sawani and Amrawi, who continue to motivate and inspire me to study endlessly.

For Fyneen Haura, my dearest daughter, keep learning and spread great benefits.

Depok, 23th May, 2023

MASDURI

TRANSLITERATION GUIDE

Arabic	Indonesian	Arabic	Indonesian	Arabic	Indonesian
ا	=	'	ر	=	r
ب	=	b	ز	=	z
ب	=	b	س	=	s
ت	=	t	ش	=	sh
ث	=	th	ص	=	ṣ
ج	=	j	ض	=	ḍ
ح	=	ḥ	ط	=	ṭ
خ	=	kh	ظ	=	ẓ
د	=	d	ع	=	'
ذ	=	dh	غ	=	gh
ف	=	f			
ق	=	q			
ك	=	k			
ل	=	l			
م	=	m			
ن	=	n			
و	=	w			
ه	=	h			
ء	=	'			
ي	=	y			

In writing, to show a long sound (madd) by writing a stroke above ā, ī, and ū (ا, ي, and و). Arabic double vowels (diphthong) are transliterated by combining the letters "ay" and "aw", such as layyinah and lawwamah. For words that end in ta'marbuṭah and function as ṣifah (modifier) and muḍaf ilayh are transliterated with "ah", while those that function as muḍaf are transliterated with "at".

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ABBREVIATION DIRECTORY

Berkarya

Partai Berkarya (*Work Party*)

BPS

Badan Pusat Statistik (*Central Bureau of Statistics*)

DPRD

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (*Regional House of Representatives*)

DPR RI

Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia (*House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia*)

DPT

Daftar Pemilih Tetap (*Final Voter List*)

FPI

Front Pembela Islam (*Islamic Defenders Front*)

FUM

Forum Ulama Madura (*Madura Ulama Forum*)

Gerbang Salam

Gerakan Pembangunan Masyarakat Islami (*Islamic Community Development Movement*)

Gerindra

Partai Gerakan Indonesia Raya (*Great Indonesia Movement Party*)

Golkar

Partai Golongan Karya (*Work Group Party*)

Hanura

Partai Hati Nurani Rakyat (*People's Conscience Party*)

Jokowi

Joko Widodo - *The Seventh President of the Republic of Indonesia*

KartaNU

Kartu Tanda Anggota NU (*NU Membership Card*)

KPU

Komisi Pemilihan Umum (*General Elections Commission*)

LP2SI

Lembaga Pengkajian dan Penerapan Syariat Islam (*Study and Application of Islamic Sharia*)

MUI

Majelis Ulama Indonesia (*Indonesian Council of Ulema*)

NasDem

Partai Nasional Demokrat (*Democratic National Party*)

NU

Nahdlatu Ulama

PAN

Partai Amanat Nasional (*National Mandate Party*)

PBB

Partai Bulan Bintang (*Crescent Star Party*)

PBNU

Pengurus Besar Nahdlatul Ulama (*Nahdlatul Ulama Great Management*)

PD

Partai Demokrat (*Democratic Party*)

PDIP

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (*Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle*)

Perindo

Partai Persatuan Indonesia (*Indonesian Unity Party*)

PKB

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (*National Awakening Party*)

PKI

Partai Komunis Indonesia (*Indonesian Communist Party*)

PKS

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Prosperous Justice Party*

PPP

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (*United Development Party*)

SBY

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono - *The Sixth President of the Republic of Indonesia*

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The kiai have a central role in the life of the Madurese community. In the cosmology of the Madurese community, there are three people who are highly respected and whose every commandment must be followed, namely *Bhuppa-Bhabhu*, *Ghuru* and *Rato*, the Father-Mother, Teacher and King (Hefni, 2007; Wiyata, 2013). Kiai fall into the category of *Ghuru* (teachers), who play a major role in the educational process, especially Islamic religious education. In the daily life of the Madurese community, kiai are also heavily involved, apart from being religious teachers, as imams of prayer, imams of remembrance, public speakers, and as figures who strengthen relationships and social harmony.

The kiai has a dual role, theoretically-cognitively providing direct teaching in class, halaqah, recitation, or public lectures, on the other hand practically-affectively providing examples of ideal life behavior practices in social life. This second context effectively builds the charisma of the kiai in public life, because to borrow Antonio Gramsci's (1996) term, the kiai acts as an organic intellectual, who directly integrates and protects people's lives.

The consequences of the kiai's involvement and role in social life have direct implications for the political life of society. As an integral part of people's lives, politics is translated as an instrument to get a more decent life—a more prosperous and more peaceful one, in the simple language of the Madurese people, *nemmo ekana ben aman* (getting something to eat and living a safe and enjoyable life). In another section, political terminology is interpreted as part of the daily behavior of Muslims, which also means that politics is part of the Islamic mission. There are at least two standard models of Islamic politics developing in Madura, Islam as a political spirit and the formalization of Islam as a political standard.

Regarding the role of the kiai in politics, especially in Madura, its history stretches back from the 1955 elections to the present. In the beginning, the kiai's political role in Madura could not be separated from Nahdlatu Ulama (NU)'s political role, he moved according to NU's position in national politics. When there was political fusion in 1973 by the New Order, Islamic political forces grouped into the United Development Party (PPP). Ideological variations and Islamic groups united in the big tent called the PPP, even though

in its history it has never won an election in a dominant way. Even in Madura, where the PPP always won, it experienced political turmoil, in the 1992 and 1997 elections the PPP lost to the Golkar Party in Sampang (Musatafa, 2016). This fact surprised many parties, and of course raised further questions about the shift in voter preferences in Madura.

The peak of the kiai's involvement, especially in Madura, was in the 1999 election, in which the National Awakening Party (PKB) took part in the election as NU's political representative. The PKB massively and significantly restored the political spirit of the kiai, who during the New Order were in the shadow of PPP politics along with other mass organizations. In addition, political space during the New Order era was very limited. The Suharto regime controlled politics, and as a consequence the kiai also did not get proportional and representative political space.

For this reason, the PKB had a major impact on the involvement of the kiai in electoral politics, including in Madura. The 1999 election was the most democratic election worthy of being compared with the 1955 election. The excitement and enthusiasm of the voters was so great, the voters were directly involved in socializing and campaigning for the parties of their choice. The kiai as an influential figure in Madura played a central role in the success of the PKB in the 1999 election.

The success of PKB in 1999 brought Abdurrahman Wahid, "Gus Dur", as a kiai representative to the pinnacle of his political career as President of the Republic of Indonesia (Suhanda, 2010). The presence of Gus Dur as the representative of the kiai in national politics certainly further strengthened the political role of the kiai and aroused the enthusiasm of Muslims in electoral politics. Of course in Madura as one of the areas where the level of kiai patronage is very high, it had a direct impact on the increase in electoral political enthusiasm.

In the 2004 presidential election, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, "SBY", as the Democratic Party (PD) presidential candidate, tried to attract the sympathy of the *nadhliyin* masses through kiai and Islamic boarding schools (pesantren). On June 6, 2004, SBY visited Pesantren Al-Hamidiy Pamekasan, Pesantren An-Nuqayah and Pesantren Al-Amin (Detik.Com, 2004). SBY's efforts to approach the kiai and pesantren were, of course, to gain political support. This confirms that in Madura the kiai is an influential figure, whose political support can be capitalized and has a resonant impact on other voters. Gaining kiai support is something that is certain to strengthen political support in Madura.

Since the regions held direct elections in 2005, the candidates for regional heads or regional heads elected in the four regencies in Madura had to be representatives of the kiai,

either as regents, deputy regents, or at least have the support of an influential kiai in the area. Regents who are well-known kiai include in Bangkalan, K.H. Fuad Amin; Sampang, K.H. Fannan Hasib; Pamekasan, K.H. Kholilurrahman Wafi; and Sumenep, K.H. Abuya Busyro Karim. This confirms that the kiai's patronage in Madura is enormous, and determines the map of the electoral political environment.

Likewise in the 2009 presidential election, SBY as the incumbent who ran again in the 2009 presidential election also approached the kiai group in Madura. For example, Muhammad Romahurmuziy as deputy secretary of the SBY-Boediono National Campaign Team was present at the declaration of support for Madurese ulema/kiai across political parties who were members of the Madura Ulama Forum (FUM). FUM declared its support for the SBY-Boediono pair at the Pesantren Al-Mujtama Pamekasan Madura (OkezoneNews, 2009). SBY, who led the government, also took advantage of the political support of the kiai in Madura. This shows that bargaining from the kiai's position, especially in Madura as the *nadhliyin* base, remains strong.

Therefore, it is not surprising that in every electoral political competition in Madura, kiai are always involved either as contestants or as campaigners who are effective in moving the masses. Kiai have charisma and influence in the political life of the Madurese community. Kiai become a reference in making decisions on electoral political choices. This position is also often used by candidates to get an abundance of electoral blessings from the support of the kiai, specifically for electoral competitions at the provincial or national level.

The political power and influence of kiai, not only at the district level, but also at the provincial and national level, are often used by candidates, including in the 2019 presidential election. The political power of the kiai is used by candidates to gain electoral support from voters. Moreover, the 2019 presidential election was constrained as a political competition with social divisions, especially identity politics (Hanan, 2020), at the highest level in Indonesian political history. Religion was used as a space to discredit candidates who were not in line with their political preferences, and kiai in particular in Madura were involved in broadening the space for distortion of identity politics, which had implications for the vote acquisition of candidates.

This study looks to examine the role of kiai in the 2019 presidential election, where the Prabowo Subianto-Sandiaga Uno pair excelled in Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep regencies, but lost in Bangkalan regency, or in other words, the Joko "Jokowi" Widodo-Ma'ruf Amin pair only excelled in Bangkalan. As the General Elections Commission (KPU)

recapitulation results show, in Bangkalan Jokowi-Ma'ruf won 440,129 votes and Prabowo-Sandiaga 322,131 votes; in Sampang Jokowi-Ma'ruf 187,189 votes and Prabowo-Sandiaga 570,597 votes; Pamekasan Jokowi-Ma'ruf 102,931 votes and Prabowo-Sandiaga 531,561 votes; and in Sumenep Jokowi-Ma'ruf 242,305 votes and Prabowo-Sandiaga 436,931 votes. The total votes for Jokowi-Ma'ruf were 972,554 and Prabowo-Sandi 1,861,220, the difference being 888,666 votes.

Recapitulation of The 2019 Presidential Election Results					
CANDIDATE	BANGKALAN	SAMPANG	PAMEKASAN	SUMENEP	NUMBER
JOKOWI-MA'RUF	440,129	187,189	102,931	242,305	972,554
PRABOWO-SANDI	322,131	570,597	531,561	436,931	1,861,220
				LEGAL VOICE	2,833,774

Table 1.1 The 2019 Presidential Election Results

Why did I choose the 2019 presidential election? Because it was well-known that the 2019 presidential election was a presidential election with a very high level of divisiveness. The polarization that developed was widespread in society. Negative campaigning and identity politics resonated immensely. Madura was no exception, as the basis for NU, kiai and pesantren. The 2019 presidential election in Madura presented a sizable social divide. There was a split between the kiai supporting Jokowi-Ma'ruf and those supporting Prabowo-Sandi.

The issue of identity politics in the 2019 presidential election in Madura was very large, because culturally the Madurese are attached to Islamic traditions. Its religious culture is similar to that of Aceh, West Sumatra and South Sulawesi. The cases in this study can also be a reflection and also notes for areas with similar historical bases. The context of the Madurese locality as a case study does not limit the scope of the context from the influence of kiai, buya, ustad or other terms used in each region for Islamic religious teachers or respected religious figures. For example, in Pamekasan there is formalization of Islamic law through the Gerbang Salam (Islamic Community Development Movement) under the Institute for the Study and Application of Islamic Sharia (LP2SI) through the Regent's Decree No. 188/126/441.012/2002 on April, 30 2002 (in the LP2SI Handbook, 2011). What happened in Pamekasan also happened in other areas, such as in Aceh and West Sumatra.

Madura's choice is of course none other than because the religious and political landscape in Madura had a strong context and relevance to the 2019 presidential election

political environment. Specifically related to the representation of NU and kiai in the 2019 presidential election. Respect for kiai in Madura is higher compared with other regions in Indonesia, because of the cultural hierarchy of loyalty to the *ghuru* (teacher). Likewise, one of the influential kiai/ulema who determined and at the same time approved the founding of NU was also a charismatic ulema from Madura, Syaikhona Khalil Bangkalan (Syamsuddin, 2019). Madura and NU have a long history and it contributed to its establishment.

In the 2019 presidential election, one of the vice-presidential candidates was a kiai who served as Rais Aam NU, namely K.H. Ma'ruf Amin, Jokowi's running mate. Apart from representing NU, Kiai Ma'ruf is also the grandson of a charismatic ulema who was very influential in Madura, namely Syekh Nawawi al-Bantani (Asmani, 2023). Syekh Nawawi was also the Grand Imam of the Haram Mosque in Mecca, which further strengthened the quality of his knowledge as an international scholar.

Therefore, the results of the recapitulation that Jokowi-Ma'ruf only won in one regency, and lost in three other regencies to Prabowo-Sandi in Madura in the 2019 presidential election, present two interesting observations. First, regarding the role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. To what extent and what kind of political role was played by the kiai and how did it impact on the electoral political map that was occurring in Madura at that time? In the context of Madurese society, kiai have a significant role in the socio-political life. Tracing the role and influence of the kiai becomes interesting, especially because there is a clash of kiai identities.

Second, there is a cultural paradox in electoral political choices. One of the candidates contesting the 2019 presidential election, Ma'ruf, Jokowi's running mate, was a kiai and a major ulema, an NU Rais Aam and chairman of the Indonesian Council of Ulema (MUI), but lost in the kiai and NU base areas, despite Madura having great respect for kiai and the majority of the population being affiliated with NU. In simple terms, the candidate supported by NU should have been far superior in terms of votes. However, the Prabowo-Sandi pair, who did not have a strong religious background, won the vote.

In many factual analyses, the involvement and role of the kiai in the context of the 2019 presidential election has so far been assessed as affecting the candidate's vote acquisition. The difference in the number of votes for the two was influenced by the political role of the kiai in each district in Madura. The kiai as a figure who has important influence in Madura (Karim, 2008), has a very decisive central role. The only interesting question is why the candidates who represented the kiai lost.

Political friction and the massive campaigning that took place at the level of the kiai or society in general, provide an initial picture of what happened in Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep. Prabowo-Sandi's victory was none other than the effect of the strengthening of the political role of the kiai in building a political narrative that benefited Prabowo-Sandi, such as being supported by ulemas, Muslims, etc. Meanwhile, on the other hand, it was rumored that Jokowi was not pro-Muslim, had criminalized ulema, and was descended from Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members.

In the context of the 2019 presidential election, the political environment that occurred in Madura attracted enough public attention. Kiai who variously supported Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi experienced fairly strong polarization (Salahudin et al, 2020), and as a consequence this polarization occurred at the community level.

The victory of Prabowo-Sandi in Madura, of course, culturally surprised many people, given Ma'ruf was Jokowi's vice-presidential candidate and a kiai. In Sumenep, for example, this defeat raised quite a question mark, why in an area where the NU base was very large and known to be closely associated with royal culture (Najib, 2020), which firmly adhered to the values of *Bhuppak-Bheubuk*, *Ghuru*, *Rato*—in this case the kiai as *ghuru* (teacher), did Jokowi-Ma'ruf lose? Likewise, the victory of the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair in Bangkalan is of course interesting, because on a religious basis, Bangkalan is closer to Sampang.

In this context, it is interesting for us to explore deeper, what was the role of the kiai in Prabowo-Sandi's victory on the one hand and Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat on the other, and why did a cultural paradox occur in the 2019 presidential election, where Jokowi-Ma'ruf, who represented kiai and NU, actually lost in Madura.

B. RESEARCH QUESTION

1. What was the kiai's political role in the 2019 presidential election in Madura?
2. Why did Jokowi-Ma'ruf only win in one regency, and lose in three others to Prabowo-Sandi in Madura in the 2019 presidential election?

C. OBJECTIVE OF STUDY

1. To find out what was the kiai's political role in the 2019 presidential election in Madura.
2. To find out why Jokowi-Ma'ruf only won in one regency, and lost in three others to Prabowo-Sandi in Madura in the 2019 presidential election.

D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This research is limited to two things.

First, this research focuses on the role of kiai as vote getters in the 2019 presidential election. The time span of this research is limited to the 2019 presidential election period, from the campaign period to voting.

Second, this research focuses on the occurrence of a cultural paradox in the 2019 presidential election, where Jokowi-Ma'ruf, who represented the kiai and NU, lost to Prabowo-Sandi in Madura, a base of the kiai and NU.

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

The role and influence of kiai cannot be doubted in the electoral political environment in Madura. The cosmology of *Bhuppak-Bheubuk*, *Ghuru*, and *Rato* emphasizes that the kiai's influence has been deeply rooted as part of the culture of the Madurese people. The existence of kiai in Madura is institutionally related to pesantren and NU as the largest Islamic organization in Indonesia. Because of that, when Jokowi-Ma'ruf suffered defeat in Madura as a base of kiai and also NU, it begged the question, why did Kiai Ma'ruf, who was a leading kiai and NU's supreme representative as Rais Aam NU, suffer defeat in Madura?

This cultural paradox is one of the fundamental reasons why this research is important. Logically, the kiai should provide support to the kiai and the NU member as the majority should choose a leader from the NU representation. But what happened in Madura was just the opposite, the major kiai and NU figure lost significantly. There are at least two basic things that can be the focus of this case, the role of the kiai as an influential figure and the ideological basis of the pesantren or NU networks.

The contribution of this research is of course to uncover and explain why it happened or what could explain the defeat of Jokowi-Ma'ruf in Madura, as well as why Prabowo-Sandi, who personally did not have strong religious backgrounds, actually won in Madura. Theoretically, it can also elaborate on the role of the kiai as selectorate and patron, and the consequences from an ideological or political perspective that is developing in Madura.

F. CHAPTERIZATION

The writing of this research report will be organized into the following chapters:

Chapter I: Introduction.

This section explains the problem statements, research questions, objective of study, and significance of study of the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election in Madura.

Chapter II: Theoretical Foundations.

This section describes a literature review, theoretical framework of study, and hypotheses for research on the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election in Madura.

Chapter III: Research Design.

This section explains the research methodology, the place and time of the study, research materials and tools, and research management related to research on the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election in Madura.

Chapter IV: Research Results and Discussions.

This section will explain the results of the research, field findings regarding the role of the kiai in the politics of the 2019 presidential election, and analyze these findings using a theoretical framework designed to read the results of this research.

Chapter V: Conclusions and Suggestions.

This section contains conclusions on the results of research on the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election and suggestions for future studies regarding the political role of the kiai in Madura.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS

A. LITERATURE REVIEW

Research into kiai is of course not new to studies in Indonesia. The kiai in the terminology of our society is an informal king who plays a central role socially and politically. This cannot be separated from the long history of the Nusantara, which is attached to the royal system, including in Madura, where in the words of Iik Mansurnoor (1995), the role of the kiai in society is a consequence of royal culture, which has a big influence on the socio-cultural system where society needs leaders—and the kiai are present informally as figures who can become references and role models in social life.

There have been many studies related to Madurese kiai, specifically related to kiai politics in Madura. This research topic is interesting and has novelty and relevance, because of the context of the 2019 presidential election, which had a significant influence on the dynamics and political environment in Madura. Even long after the 2019 presidential election, division and devotion regarding kiai support in Madura are still very significant. This means that the fact that the Prabowo-Sandi pair lost at the national level did not dampen enthusiasm. This is of course interesting for us to understand what exactly is the political environment that is developing in Madurese society, specifically the role of the kiai who have enormous influence in Madurese society.

This research is interesting and has novelty, at least for three reasons. First, from an issue standpoint it is still very new, because this research focuses on the political role of kiai in the 2019 presidential election. According to the author's search, no researchers have conducted studies and research related to this topic. Second, so far there are two theses that explain the political shifts of the kiai in Madura, firstly the Reform era since 1998, where political freedom has opened up a large space for participation, secondly, after the Suramadu Bridge became operational it opened up space for economic progress in Madura, which certainly has had an impact on political perspectives and behavior in Madura (Haliq, 2014). This research is interesting because it will focus on how politics operates in Madura in the era of disruption, when social media holds great control in political battles. Third, there is a cultural paradox, Madura is NU's base, but why did Kiai Ma'ruf Amin, as one of the vice-presidential candidates and former NU Rais Aam, the highest leader in NU, not receive significant support from the kiai in Madura?

In the search by the author, there has been no research that specifically examines the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election vote in Madura. This is of course caused by the novelty of the 2019 election. However, if we explore the role of the kiai in politics, there are several articles and research related to the political role of the kiai in Madura.

First, Zamroni, M. Imam. "Ethnic Religion and Politics in the Stage of Power: A Political Dynamics of *Tauke* and *Kiai* in Madura." *Journal of eI-Harakah*, Vol. 10, No. 1, January-April 2008. This article describes the political movement of *tauke* (entrepreneurs) and *kiai* in Madura, as controllers of economic and religious power, each of which has become a political force to influence society. The *tauke* and *kiai* are directly involved in the electoral political struggle. Even though the *tauke* often fail, because they are considered non-indigenous/ethnic Chinese, while the *kiai* are Madurese natives and respected figures, they often win electoral political competitions. The two often work together, the *tauke* has an interest in securing his business, while the *kiai* strengthens his influence as a respected figure by being directly involved in various government structural positions.

Second, Pribadi, Yanwar. "Kiai in Madura: Their Roles in Local Politics in Indonesia." *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2012. This article discusses the role of the *kiai* in Madura as traditional and modern leaders, who have control over the behavior of the Madurese community. This study describes the *kiai* in Madura as the main actor in state-society relations. *Kiai* have become the main actors controlling all social, cultural, economic, and political movements in Madura. The *kiai*, with their pesantren and NU network, maintain a distance from the government in order to form mutually beneficial relations with the state when state power is too strong to be resisted or when making alliances with the government is seen as a beneficial option for their interests. This means that the *kiai* in Madura have built symbiotic politics of mutualism, at certain times maintaining a distance, at other times when it is considered profitable, they build good relations with the state.

Third, Prastiwi, Merlia Indah. "Politicalization of Pesantren and Shifting the Functions of Pesantren in Madura." *KARSA: Journal of Islamic Social and Culture*, Vol. 23 No. 2, December 2015. This article describes the role of pesantren and *kiai* as the lifeblood of the Madurese community. The *kiai* in Madura are respected and influential figures, no doubt, the *kiai* in Madura have many followers, which results in the realm of trust in the *kiai* shifting from religious to political. Ownership of support and a large mass following,

make the kiai's position lucrative, including to politicians. The findings of this study indicate a shift in function, from a religious role to a political one. Researchers found mixed responses to this shift in function. In general, the public response supported the involvement of the kiai in politics, although there were some who questioned the involvement of the kiai in the political sphere. This fact can be understood because the Madurese community still positions the kiai as the main figure and role model, so that the involvement of the kiai in politics is expected to change the heretofore poor image of politics.

The three studies above contribute to at least a few things regarding the role of the kiai in politics; In order to strengthen the existence and influence of the kiai in people's lives, the kiai takes on the role of being an electoral political campaigner (Zamroni, 2008), the kiai performs mature political calculations in providing electoral support. If it is profitable, he will approach the state/government/political elite, while if it is neutral or not at all gainful, he will be distant (Pribadi, 2012), and the kiai is a magnet for electoral politics. Politicians and candidates will always approach the kiai before a general election, because the kiai plays a role in gathering votes (Prastiwi, 2015).

The advantages of these three studies are that they are successful in tracing the power relations of the kiai with *tauke*, in the context of winning electoral competitions, as well as strengthening the anchor of the kiai's influence in Madurese society (Zamroni, 2008), being able to describe the political pragmatism of the kiai, meaning as religious symbols and figures who are respected by the community. Support and rejection – efforts to keep a distance from the state or government were also carried out with rational considerations about the political benefits that would be obtained (Pribadi, 2012), and succeeded in describing the shift in the orientation of the pesantren in Madura, from what was originally a place to study religious knowledge to mass consolidation efforts to strengthen the kiai's political support (Prastiwi, 2015).

What criticisms can be made of the three studies? Zamroni (2008) overgeneralizes the involvement of the kiai in electoral politics as a desire to strengthen the influence of the kiai, even though if we look at it, there are ideological (religious) and economic orientations, which are marked by at least two things, firstly, the involvement of kiai in politics in Madura after the Reform era of 1998 was driven by the desire to enlarge the PKB as NU's political vehicle, and secondly, after the 2004 general election, many kiai believed in themselves, thereby reducing public confidence in the kiai.

Pribadi's research (2012), does not touch on changes in the political landscape in Madura, where trust in the kiai in politics has recently tended to be low, as a consequence

of the political pragmatism that has occurred when the kiai enter into practical politics. This means that kiai who have strong charisma and mass loyalty are actually kiai who have so far kept their distance from practical politics. Meanwhile, for Prastiwi's research (2015), I see it as too hasty to conclude about shifting the role of pesantren from a place of religious learning to mass consolidation or the politicization of pesantren in order to reap huge profits from the kiai's politics.

The topic of my research is interesting and has relevance that has not been touched on by previous research, at least in terms of the cultural paradox of the defeat of Kiai Ma'ruf as a representation of kiai and NU in Madura. This paradox triggers further investigations regarding the shift in the political role of the kiai, the battle for political ideology, and political pragmatism that has developed in the social media era.

B. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In the study of political science, democracy, which provides space for equality between voters, does not necessarily translate directly into the reality of electoral politics. There is always a space, where the dominance of the power of a particular group, plays a significant role in the process of environment and contestation of electoral politics. These groups or figures can be businessmen, political elites, or community/religious leaders. Support furthers their strategy and active involvement and greatly determines the position and victory of the candidate they support.

Bueno de Mesquita et al (2005) refer to influential voters as a "selectorate", namely voter actors who can influence the composition of the ruling coalition and the population in a broader sense, as well as voters in a special sense. In theory, Bueno de Mesquita et al divide three groups of people who limit or "determine" leadership. First, citizens. They are also referred to as the nominal selectorate, namely all citizens who are registered as voters. Citizens can be included or excluded from the selectorate. Those who are excluded are disenfranchised, they have no political weight or influence. Second, the selectorate. They are the electorate who can influence who becomes the leader. The selectorate can influence the composition of the ruling coalition and the population in a broader sense, as well as voters in a special sense. Furthermore, the selectorate can access winning coalitions—including challenger coalitions. Third, the winning coalition. They are the subgroup of the selectorate who keep the incumbent in office and receive special privileges in return. They are also referred to as the essentials, as their support can translate into wins. If enough

members of the winning coalition defect to the challenging politician, there is a possibility that the incumbent will lose office. Politics defends and struggles for power.




Figure 2.1 Diagram of Selectorate Theory¹

Kiai in this context, as community leaders, as well as religious leaders in Madurese society, become the selectorate, which plays a big role in determining who will be elected. Borrowing the term of the selectorate from Bueno de Mesquita, the kiai is included in the category of the real selectorate who occupy a special position, because the kiai is a respected voter. The kiai is clearly not a nominal selectorate who has no political weight or influence. Kiai here also have access to winning collations or challenger coalitions, whose voices in particular certainly influence the developing political environment, both at the elite level and grassroots voters. Furthermore, with a large network, kiai can enter into the category of winning coalition or challenger coalition, whose support is essential and determines the continuity or termination of an incumbent's leadership.

The 2019 presidential election cannot be separated from the significant role of kiai who supported the presidential and vice-presidential candidates. The difference in the number of votes for the Prabowo-Sandi and Jokowi-Ma'ruf pairs is not only the effect of the candidate's personal work, but the role of the kiai who supported each of these

¹ This diagram is taken from Lucio Buffalmano's work, "The Logic of Political Survival: Summary & Review". *Thepowermoves.com*, accessed on June 9, 2023.

candidates. The support of the kiai becomes a kind of "control" that can determine who will be elected and who will not.

In James C. Scott's view (1972), what happened in Madurese politics, the power relation between the kiai and the community, he called clientism or political patronage. This relationship is established between an individual from a higher socio-economic status/patron and a person of lower status/client. The motive behind this relationship is the protection or benefit that the patron provides. In return an offer of general support and assistance, including personal service, is given to these individuals.

Kiai provide benefits as teachers, mentors, and role models in daily lives among traditional communities. The community, especially voters, of course feels the benefits and advantages of the kiai's role in their daily life, from here, a reciprocal relationship occurs. When the kiai needs support, or supports a certain candidate in the general election, the community naturally, because they feel "there is a role debt", provides support for the candidate supported by the kiai.

This kind of practice does not only occur in developing countries, even in developed countries there are elite groups that also influence the political environment in their country. This occurs because the democratic space is an open space, where everyone from various backgrounds and personalities can play a role in influencing and being influenced by each other.

In the context of institutions, the comparative analysis of the role of social institutions by Anthony Gill (1998) is interesting to present. This is because kiai and pesantren in Madura, apart from being figures/persons, also have institutions in the form of pesantren, which carry out social and institutional roles in people's lives. Kiai and pesantren have become an inseparable part of the life of the Madurese community. Therefore, the position of the two is very strategic, especially for those who have an interest in the electoral political contestation.

Gill's writings and research, *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and State in Latin America* (1998), can be a basic inspiration, tracing the comparison of orientations and roles performed and provided by kiai to communities in their respective regions, especially in Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep, as well as Bangkalan whose presidential election results were different. Gill's writings inform us that even in institutional power struggles involving religious institutions, there are always worldly motives for economic and political gain.

Operationally, these three theories will form the basis for analyzing the political role of the kiai in studying the 2019 presidential election in Madura. The theory of the selectorate by Bueno de Mesquita et al will be used to read the political reality regarding the extent to which the kiai's role as an informal leader in influencing the political environment map, related to campaigns carried out explicitly or implicitly in various kiai activities, including its impact on the vote acquisition of presidential candidates 2019.

The theory of clientism or political patronage by Scott, will become the basis for analyzing the power relations between the kiai and society, related to what motives underlie the support of the kiai, the political advantages of the kiai and the community, and the dependency relations of the kiai, the community, and politicians (candidates) that are intertwined in the election process.

Finally, the theory of institutional relations and influence struggles by Gill, will serve as the basis for comparative analysis in understanding the relations of the role of religious institutions such as pesantren in Madura, where the kiai as the main actor plays a major role. Each candidate has the support of the kiai, but why is the impact different? Including the influence of NU's support in Madura, why it is increasingly fading in political contestation, can also be traced from the theory of relationship between institutional relations and influence struggles by Gill.

C. HYPOTHESIS

Prabowo-Sandi's victory in the 2019 presidential election in Madura had serious consequences for the religious and political landscape in Madura. Madura is known as a region that has a very strong NU religious base, where the kiai as religious leaders and at the same time community leaders play a major role in the social life of the Madurese people. Research by Zamroni (2008), Pribadi (2013), and Prastiwi (2015) in general emphasizes the central role of the kiai in Madurese society, especially Madurese politics. Therefore, when Prabowo-Sandi won big enough in three Madura regencies, namely Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep, it would be quite surprising to return to the old religious and political landscape in Madura. As a base for NU, pesantren and kiai, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair should have won.

Why did the Prabowo-Sandi pair win in Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep, while the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair only won in Bangkalan? Does this mark the decline of the kiai's influence in electoral politics in Madura? Or was there a shift in orientation and political landscape in Madura? In my opinion, at least in general it can be answered through the

findings of A'la, Zamzami, Udin, & Aniq (2018) regarding changes and shifts in the religious and political landscape in Madura, from initially the majority of kiai and pesantren being strongly affiliated to NU, but now many shifting to right-wing groups such as the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI). This shift in the religious landscape has political implications for the political choices of the kiai network affiliated with the FPI down to the central level. Recently, FPI-style religious models have developed and their followers are quite significant in Madura (A'la et al, 2021). Prabowo-Sandi were supported by conservative groups, both political parties such as the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) and mass organizations like the FPI. Prabowo, in many campaign events, often shouted *Allahu Akbar* in a gesture toward Islamism (Yilmaz & Barton, 2021).

Prabowo-Sandi's victory was made possible as a chain effect of the strengthening of far-right Islamic groups in Madura, which were then ushered into the politics of the 2019 presidential election. The shift in the religious landscape in Madura was closely related to the kiai as influential figures and religious teachers. The kiai's large influence in Madura had a major impact on Prabowo-Sandi's political position. The community or voters in general, who defer to the kiai, naturally follow what the kiai in Madura choose. There are quite a lot of facts and field data that explain the role and aggressiveness of the kiai in the process of campaigning and providing support for Prabowo-Sandi.

Prabowo-Sandi's victory was thus influenced more by the passion of far-right Islamic groups than the kiai from the NU, who actually control pesantren in Madura. The political campaigning carried out by NU kiai could not compete with the political enthusiasm of kiai who were from right-wing groups such as the FPI. The dominance of kiai from the right in the electoral political environment in Madura had a role in Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat in Madura.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

A. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This research was conducted using qualitative methods. Qualitative research is research conducted to understand facts or social phenomena that exist in society. Reports in qualitative research describe the phenomenon as a whole, present in detail data or information from informants, and the research is carried out in natural settings (Fadli, 2021). The qualitative method emphasizes the process and meaning aspects, which are seen as a whole from the facts found in the field (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975).

This method was appropriate in this research to fully understand the role of the kiai in the vote acquisition for the 2019 presidential election in Madura, especially to explore why the Prabowo-Sandi pair won in three regencies, Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep, while the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair only won in Bangkalan, as well as to understand the cultural paradox that occurred when the candidates who represented kiai and NU lost in Madura.

a. Case selection

Madura was selected for this study as it is a base of NU and as a base of NU, of course, there are many kiai and pesantren in Madura. Pesantrens have thousands of students and kiai are among the most respected community leaders (Zakiyah, 2017). Not infrequently, the kiai's wishes, including his political attitudes and choices, often become a representation of the political attitudes and choices of the surrounding community.

This study aims to examine the political role of kiai in Madura in the 2019 presidential election. What was the choice in the divisive 2019 presidential election in a polarized society? One thing that caught our attention, perhaps also an anomaly is the support of the Madurese kiai, voters in general tended to the Prabowo-Sandi pair, in contrast to the background of the Madurese who are majority NU, when on the basis of mass support, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair should have got much greater support. In fact the Prabowo-Sandi pair excelled in three regencies, Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep, while Jokowi-Ma'ruf only won in Bangkalan.

This fact is certainly interesting to examine, to understand how the political role of the kiai in Madura actually took part directly in the 2019 presidential

election. So far, at least the basic things that have developed, are related to the shift in the religious landscape, which initially had many affiliates with NU, now shifting to right-wing groups such as FPI. The consequence was a shift in the political landscape toward the choice of the FPI network.

b. Data collection

Data collection in this study used non-probability sampling, specifically using a purposive sampling technique. Purposive sampling, also known as judgmental, selective or subjective sampling, is a sampling technique that is determined directly by the researcher with an emphasis on his own judgment when the researcher selects members of the population to participate in the study (Ray, 2012).

Purposive sampling as a non-probability sampling method, makes subjectivity the basis for determining the sample, of course by considering the accuracy and representation of the samples taken. This consideration is also based on facilitating and accelerating the research process while still considering its quality (Ray, 2012).

Researchers will determine specific criteria regarding who will become informants in this study. The purposive technical model is considered to be able to represent research needs because the criteria for the need for sources of informants and the information they need have been determined.

Then the data collection model is carried out through in-depth interviews. This in-depth discourse is a process of critical and in-depth debriefing with informants that is carried out directly. Access to primary data directly becomes very important. Because in the interview process there are often surprises that are important to explore further. Moleong (2005) refers to in-depth interviews as a process of extracting information in depth, openly and freely, while still focusing on the main problem in research. In-depth interviews, in accordance with Moleong, were carried out with a guide to interview questions that had been neatly arranged.

An important note from Tansey (2007), although interviews are very helpful in the data-collection process, we still need written sources or important documents, or field facts, which can be additional sources of data and information that can help our research. Therefore, this study also used literature on secondary sources that was considered relevant to the theme and objectives of this research. Library studies helped complete data needs that were not obtained in the field (Zed,

2004). Research on Madura and kiai has so far been quite extensive. Relevant data will be part of the database that will be used as the basis for analysis.

The informants in this study were kiai who were actively involved in or related to the process of environment and political competition in the 2019 presidential election that took place in Madura. The kiai represented candidate supporters, both Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi, and socially and politically the kiai had influence or a network of *santri* (students) and sympathizers in society.

c. Analysis plan

The analysis plan for this research was based on the formulation of the problem as well as the main questions in this research. First, relating to the political role of the kiai in the vote acquisition for the 2019 presidential election. This section will analyze the political roles of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. These roles include direct open campaigning; socialization and solicitation of support limited only to students, alumni and sympathizers; socialization that was only limited to the family; and finally the kiai who used their names to provide support. These four things will form the basis for mapping out the role of the kiai in contributing to the vote for the Prabowo-Sandi and Jokowi-Ma'ruf pairs in the 2019 presidential election.

Prabowo-Sandi's victories in Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep cannot be separated from the role of the kiai, who were directly involved in the political campaign for the 2019 presidential election. This includes the Jokowi-Ma'ruf victory in Bangkalan, which cannot be separated from the role of the kiai. We need to further explore the facts on the ground, what role did the kiai play in winning votes for the candidates they supported in the 2019 presidential election?

Second, related to the cultural paradox that occurred, why Jokowi-Ma'ruf only won in one regency, namely Bangkalan, while Prabowo-Sandi won in three, namely Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep. Madura had been considered a base of the kiai and NU, and the candidates representing the kiai and NU was the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair. This fact will be analyzed using the theory of the selectorate from Bueno de Mesquita et al, as the main theory used in this study. Then as a supporting theory is the theory of clientism or political patronage by Scott and the theory of institutional relations and influence struggles by Gill.

The provisional assumption in the Jokowi-Ma'ruf defeat hypothesis is a consequence of the shift in the religious and political landscape in Madura, from initially the majority of kiai and pesantren being strongly affiliated with NU, now many have shifted to right-wing groups such as the FPI. The religious landscape that has recently developed in Madura has political implications for the political choices of the kiai network affiliated with the FPI down to the central level (A'la et al, 2021).

These initial assumptions can serve as a basis for analysis as well as waiting for factual confirmation in the field, which will provide actual data regarding the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election, as well as finding out why a cultural paradox occurred where the candidate representing the kiai and NU actually lost in Madura.

B. PLACE AND TIME OF STUDY

This research was conducted on Madura Island, including Bangkalan, Sampang, Pamekasan and Sumenep regencies. Administratively, this area is in East Java province. The Madura part of East Java has Islamic roots and traditions similar to other areas in East Java.

Madura Island has an area of 5,378 km², stretching from the western end of Kamal subdistrict in Bangkalan and the eastern end of Dungkek subdistrict in Sumenep, as well as small islands that are geographically part of Sumenep regency on Madura Island. In Sampang there is one inhabited island, called Mandangin Island and in Sumenep 126 islands, 48 inhabited islands and 78 uninhabited islands. The large island of Madura (excluding the small islands that are part of it) is about 160 kilometers long and about 40 kilometers wide.



Figure 3.1 Map of Madura Island

Bangkalan regency with the capital city of Bangkalan has an area of 1,260 km² divided into 18 subdistricts (BPS Bangkalan 2023). Sampang regency with the capital city

of Sampang has an area of 1,233 km² divided into 14 subdistricts (BPS Sampang 2023). Pamekasan regency with the capital city, Pamekasan city, has an area of 792 km² divided into 13 subdistricts (BPS Pamekasan 2023). At the eastern end, Sumenep regency, with its capital city, Sumenep city, has an area of 2,093 km² divided into 27 subdistricts spread across the mainland and islands (BPS Sampang 2023). Sumenep is the regency in Madura with the largest archipelagic area, including having abundant natural resources.

NO	REGENCY	CAPITAL CITY	AREA (km²)
1	Bangkalan Regency	Bangkalan	1,260
2	Sampang Regency	Sampang	1,233
3	Pamekasan Regency	Kota Pamekasan	792
4	Sumenep Regency	Kota Sumenep	2,093
		Total Area	5,378

Table 3.1 Madura Island Area

Based on the latest data from the Central Bureau of Statistics (BPS) for the four regencies in Madura, the population living on Madura Island is 4,064,503 people, divided into a population of 1,086,620 people in Bangkalan, 984,162 people in Sampang, 857,818 people in Pamekasan, and 1,135,903 people in Sumenep (BPS 2023). The most numerous ethnic groups on Madura Island are the Madurese, which on a national scale is one of the major ethnic groups in Indonesia. The total number of Madurese is around 7,179,356 million people. The data shows that almost half of the Madurese do not live on the island of Madura itself. The Madurese are known as nomadic tribes. The areas outside Madura where the Madurese are most located are West Kalimantan, DKI Jakarta, South Kalimantan, East Kalimantan, West Java, Central Kalimantan, and Bali (2010 Census).

NO	REGENCY	POPULATION 2023
1	Bangkalan Regency	1,086,620
2	Sampang Regency	984,162
3	Pamekasan Regency	857,818
4	Sumenep Regency	1,135,903
	Total Population	4,064,503

Table 3.2 Total Population of Madura

Voter data in Madura, those who are over 17 years old or married (Article 1 Number 6 of the 2015 Election Law),² based on the 2019 General Election Commission (KPU) Final Voter List (DPT) total 3,307,060 voters. This data is divided geographically and demographically, in Bangkalan there are 868,515 voters consisting of 421,181 male voters and 447,332 female voters. In Sampang 857,511 voters consisting of 413,130 male voters and 424,381 female voters. Meanwhile, in Pamekasan there are 707,761 voters, consisting of 342,760 male voters and 362,041 female voters. Meanwhile, in Sumenep, there are 873,273 voters, 410,927 male voters and 462,346 female voters (Okezone.Com, 2018). The DPT in Madura accounts for at least 1.7% of the national DPT. Even though it is small quantitatively, the political context that occurred in Madura has a significant influence on the issue nationally.

NO	REGENCY	VOTERS 2019
1	Bangkalan Regency	868,515
2	Sampang Regency	857,511
3	Pamekasan Regency	707,761
4	Sumenep Regency	873,273
	Total Voters	3,307,060

Table 3.3 Total Voters in Madura

Based on statistical data from the Ministry of Religion, the Madurese are Muslim (99.89%), Protestant/Catholic (0.10%), and Hindu, Buddhist, & Confucian (0.01%). This data confirms that adherents of religions other than Islam in Madura are less than 1%. The essence of the socio-religious life of the Madurese community is supported by the existence of a significant number of pesantren. The number of pesantren in Madura is at least 861. The largest number of pesantren is in Sampang with a total of 352 pesantren, in second place in Pamekasan with a total of 218 pesantren. Then followed by Sumenep with 177 pesantren and Bangkalan with 114 pesantren (Antaraneews.com, 2022). These numbers may still be higher, because there are small pesantren which have not been officially recorded by the government. But what is important to highlight here is the cultural basis of Islam as the face of Madurese society.

² Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia Nomor 8 Tahun 2015 Tentang Perubahan Atas Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2015 Tentang Penetapan Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang Nomor 1 Tahun 2014 Tentang Pemilihan Gubernur, Bupati, dan Walikota Menjadi Undang-Undang

The existence of pesantren in Madura is closely related to the existence of NU. The presence of NU cannot be separated from the blessing of Syaikhana Khalil as a Madurese ulama in Bangkalan regency who played a major role in the process of establishing NU. Madura is very attached to the NU tradition (Syamsuddin, 2019). Even though they may not be officially registered as NU members or have an NU membership card (KartaNU), culturally the Madurese are the executors and preservers of the NU-style Islamic tradition. The large number of pesantren and the kiai who are in them as leaders of the pesantren, strengthen the NU-style Islamic pulse in the traditions and daily life of the community. Kiai in Madura are not the only ones who own or teach at a pesantren. There are also many village kiai who, in their daily practice, teach Koran recitation and lead religious activities such as *tahlilan* and *selamatan* (salvation).

Politically, Madura is dominated by Islamic political forces, especially the political representation of NU through the National Awakening Party (PKB) and the United Development Party (PPP). Even though the political dynamics have changed a lot and the tendencies of voters has changed, including pragmatism in the midst of open elections, Islamic parties, especially the PKB and PPP, still prevail in Madura. The results of the 2019 general election for regency DPRD seats at least show this. The largest number of seats in the regency DPRD, PPP (33), PKB (30), Gerindra (25), Democrats (23), PDIP (15), PAN (14), PKS (13), NasDem (11), Golkar (9), Hanura (8), PBB (5), Perindo (2), and Berkarya (2).

In each district, the number of seats in the Bangkalan regency DPRD: Gerindra (10), PDI-P (8), PPP (7), PKB (6), Democrats (5), PAN (3), Hanura (3), Golkar (2), Berkarya (2), and Perindo (1) (Madura.tribunnews.com, 2019). The number of seats in Sampang regency DPRD: PKB (7), PPP (7), NasDem (6), Democrats (5), Gerindra (5), Golkar (4), PKS (3), PAN (3), PDI-P (2), Hanura (2), and PBB (1) (Maduraindepth.com, 2019). The number of seats in Pamekasan regency DPRD: PPP (12), PKB (7), Democrats (6), PKS (5), Gerindra (4), PBB (3), Golkar (3), PAN (2), NasDem (2), and Perindo (1) (Beritajatim.com, 2019). Number of seats in the Sumenep Regency DPRD: PKB (10), PPP (7), Democrats (7), PAN (6), Gerindra (6), PDI-P (5), NasDem (3), Hanura (3), PKS (2), and PBB (1) (Mediamadura.com, 2019).

NO	REGENCY	PPP	PKB	GERINDRA	DEMOKRAT	PDIP	PAN
1	BANGKALAN	7	6	10	5	8	3
2	SAMPANG	7	7	5	5	2	3
3	PAMEKASAN	12	7	4	6	-	2
4	SUMENEP	7	10	6	7	5	6
	TOTAL	33	30	25	23	15	14

NO	REGENCY	PKS	NASDEM	GOLKAR	HANURA	PBB	PERINDO	BERKARYA
1	BANGKALAN	3	-	2	3	-	1	2
2	SAMPANG	3	6	4	2	1	-	-
3	PAMEKASAN	5	2	3	-	3	1	-
4	SUMENEP	2	3	-	3	1	-	-
	TOTAL	13	11	9	8	5	2	2

Table 3.4 Total of seats for political parties in the Regency DPRD 2019

The total number of seats in the regency DPRD in Madura, if grouped into two ideological spectrums, from the Islamist group there are the PPP, PKB, PAN, PKS, and PBB with a total of 95 seats in the regency DPRD. Meanwhile, the Nationalist groups included Gerindra, Democrats, PDIP, NasDem, Golkar, Hanura, Perindo and Berkarya with a total of 95 seats. Quantitatively this figure shows the balance of the two ideological spectrums in Madura. However, if we analyze qualitatively, the balanced numbers indicate that the political power of Islam in Madura is still very large. At least if we compare it with the acquisition of seats for Islamic parties at the national level in the DPR RI. The PDIP as the party that won the 2019 election did not get any seats in Pamekasan. Nasdem also did not get any seats in Bangkalan. Golkar, as the third most successful party in the 2019 election, with its long and varied track record in elections, also won no seats at all in Sumenep.

Meanwhile, for the presidential elections, at least the last two, the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections, there were political changes that attracted enough public attention. This is because Madura, as part of a region with a cultural tradition that is very close to NU and kiai, also had an impact from the electoral political environment that occurred at the national level. In the 2014 presidential election, the Jokowi-JK vote in Madura was 692,631, specifically in Bangkalan 149,258 votes, Sampang 162,785 votes, Pamekasan 135,178 votes, and Sumenep 245,410 votes. While Prabowo-Hatta in the 2014 presidential election in Madura won 1,830,968 votes, specifically, Bangkalan 644,608 votes, Sampang 474,752 votes, Pamekasan 378,652 votes, and Sumenep 332,956 votes (Sindonews.com, 2014). In the 2014 presidential election, Jokowi lost in all districts in Madura by 1,138,337 votes to Prabowo.

Not much different from the 2019 presidential election, Jokowi-Ma'ruf won in one regency, namely Bangkalan, and Prabowo-Sandi won in three, namely Sampang,

Pamekasan and Sumenep. Jokowi-Ma'ruf won 972,554 votes, specifically Bangkalan 440,129 votes, Sampang 187,189 votes, Pamekasan 102,931 votes, and Sumenep 242,305 votes. Meanwhile Prabowo-Sandi in the 2019 presidential election totaled 1,861,220 votes in Madura, specifically Bangkalan 322,131 votes, Sampang 570,597 votes, Pamekasan 531,561 votes, and Sumenep 436,931 votes (Tribunnews.com, 2019). The difference between Jokowi's defeat and Prabowo's in the 2019 presidential election was 888,666 votes.

RECAPITULATION OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS IN MADURA					
The 2014 Presidential Election					
CANDIDATE	BANGKALAN	SAMPANG	PAMEKASAN	SUMENEP	NUMBER
JOKOWI-JK	149,258	162,785	135,178	245,410	692,631
PRABOWO-HATTA	644,608	474,752	378,652	332,956	1,830,968
				LEGAL VOICE	2,523,599
The 2019 Presidential Election					
CANDIDATE	BANGKALAN	SAMPANG	PAMEKASAN	SUMENEP	NUMBER
JOKOWI-MA'RUF	440,129	187,189	102,931	242,305	972,554
PRABOWO-SANDI	322,131	570,597	531,561	436,931	1,861,220
				LEGAL VOICE	2,833,774

Table 3.5 The Result of Votes for the 2014 and 2019 Presidential Elections in Madura

The political map drawn from the results of the legislative election and presidential election in Madura, marks the political landscape that is developing in Madura, which cannot be separated from Islamic issues as a consequence of the growing Islamic conservatism in Madura. The level of conservatism among the Madurese is very large. Amien Rais (2013) tells a story that since he was a child, he was told the Madurese people would be very angry if they are not known as Muslim. We can find this in the daily life of the Madurese, as well as marking that Islam is a very important part of the life of the Madurese people.

Devotion to Islam in the end also has implications for devotion towards the kiai as teachers of Islamic religion. Kiai become role models in the daily behavior of the Madurese people. This research wants to explore the intersection of kiai with electoral politics in the 2019 presidential election. Therefore, in this study, researchers interviewed several kiai who were involved or had a role in the political environment in Madura in the 2019 presidential election. The kiai interviewed also represented kiai from each district and supporters of the presidential candidates of Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi. The timeframe for conducting this research was from January to May 2023.

C. RESEARCH MATERIALS AND TOOLS

This research was conducted by directly interviewing as primary sources the clerics involved in the 2019 presidential election in Madura and processing data from secondary sources related to political and religious literature in Madura. The tools used in this research are voice recorders and cameras for documenting interviews.

There were two things to be explored in this research. First, what was the political role played by the kiai in the 2019 presidential election? The kiai in Madura are influential figures, holding socio-political control, and their choices often influence other people's choices. The 2019 presidential election as part of electoral political competition cannot be separated from kiai politics in Madura. In many factual findings, many kiai were involved and participated in campaigning for the candidates they supported.

Second, there was a cultural paradox between the vote recapitulation results for the 2019 presidential election, where the presidential-vice presidential candidate pair, Jokowi-Ma'ruf, representing the kiai and NU actually lost in Madura. Kiai Ma'ruf as Jokowi's vice-presidential candidate is a great kiai and ulema, he served as Rais Aam NU and chair of the MUI, the highest position in a large organization in Indonesia but lost to the Prabowo-Sandi pair, who did not have a strong Islamic or NU background. Although Prabowo-Sandi did get a lot of support from right-wing Islamic groups, including several kiai and *habaib* (descendants of Prophet Muhammad SAW).

Who were the informants of this research? They were kiai who were directly involved in or were part of the political process for the 2019 presidential election in Madura. Determination and identification of these kiai were based on field investigations conducted by researchers. The representation of the kiai from the Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi support groups was also taken into consideration in the process of determining the informants. As a researcher, I tried to explore the data needed from credible sources.

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

A. RESEARCH RESULTS

This study has two objectives as stated in the previous part of this thesis. First, regarding the role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election in Madura. Based on the data obtained through fieldwork research, this research confirms that the kiai assume an influential role in elections. Kiai control and influence the movement of voices in society.

As a religious reference and authority, the kiai is a public figure whose actions set examples. It is very easy for ordinary people to base all important decisions, including in this case politics, on respected figures. It is at this point that the kiai politically gains recognition and becomes a reference for voters. At first this was very simple, firstly for reasons of the kiai's charisma and his role model as an authoritative reference in religious affairs, then it penetrated into politics, and secondly because of ignorance or lack of knowledge among the general public of political affairs, and so the kiai became a reference for political choices. Furthermore, from the perspective of the pesantren network, when these voters are *santri* of a certain kiai, the kiai's behavior—including political choices—is considered a sacred duty that must be fulfilled, even further there is a belief that not carrying out the kiai's wishes will lead to damnation (Adi & Muhtadi, 2017).

The position and great respect for the kiai certainly politically has interesting implications to be examined further. The three basic pillars of the Madurese community of *Bhuppa-Bhabhu*, *Ghuru*, and *Rato* (Father-Mother, Teacher and King) (Hefni, 2007; Wiyata, 2013) are still firmly held by the Madurese community in the midst of modernization and industrialization, even after the construction of the Suramadu Bridge and amid the widespread digitalization that has penetrated villages via smartphones. It is in this context that the distinctive characteristics of the Madurese people are interesting to study given their political intersections in the 2019 presidential election, where one of the losing contestants was a kiai, the leader of the largest mass organization, and a descendant of an influential major ulema.

The findings of this study confirm the kiai played a role in the 2019 presidential election. The victory of Prabowo-Sandi and on the other hand the defeat of Jokowi-Ma'ruf in Madura cannot be separated from the political role of the kiai in Madura. Even though we try to put a distance between politics and kiai, they cannot be factually separated. What

does it mean, in the midst of the debate about whether the kiai still have a role or influence in politics as a consequence of political pragmatism? The research findings show the relevance as well as the actualization of the kiai's political role in electoral politics.

We cannot deny that recently there has been a shift in electoral politics, particularly with regard to elite apathy and voter pragmatism. K.H. Kholilurrahman Wafi (Kiai Wafi)³ who was interviewed in this study acknowledged that there was a shift in the political role of the kiai. Kiai Wafi said that kiai are still influential but indeed not as strong as they used to be. But that does not mean they are weak either. Kiai Wafi underlined that the role of the kiai is still strong, although not like it used to be. This is a consequence of the openness of the world, where education is advancing. He explained how the kiai used to be a reference for the community in various aspects of life, previously people wanted to go to the kiai for treatment, or came to the kiai for farming advice, and so on. Now times are advancing, the development of medical science is rapid, hospitals are progressing, and finally, patients who used to be treated by kiai have now shifted to seeing a doctor. Likewise, many agricultural graduates have been produced, the science of weather forecasting is advancing, there is engineering of superior seeds, this of course has also shifted the role of the kiai, who used to be the community's reference in farming.

"The control of the kiai is not what it used to be. In the past, if the kiai said they were white, everyone followed white, or the kiai said red and they also went red. But at this moment not so much, why? First, the roles of the figures are increasingly divided. So before, maybe before the 1960s, the kiai were the only support for the community. Even when sick you did not go to the doctor but to the kiai, they wanted to start planting rice according to the kiai. Ask for the days, ask for the hours. Now there are agricultural figures, the role of the kiai is shared [...] including in political matters. So that the control of the kiai is not as strong as it used to be, because of the sharing, and I think it will continue like that in the future."⁴

³ Interview with K.H. Kholilurrahman Wafi, held on May 6, 2023.

⁴ "Pengendalian dari para ulama sudah tidak seperti dulu, kalau dulu kata Kiai putih ya putih, kata kiai merah ya merah. Tapi pada saat ini tunggu dulu, kenapa sebabnya? Pertama, peran dari pada ketokohan itu sudah semakin terbagi. Jadi kalau dulu sebelum, mungkin sebelum era 60-an, para ulama itu jadi tumpuan satu-satunya bagi masyarakat. Sakitpun tidak ke dokter tapi ke ulama, mau mulai tanam padi itu ke ulama. Minta hari minta jam. Sekarang sudah ada tokoh pertanian, peran ulama terbagi, tidak boleh tidak, termasuk di dalamnya dalam masalah politik. Sehingga pengendalian ulama sudah tidak sekuat yang dulu, karena kerbagian itu, dan saya kira ke depan akan terus seperti itu". Excerpts from an Indonesian interview with K.H. Kholilurrahman Wafi on May 6, 2023.

K.H. Kholil Asy'ari (Kiai Asy'ari)⁵ also spoke of how in the 1999 election he was involved in electoral politics, due to the encouragement of the kiai, including himself running for deputy regent of Pamekasan in the 2013 election. The 1999 election became the most historic political era in kiai politics, specifically in terms of Madura. The uproar and great participation of the kiai raised the political awareness of voters high. The role of the kiai was very great at that time. His influence on various party cadres was strong. There was lots of input on the legislature and executive from kiai. There was also a lot of community participation in matters of political funding. There was a collective awareness of the importance of politics. Kiai became influential and obeyed figures.

K.H. Abuya Busyro Karim⁶, who was also interviewed in this study, said that when he was first in Sumenep he served as chair of the DPC PKB Sumenep. At that time he was only thinking about how to run the office, and operations when visiting the field, the rest of the political activities and campaigns were mostly assisted by the community. He was not prepared for what occurred. The PKB's declarations were implemented in various places. Many voters requested the holding of activities in their areas. Many voters told Kiai Busyro directly, they held activities and attended joint party events by selling goats and chickens. Communities are mutually active and participatory in various party activities. This is different from now; it is very difficult to receive direct assistance from the community. What occurs now is that voters want to reap huge profits in each election.

“I was only prepared, until I got into debt, to run an office, how to operate the office, how to get on with it. Not set up events at ground level. Uh [...] everywhere was asking for events. PKB declarations. PKB declarations. We just got off the ground. If now PKB is holding an event, who will donate? In the past, people sold chickens and goats [...] Campaigning on Gilling field, so full people couldn't fit, 'I sell something kiai, come here kiai'”⁷

Furthermore, Kiai Busyro explained, the votes obtained by the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair in the 2019 presidential election, even though they suffered defeat in Madura, specifically in Sumenep, cannot be separated from the role and influence of the kiai involved in

⁵ Interview with K.H. Kholil Asy'ari, held on May 2, 2023.

⁶ Interview with K.H. Abuya Busyro Karim, held on April 24, 2023.

⁷ “Saya hanya menyiapkan, tang taotang awal pertama, bagaimana punya kantor, bagaimana operasional kantor, bagaimana turun. Tidak pernah menyiapkan acara di bawah. Uh.. itu dari mana-mana minta acara. Deklarasi PKB. Deklarasi PKB. Kami coma toron. Semua. Kalau sekarang PKB mengadakan acara, sapa e bebe se asombhangana'a. “saya mau tapi harus ada uang, yang hadir berapa, uang ganti bensin kalau sekarang. Dulu a juel ajem ben embik....Kampanye di Giling, lapangan, oreng full tak kabhuwek, kaule ajuel anu Kiai, entar ka enje Kiai.” Excerpts from an Indonesian & Maduresee interview with K.H. Abuya Busyro Karim on April 24, 2023.

campaigning for the pair. Kiai Busyro, former Sumenep regent for two periods, confirmed that at the national level of political contestation, the kiai in Sumenep are still the political reference for society. The distance between voters at the grassroots from the national elite in Jakarta allows the kiai's influence to grow. Even though social media freely opens access to information there is still limited access to information about candidates at the grassroots, so as an alternative, voters take their political references from the influential kiai in their respective areas.

In the context of Sumenep, for example, one reason why Prabowo-Sandi won, was the presence of a charismatic kiai in the southwestern part of Sumenep, K.H. Thaifur Ali Wafa, who openly supported the Prabowo-Sandi pair. One of the sources, K.H. Kamalil Ersyad⁸ who was interviewed by researchers had a story about how he was involved in working for Jokowi-Ma'ruf, he even had a chance to go politically with Kiai Thaifur, hoping he would change his political support to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair, who in fact represented the kiai and NU. However, Kiai Thaifur 's political stance could not be shaken, because his choice was based on *istikharah*, one of the Islamic traditions that is deeply rooted among kiai and *nahdliyyin* in general. Kiai Ersyad also emphasized that even though the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair lost in Sumenep, the kiai's role in the pair's vote acquisition was still substantial and without the support of the kiai it would have been difficult for the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair to get the vote they did in Sumenep.

Kiai Ersyad explained how he was actively involved in campaigning for the pair, especially Kiai Ma'ruf as a representative of NU. In Sumenep many kiai were involved in the 2019 presidential election, providing support and campaigning for the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair in their area. The driving force behind this was ideological similarities, with the hope of entrusting the interests of their followers through Kiai Ma'ruf as a representative of NU. According to Kiai Ersyad, ideology in politics is very important, and taking sides with congregations or groups with the same ideology is also important, because the realm of political struggle is actually a joint endeavor in fighting for justice and prosperity.

K.H. Imam Bukhori Kholil⁹ said that the 2019 presidential election in Madura was a battle between the NU kiai and FPI kiai. The polarization that occurred in Madura was rooted in the two major groups, the NU kiai supported the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair, while the FPI kiai supported the Prabowo-Sandi pair. The two kiai groups were involved and worked hard for the candidate pairs they supported. The Jokowi-Ma'ruf victory in Bangkalan, the

⁸ Interview with K.H. Kamalil Ersyad, held on April 25, 2023.

⁹ Interview with K.H. Imam Bukhori Kholil, held on May 13, 2023.

only district they won in Madura, was a significant factor due to the support of the kiai in Bangkalan. According to Kiai Imam this victory occurred because the domination of the NU kiai was still very strong in all aspects of people's lives, these kiai were close to farmer groups, fishermen groups, *blater* groups, all of which existed in their (and the kiai's) daily life. It is the domination of the kiai that determined the other variables in the victory in Bangkalan.

The role of kiai according to K.H. Yahya Hamidudin¹⁰ was very big in the 2019 presidential election, Kiai Yahya said that voters in Madura fall into the category of traditional voters, who base their choices on the influence of local figures, especially kiai. Kiai as influential figures control voting behavior in Madura. In fact, he said "very...very...very...very" emphatically when answering a question about the influence of the kiai in politics, at least in Sampang. The involvement or role of the kiai was demonstrated directly by Kiai Yahya with the Majelis Silaturahmi Ulama Sampang (Majsus) in the 2019 presidential election by visiting the Sampang KPU.¹¹ According to him, in Indonesia only in Sampang did the kiai dare to face the KPU directly as the election organizer. His presence at the KPU was not to get involved in technical election matters, but to carry out the duties of the kiai *al-amru bil ma'rūf wa nahī anil munkar*. Because the Kiai saw that there were many who were worried about fraud and abuses of power in the 2019 presidential election in Madura.

Kiai Wafi also explained his observations and views regarding the role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election in Pamekasan. For Kiai Wafi, the political role of the kiai is only one part of the many roles of the kiai in people's lives, and the role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election cannot be separated from the basic role of the kiai in protecting the community. Kiai Wafi states that in Madura the role of the kiai is still dominant, especially in three regencies, namely Sampang, Pamekasan, and Sumenep. Kiai still influence people's lives a lot, so from here the influence of the kiai is still strong. The nuances of obedience to the religious scholars or kiai in the three districts are still strong. Although, Kiai Wafi stressed that regarding Prabowo-Sandi's victory in the 2019 presidential election, it was not only the role of the kiai, but all parties involved, including figures from outside the pesantren. That the kiai is one of the driving forces cannot be

¹⁰ Interview with K.H. Yahya Hamidudin, held on May 15, 2023.

¹¹ When interviewed, Kiai Yahya said that only in Sampang did the kiai dare to approach the KPU directly as a form of effort to realize honest and integrity elections. The news can also be accessed on *koranmadura.com* with the title "Dozens of Ulama and Kiai Visit KPU Sampang Office, What's Going On? (Koran Madura, 14 March 2019).

denied, because the culture of the Madurese people still places the kiai as a figure to be obeyed.

The same thing was conveyed by K.H. Achmad Fauzan Zaini¹² in the 2019 presidential election, the role of the kiai and their involvement in electoral politics was quite large and influenced the political environment in society. Conflicts of interests and different political choices are inevitable. Kiai Fauzan directly felt the pulse and social segregation that occurred due to differences in political choices, even he, who at that time served as chairman of the PKB, received attacks and political harassment because he differed from the political currents that developed in society. At that time the kiai and the public generally chose Prabowo-Sandi, while he himself, because he held party office, chose Jokowi-Ma'ruf. The politicization of religion in the political space also encouraged and had a great influence, and the kiai controlled the production of issues and discourse that developed, as if in the 2019 presidential election voters were waging jihad to defend Islam, even though it was Prabowo Subianto who was being defended, who has since joined the Jokowi-Ma'ruf government coalition.

Even though there was a shift in the role of the kiai in electoral politics compared with the early elections of the Reform era, Kiai Asy'ari emphasized that the kiai in Madurese society still had a significant role. Kiai Asy'ari described that in Madura there are many religious sects in which of course there are kiai, this is the basis for the influence of the major kiai, or in simpler language the kiai have a big role in electoral politics in influencing the political choices of voters in Madura. If you take it to a deeper root, the end is related to religious sects. Islam in Madura is deeply rooted, and the kiai as a representative of Islamic teachers plays a significant role. Ideologically, this departs from encouragement, apart from mastering religious knowledge, Muslims must also be good leaders, in the language of the Koran *muttaqīna imāma*.

Leadership in Islam is the moral responsibility of Muslims, Indonesian Muslims must not be led by non-Muslims. This is actually apart from the issue of Muslim respect for non-Muslims, of course respect or tolerance in matters of religion must be upheld. Non-Muslims need to be respected, but they should not be leaders for Muslims, because it is feared that when non-Muslims lead, there will be many policies that are not in accordance with Islamic teachings or are detrimental to Muslims. The kiai's role is to oversee this, to ensure that the leadership of the Muslim ummah is held by good and pious Muslims. Kiai

¹² Interview with K.H. K.H. Achmad Fauzan Zaini, held on May 16, 2023.

as influential figures must have political considerations or *ijtihad* that takes into account the benefits of Islam.

"Our nation, Indonesia, is predominantly Muslim, so even the majority of Muslims must not only be knowledgeable about Islamic religion, but also control from a leadership perspective. So yes, a majority of Muslims being led by non-Muslims, for example, it's our logic that we don't accept that, but that seems to be a fear for some of our society, terms like that are a fear. If I think it should be, we Muslims must be led by Muslims who, according to the terms in the Koran, are *muttaqina imama*... So if we let it go, the ulema are let go, the kiai are let go, what if later the leaders are not in accordance with the conditions of Muslim society, then they make laws and regulations that are not in accordance with Islamic teachings? We as a Muslim society are the victims".¹³

The orientation of the kiai's political support and attitude in the presidential election is always based on religious considerations. Leaders according to Kiai Yahya must have a strong basic religious concept. "The concept of faith is very important and it is the basis of leadership in Islam." He gave an example in Islam that there is a conception of leadership traits taught by Islam and exemplified by the Prophet Muhammad, such as *shiddiq* (honest), *amanah* (trustworthy), *tabligh* (conveying mandate), and *fathonah* (smart). Of the two candidates in the 2019 presidential election, it is clear which candidate was closer and had the ideal character. It was from this that the support of the kiai in Madura arose to provide the best choice for the improvement of the nation and state.

We do not deny that there is a shift in the role of the kiai in Madura, one of which is marked by political learning in direct elections. According to Kiai Wafi, the gradual and waning influence of the kiai in society is one of the effects of political learning where, when many kiai are involved as candidates or supporters of candidates, then after the election it turns out that they do not provide protection and assistance directly related to the welfare of their citizens, from here "distrust" begins to emerge. The community looks to the kiai, but this does not end the role of the kiai as an influential figure in society. Kiai remain a reference in many aspects, especially religion, including politics. Because politics has a big

¹³ "Bangsa kita Indonesia ini mayoritas Muslim, maka yang mayoritas Muslim inipun harus tidak hanya dari sisi pengetahuan tentang keagamaan-keislaman, tetapi dari sisi kepemimpinan harus terkendali juga, kan masak iya mayoritas Muslim akan dipimpin non Muslim misalnya. Ini kan logika kita kurang menerima, tapi itu sepertinya menjadi ketakutan bagian masyarakat kita, istilah-istilah seperti itu menjadi ketakutan, kalau menurut saya memang seharusnya, kita Muslim harus dipimpin oleh orang Islam yang kalau dalam istilah dalam Alquran *muttaqina imama*..... Jadi kalau kita biarkan, dilepas olah para tokoh ulama, para kiai dilepas, bagaimana kalau nanti pemimpinnya tidak sesuai dengan kondisi masyarakat Muslim, kemudian mereka membuat peraturan perundangan-undangan yang tidak sesuai ajaran Islam, kan kita sebagai masyarakat Muslim kan jadi korban". Excerpts from an Indonesian & Maduresee interview with K.H. Kholil Asy'ari on May 2, 2023.

intersection with the interests of Islam as the majority religion in Madura, and Indonesia in general.

Second, related to the political paradox of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. Why did the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair lose in Madura compared with the Prabowo-Sandi pair, while Jokowi paired with Kiai Ma'ruf, who was culturally considered an influential figure in Madura? There are several findings that can answer this problem. Kiai Busyro, who was interviewed by the researcher at his residence, gave two basic things, why Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost in an NU base. First, issues of identity politics, such as the PKI and the criminalization of ulema, which were pinned on Jokowi, rolled freely through social media. Voters in Sumenep, for example, rushed to conclusions and confirmed the truth of the issue, without *tabayun* and asking in more detail about the truth of the issue. On the other hand, information about Jokowi working with Kiai Ma'ruf, who at that time served as Rais Aam of NU and chairman of the MUI, the representation of major Islamic organizations in Indonesia, did not reach voters. Even for Jokowi's representatives, voters in Sumenep and Madura in general, did not know much about the issues.¹⁴ The buzzer's ability to disseminate issues of identity politics also played a major role in Prabowo-Sandi's political work in Madura.

One of the sources interviewed by the researchers said that there was an Islamic party that has a rightwing ideological base preparing "paid" buzzers from the regions who were trained in Jakarta to play on issues of identity politics in the 2019 presidential election. One of the kiai confirms that there was a social media campaign designed deliberately to create uproar on social media, which had a further effect of creating social segregation. Matters like this are often associated with jihad, thus all means can be taken to fulfill the political goals. On the other hand, we do not deny that the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair also had influential buzzers, but including jihad claims and reasons associated with Islamic teachings felt wrong, using the holy teachings of Islam for negative politics through hoaxes and slander on social media.

The role of social media cannot be denied in the dynamics of the 2019 presidential election, easy access to social media via voters' smartphones had implications for voter preferences. Kiai Busyro had a chance to tell how the people in Sumenep were very anti-PKI as a consequence of incitement on social media. It was as if everything related to the PKI was bad and had to be shunned, even though for example when asked what was the

¹⁴ Important summary of the interview with K.H. Abuya Busyro Karim on April 24, 2023.

PKI? Many of the people did not have a basic understanding of the PKI, let alone wanted to have a comprehensive understanding of the PKI. Kiai Fauzan also said that the hoax of Jokowi being a child of the PKI, for example, had a big influence on society. Even though it was slander and not proven. When this emptiness of understanding enters the spaces of identity politics seasoned with Islam, it increasingly opens the fires of voter hatred against candidates affiliated with the PKI. Finally, Jokowi's defeat in Madura was also influenced by issues of identity politics that discredited the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair, on the other hand Prabowo- Sandi benefited from identity politics.

Kiai Wafi said that identity politics has a lot of influence on electoral politics. Identity politics is inevitable. This is often because identity represents what is in each voter personally, so this condition cannot be denied. Although Kiai Wafi feels that identity politics should not be at the fore of electoral politics because Islam teaches *rabbānā ātina fī dūnyā hasanah wa fī ākhirati hasanah*, the affairs of the world and the hereafter must have equal portions. However, no matter how great our efforts are, it is difficult to escape from identity politics. In every election, including the 2019 presidential election, identity politics worked in Madura and became a source of reference for voters in determining their preferred presidential and vice-presidential candidates.

Identity politics developed rapidly because it was also influenced by the role of the kiai involved in it. The 2019 presidential election became a battleground for identity politics, Islam was brought into practical politics. Kiai Imam deeply regretted this because he was raised to narrow the meaning of struggle in Islam to the extent that it was political.

"I don't agree with identity politics, because it doesn't educate people to be more mature in democracy. In Islam taught by His Majesty the Prophet, of course identity politics does not become Shari'a. The Prophet gave freedom for his people to think about the nation and the state, and the scholars had many opinions about this. So I think my view on identity politics narrows the meaning of a religious struggle in a very narrow corridor, just this political path, whereas there are many other paths that also cannot be ignored."¹⁵

¹⁵ "Saya tidak sepakat dengan politik identitas itu, karena itu tidak mendidik masyarakat untuk lebih dewasa dalam berdemokrasi. Dalam Islam yang diajarkan Baginda Nabi, tentu politik identitas bukan menjadi sebuah syariat. Baginda Nabi memberikan keleluasaan bagi umatnya untuk berpikir tentang bangsa dan negara, dan itu para ulama-ulama banyak pendapat-pendapat tentang itu. Nah saya kira pandangan saya terhadap politik identitas, itu menyempitkan arti sebuah perjuangan agama dalam koridor yang sangat sempit, jalur politik ini saja, padahal banyak jalur-jalur lain yang juga tidak boleh diabaikan." Excerpts from an Indonesian & Maduresee interview with K.H. Imam Bukhori Kholil on May 13, 2023.

Kiai Fauzan emphasized the same thing regarding identity politics in the 2019 presidential election. The violent clashes that occurred between supporters of Jokowi-Ma'ruf and Prabowo-Sandi led to the conclusion that what was at stake and defended in the 2019 presidential election was Islam, even though according to Kiai Fauzan it was not Islam that was being defended by the kiai and people in Sampang but Prabowo. When Prabowo joined Jokowi, voters were disappointed.

One of the kiai¹⁶ interviewed conveyed the basic ideological reasons why the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair lost in Madura. Jokowi as a representative of the PDIP is ideologically very far from Kiai Ma'ruf as a representative of NU or *ahlussunnah wal jamā'ah* in general. So the problem lay with Jokowi, not Kiai Ma'ruf. The Jokowi referred to here is not Jokowi as a person/individual, but as a representation of a political party that has a different ideological basis. In simple terms it can be understood that ideologically Jokowi and Kiai Ma'ruf are like oil and water, which cannot be combined. According to this kiai, the obstacle in Madura was that Jokowi was considered to be distant or from a different orientation ideologically. This kiai believes that the ideological basis for NU members in Madura is a determining factor in influencing their political choices, especially at the national level, which is geographically far away.

"So it was actually a matter of ideology that was the basis of their choice. Why not to Jokowi? Because in fact Jokowi is the *illat*. Jokowi is not personal, but the question of where came from (his political party). It was very sensitive for Madurese people".¹⁷

There were further factors related to ideological reasons. One reason is culturally sensitive, regarding the matter of pride of NU members as a large mass organization that wishes to have NU representatives at the highest level of office, in this case as presidential candidates. So it was kind of a disappointment that the presidential candidate did not represent NU. This had a psychological impact on some voters in Madura.

In the context of political party and ideological battles, Kiai Ma'ruf also did not represent the party of NU members, namely the PKB. Even though he represented NU, and the candidacy of Kiai Ma'ruf was also due to Cak Imin's political tactics as the general chair

¹⁶ Because the content is sensitive, some researchers declined to be identified.

¹⁷ "Jadi sebetulnya masalah ideologi yang menjadi basic pilihan mereka itu. Mengapa tidak ke Jokowi? Karena sebetulnya Jokowi yang menjadi illat-nya. Jokowi bukan personalnya, tapi soal Jokowi berangkat dari mana (partai politik). Itu sangat sensitif sekali bagi masyarakat Madura". Excerpts from a statement by one of the kiai in an interview for this thesis research.

of the PKB, for NU members at the grassroots, Kiai Ma'ruf was not seen as a representative of the PKB.

This position was detrimental to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair, especially of course in Madura. Ideological sensitivity and political party rivalry posed political constraints. There was a very clear cultural clash. The support from the kiai, which is supported by the support of the *habaib*¹⁸ at the local or national level, for NU members in Madura is a non-negotiable factor. Prabowo-Sandi on an ideological basis benefited from this context, they got electoral support from kiai and *habaib*, who were culturally considered representatives of NU.

Talking about NU in Madura cannot only rely on the perspective of the structural NU, but it is also important to place NU in its cultural context. In the context of the presidential election, structurally, even though it was not conveyed directly, NU support at all levels was given to Kiai Ma'ruf as Jokowi's vice-presidential candidate at that time. Uniquely in Madura in particular, there were cultural factors in the form of the influence of kiai and *habaib* who were at odds with the structural NU.

In Madura, the kiai and *habaib* are cultural representations of NU, so what is the political view of the kiai and *habaib* for some NU members in Madura is considered the basis of political ideology. This departs from the devotion to Islam in Madura. NU in Madura cannot be defined only as an organization with a series of formal structures and activities, but also NU in Madura has a cultural meaning as activities which involve *habaib* and kiai. From this, support developed in Madura for Prabowo-Sandi because they were considered the political choice of kiai and *habaib* who also represented *ahlussunnah wal jamā'ah* (in this case NU) or Islam in general.

Islamic devotion in Madura is very strong, this was confirmed in an interview with Kiai Eryad.

"In Madura devotion toward Islam, since it developed, meant the ideology of *ahlussunnah wal jamaah*... Pak Prabowo at that time was supported by the *habaib*, it was cultural, paternalistic, the kiai, if they had been supported by the *habaib*, it was apparently something that was not negotiable on several sides".¹⁹

¹⁸ Habaib is the plural form of Habib. Habib literally means "beloved", an honorary title given to descendants of the Prophet Muhammad in areas such as in the Hadramawt valley of southern Arabia, Southeast Asia, and the Swahili coast of East Africa. Read in, Ismail Fajrie Alatas. (2018). "Habaib In Southeast Asia". *The Encyclopaedia Of Islam (Three)*. Leiden: Brill.

¹⁹ "Di Madura fanatisme terhadap Islam, setelah itu berkembang, ada ideologi ahlussunnah wal jamaah... Pak Prabowo waktu itu didukung oleh para habaib, itu kultur, paternalistik, para kiai-kiai kalau sudah didukung oleh para habaib itu rupa-rupanya sesuatu yang tidak bisa ditawarkan di sebagian pihak". Excerpts from an Indonesian & Maduresee interview with K.H. Kamalil Eryad on April 25, 2023.

Meanwhile, Kiai Yahya is of the view that the position of religious organizations, in this case the greatness of NU in Madura, is not a guarantee that voters will directly follow NU's choice. Voters are now smart, especially when it comes to national issues on a national scale. Voters learn a lot from various government policies that do not benefit the community, in particular of course the kiai and Muslims in general. Jokowi-Mar'uf's defeat as well as Prabowo-Sandi's victory in Madura marked the rationality of voters as well as the consolidation of the kiai's politics in fighting for the welfare of the ummah on the basis of considering criteria and choosing leaders who were in accordance with or close to Islamic provisions.

On the other hand, the focus on the intersection or clash of Islamic ideologies that had recently developed in Madura, for example the FPI (which at that time had not yet been disbanded), also played a role in the defeat of Jokowi-Ma'ruf, which was accused of being PKI and of criminalizing religious scholars. In several areas in Madura, such as Pamekasan and Sampang, for example, right-wing groups have developed, which are ideologically and politically opposed to NU. The spirit of their *da'wah* and electoral political work, from the kiai to their sympathizers, is great. Their campaigns are carried out openly and often involve mass organizations, both on a small and large scale.

Kiai Imam presented another perspective in responding to Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat in Madura. Even though there was a clash between the NU kiai and the FPI kiai, it does not mean that NU's strength was weak in Madura. NU's strength in Madura cannot be doubted. It is undeniable that the Madurese are the majority and are dominated by NU members, even to the point that "NU religion" in Madura, is spoken of as a sign of the greatness of NU. It is just that in discussing Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat in Madura one cannot put one variable in the form of NU or kiai. There are other factors that also need to be considered such as the electoral system, the role of organizers, the role of local authorities, and the awareness of society in democracy. While in Bangkalan, why did they win? Because the domination of NU ulema in all lines of community life is very strong in Bangkalan. The kiai in Bangkalan are close to and directly in contact with voters, for example they are close to farmers' groups, fishermen's groups, *blater* groups. From here, if the perspective is reversed, it means that there is a gap in closeness between the kiai in each district and the community or it could also be that the enthusiasm for *da'wah* and political campaigns is not as intense as among groups outside NU, which has implications for defeats in other districts.

Kiai Wafi also highlighted the issue of strengthening "new" organizations in Madura, particularly in Pamekasan which has a different perspective from the cultural basis

of Madurese society, especially NU as an organization that culturally influences the religious and political views of Madurese society. We cannot deny that before it was disbanded, the FPI, as a right-wing Islamic group, was getting stronger in Madura, especially in Pamekasan, which nationally intersected with the 212 movement driven by FPI elites. Kiai Asy'ari also mentioned that the national network of the FPI group was strong, this also had an impact on the 2019 presidential election, especially in Madura. The political choice of the FPI network or Alumni 212 also has a direct impact on political choices in the regions. This of course cannot be separated from the use of identity politics, which psychologically influenced people's choices in Madura.

From Kiai Asy'ari's observations in Pamekasan, in the 2019 presidential election the FPI's involvement did not reveal much about its organizational background. Indeed, many had joined the FPI, however, what emerges into the public sphere are the persons or figures, the kiai who were active in campaigning for Prabowo-Sandi. The FPI has a national network with the Alumni 212. They have the same political affiliation. This influence is really strong. There is ideological influence from a network of religious organizations. In the 2019 presidential election in Madura, there was a clash of left-right ideologies, including moderate groups. Religious organizations such as NU, Sarikat Islam, and Muhammadiyah do not have one command. They were divided because of differences in political parties, which were also influenced by the kiai's political currents within them.

Voters welcomed the domination of the campaign and the political work of the right-wing groups, moreover they were spiced up with issues of Islamic politics, regarding Prabowo-Sandi's concern for Islam, support from kiai and *habaib*, and so on with regard to identity politics. On the other hand, they also discredited the Jokowi-Ma'ruf pair as a representation of the PKI that often criminalized ulema, regardless of the fact that the Jokowi pair were also ulema, Kiai Ma'ruf had even served as chairman of the MUI, the largest organization of ulema in Indonesia and of course as Rais Aam of NU. Kiai Ma'ruf was also attacked as being a paid ulema and so on, which of course impugned his kiai character. This kind of campaign model sparked the emotions and support of voters in Madura, where they were emotionally and ideologically faced with clear choices between "black" and "white". According to Kiai Busyro, Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat in Madura was also influenced by the dominance of the campaign and political work of right-wing groups, from the kiai to their sympathizers.

B. DISCUSSIONS

The kiai's role and influence in electoral politics remains a magnet for candidates. Even though electoral politics has come a long way, the faucet of freedom and democracy is like the free market, politics is very open and pragmatic, but the kiai remains a part of the country's political discourse. This research captures the political role of the kiai as well as the electoral paradox that occurred in the 2019 presidential election in Madura. The kiai as an influential figure has a political role in determining a candidate's victory. Kiai who are involved actively contribute soundly. Moreover, as explained by Kiai Busyro, at the national level, such as in the presidential election, the role of the kiai is still quite large. Long distances, relatively limited access to information, and accompanied by the charisma of the kiai, have encouraged the strengthening of the influence of the kiai in determining local electoral success.

The political presence of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election opens up an even bigger sphere of influence, as a consequence of the existence of the kiai himself as an influential figure as well as a space and a national political level, which opens up a greater space for the kiai's influence. The research findings above help us understand the role and influence of the kiai and the electoral consequences of their support. Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat on the one hand and Prabowo-Sandi's victory on the other hand are a consequence of the role and influence of the kiai in Madura. I use the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al. as the main basis for the analysis of the findings of this study.

In the selectorate theory of Bueno de Mesquita et al, there are three groups of people who limit or "determine" leadership. First, citizens. They are also referred to as nominal selectorates, namely all citizens who are registered as voters. Second, the selectorate, also known as the real selectorate. They are the electorate who can influence who becomes a leader. The selectorate can influence the composition of the ruling coalition and the population in a broader sense as well as voters in a special sense. Furthermore, the selectorate can access winning coalitions—including challenger coalitions. Third, winning coalition. They are the subgroup of selectorates who keep the incumbent in office and receive special privileges in return. They are also referred to as the essentials, as their support can translate into wins. If enough members of the winning coalition defect to the challenging politician, there is a possibility that the incumbent will lose office. Politics defends and struggles for power.




Figure 4.1 Elaboration diagram of comparison between Leader (*incumbent*) and Challenger in Selectorate Theory²⁰

Borrowing the term of selectorate from Bueno de Mesquita, the kiai is included in the category of the real selectorate who occupy a special position, because the kiai is a respected voter. The kiai are clearly not a nominal selectorate who have no political weight or influence. Kiai here also have access to winning coalitions or challenger coalitions, whose voices in particular certainly influence the developing political environment, both at the elite level and with grassroots voters. Furthermore, with a large network, kiai can enter into the category of winning coalition or challenger coalition, whose support is essential and determines the continuity or termination of an incumbent's leadership.

After all, democracy always provides equal space between voters, but the reality on the ground is often different. There is always a space where the domination of certain groups plays a significant role in the process of electoral political environment and contestation. These groups or figures could be businessmen, political elites, or community/religious figures. Their support, even further their strategy and active involvement, will determine the position and victory of the candidate they support. In the context of Madurese society, the kiai is a main actor who holds great control over people's lives there. Kiai in this context, as community leaders as well as religious leaders in

²⁰ This diagram is elaboration diagram of Selectorate Theory from Lucio Buffalmano, "The Logic of Political Survival: Summary & Review". Thepowermoves.com & Yoav Ravid. "Building Blocks of Politics: An Overview of Selectorate Theory". Lesswrong.com. Accessed on June 9, 2023.

Madurese society, become "the real selectorate" which plays a major role in determining who will win electoral contests.

The kiai as a selectorate certainly have a personal voice, but furthermore the kiai plays a significant role for the surrounding community. The kiai forms a real selectorate that has multiple roles—personally contributing to the candidate's votes and socially, playing a role in controlling the coalition—either the winning coalition or challenger coalition, further increasing the candidate's votes through its various roles and political influence—including the potential to enter into a winning or challenger coalition.

In the context of the 2019 presidential election, there were two groups of kiai in Madura, both of whom had different political support. The first kiai was the NU kiai, who provided support for Jokowi as the incumbent paired with Kiai Ma'ruf. The second kiai were kiai FPI, who provided support for Prabowo-Sandi as the challengers. The two kiai groups as "the real selectorate" certainly had access to a winning coalition for the NU kiai and access to a challenger coalition for the FPI kiai. They could even enter into the winning coalition or challenger coalition space. In elections, the kiai certainly worked and tried to secure victory for the candidate he supported. Political clashes between kiai became unavoidable. As a consequence, the results of the 2019 presidential election were affected by the role and influence of the kiai in Madura.

The kiai interviewed confirmed that the kiai played a role in the vote acquisition for the 2019 presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Both the kiai supporting Prabowo-Sandi and Jokowi-Ma'ruf campaigned in Madura. Victory or defeat became the logical consequence of the fight. Why Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost and Prabowo-Sandi won, can be answered in four parts.

First, the issue of identity politics. The term identity politics refers to the use of social identities, such as race, ethnicity, religion, and so on in politics. According to Tilly (2002) the identity used is an "embedded" identity, that is, identity has a major influence on attitudes and actions, including in politics. Religion is one of them. Religion can influence political coalitions, choice of candidates, or influence issues that develop. Identity can shape political beliefs and actions. Identity politics within certain limits can cause political divisions, this is because identity identification makes voters focus on their own group rather than working for common political interests (Sahabi & Nacho, 2020).

The 2019 presidential election as a political contest saw a great deal of identity politics. Religious identity, specifically Islam, triggers the emotions of the people to negate "them", those who are different from themselves. According to Wimmer (2013), identity

brings its owner into two cognitive schemes. An attitude of dividing the social world into "us" and "them", by offering an attitude of action, how to relate to individuals who are classified as "us" and "them" in certain circumstances. The 2019 presidential election gave rise to *cebong* and *kampret*, a consequence of political support flavored with identity politics.

In Madura, Kiai Wafi emphasized that religious identity still had a big influence. This was because identity, specifically religion, is a personal representation and even a fixed price that is at stake. Especially in regard to the relationship between self-esteem and *carok* in Madura, a tradition that developed in Madura regarding self-esteem. In the well-known Madurese proverb, *angok pote tolang katembheng pote matah* (better white bones than white eyes), which explicitly means it is better to die than to suffer shame. This means that religious identity for Madurese is part of self-esteem, which will be maintained and be a source of honor. Therefore, it is not surprising if there are community groups or some kiai who are very strict in their preaching models, perhaps the effect of one of the cultural values of the Madurese people.

Identity politics worked to dilute the presidential election politics in Madura. The kiai network in Madura also has links with the 212 Alumni network. The FPI's growth before it was disbanded was indeed quite substantial in Madura. Many kiai in Madura, who were initially strongly associated with NU, had recently shifted direction. Regarding his motives, Kiai Buysra mentioned self-existence. Kiai are also human beings, apart from needing food and clothing, they also need recognition, and space for expression, which allows them to gain a stage in society. The FPI as an organization with relatively few followers certainly made it possible for the presence of new figures, the NU ulema who previously, due to lack of a stage, became big figures in their new organization.

For the FPI and the 212 Alumni network, the choice of Prabowo-Sandi was clear. Kiai Asy'ari emphasized this fact. The campaign model used was identity politics as a way to win voters' support. Many kiai in Madura became models for campaigning for identity politics as a way of gaining the sympathy and support of voters. Jokowi was "a henchman of PKI" and "the criminalization of ulema" became a common theme in the 2019 presidential election campaign in Madura. The presidential election was tough, the voters did not even understand what the PKI was, they simply hated the PKI. This kind of political incitement was regarded by Kiai Busyro as very dangerous, because voters did not have the space or more precisely were not given the space to check and confirm the truth of issues or information received as an effect of the domination of powerful figures in their area.

Second, the dominance of social media. The digital political battle and mastery of the issues in it are among the reasons why Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost to Prabowo-Sandi. The political trend which is increasingly shifting to the digital space is one of the obstacles that caused Jokowi-Ma'ruf to lose. Issues of identity politics were packaged in an interesting and provocative manner on social media, ignited public emotions as a whole and in an instant spread widely. Kiai Busyro said social media issues played a major role in Jokowi's defeat in Madura. The media is only a tool, but the narrowing of the communication space and the increasingly wide-ranging issues and information received are controlled by social media. For this reason, social media played a major role in the politics of the 2019 presidential election, including being used as an arena for political jihad.

One of the fundamental roles of social media is to help transform individual, localized and community-specific dissent into structured movements with collective consciousness (Philip N. and Hussain, 2011). This view is in line with the facts that occurred in Madura, personal political views and choices strengthened into regional echoes driven by the power of the kiai's charisma. Social media is a space for communicating political support with structured movements so that it becomes awareness and a collective choice. Here Jokowi-Ma'ruf was unable to dispel the overall collective awareness, even though for example Jokowi had partnered with Kiai Ma'ruf who had an inherent Islamic identity that could not be doubted.

Social media is a scaffold that allows people to easily build the power of political movements. Information technology provides new things, which they did not have before, namely information networks that are not easily controlled by the state. People easily connect with their social network. Building political movements, coordinating, and driving issues that develop in cyberspace. Jokowi with all the power and network structure of his government could not control what happened on social media, at least what happened in Madura indicates that even the incumbent was unable to dispel the power of social media and the issues that develop within it, let alone being supported by the power of the kiai, as influential figures or the selectorate that controls the domination of power and political support in Madura.

The dominance of social media also shows a new political era in Madura. Complementing the two previous theses which explain the political shifts of the kiai in Madura, firstly after the 1998 Reform era, where political freedom opened up a large space for participation—which has had an impact on reducing the influence of the kiai, secondly, after the Suramadu Bridge became operational, it opened up space for economic progress

in Madura, which on the other hand culturally certainly has had an impact on political perspectives and pragmatic behavior in Madura (Haliq, 2014). This study presents interesting findings regarding post-disruption politics, where social media plays a major role in political battles. Political tendencies in Madura in the disruption era tend to use identity politics as a way of dominating issues and influencing voters.

Third, the influence of political ideology. It cannot be denied that religion holds great sway in the life of the Madurese people. Religion is the spirit of life, from everyday life to political activities. The kiai here plays a major role as a religious teacher as well as a role model for the implementation of Islamic teachings. When there is an ideological clash, especially when it comes to Islamic interests, there is no bargaining. The devotion of the Madurese people toward Islam is very solid. That is also the reason why the PDIP has had great difficulty in Madura. There were kiai who were interviewed who said that even if a nationalist-based party had won in Madura, it would actually have been fake, because they could win in the system, but in real terms they would not win the hearts of the Madurese people.

Such devotion towards Islam made Jokowi-Ma'ruf not very popular in Madura. Jokowi was described as a henchman of the PKI, something that relates to a dark history of Islamic politics and kiai. Jokowi was condemned as a president who criminalized religious scholars. Groups that do not agree with and often criticize Jokowi are silenced and jailed, they claimed. This confirmed the view of voters in Madura that Jokowi was not pro-Islam. This ideological obstacle for most Madurese was a big problem. Referring to Satori's (1969) view, this was because ideology can convert ideas or values into social levers, a form of social movement oriented towards shared ideals. Ideology does not settle in the mind, but works in the real world through action orientation that leads to the values that are believed, Islam as the basis of political ideology certainly promises salvation in the world and the hereafter. The implications are serious for electoral politics, because this is not only related to the interests of the world but the interests of the eternal hereafter.

One of the kiai interviewed by the researchers mentioned ideological differences as a reason why Jokowi lost in Madura. Distant ideologies or different political orientations between Jokowi and his supporting party distanced some kiai and voters from Jokowi-Ma'ruf. There are voters who are very serious on matters of ideology, even though we know, there are many academic findings regarding the loosening or eroding of ideology in electoral politics. Today it is difficult to distinguish between nationalist and religious groups, all of which merge within hard-to-define boundaries. In Madura political ideology

still holds firm, in social space the domination of the power and influence of the kiai remains great on the basis of Islamic teachings. The large distance between voters and candidates in Jakarta, because this was a national-level contest, also strengthened ideological politics to work even more.

Kiai Ersyad said Islamic devotion was the main factor why Prabowo-Sandi won and Jokowi-Ma'ruf lost. Madura is known to be thick with the NU tradition, or more broadly *ahlussunnah wal jamaah*. But when it comes to electoral politics, what emerges to the surface is Islam. So NU or *ahlussunnah wal jamaah* in Madura cannot be seen from the attitude of the NU structure, for example, which implicitly provided support for Jokowi-Ma'ruf. The political attitudes of the Madurese people entered into the cultural realm with the support of *habaib* and kiai. They are both considered as representatives of Islam. When a candidate is supported by *habaib* and kiai, in this case Prabowo-Sandi, for some Madurese it is something that cannot be bargained away, meaning that *sam'an wa tha'atan* must be followed. When the influence of ideology is mixed with the charisma of the kiai, it is difficult to resist its power.

Fourth, the kiai's political aggressiveness. The main actors in presidential election politics in Madura were kiai. How did I come to this conclusion? For at least two reasons, first, the structural and cultural networks of the kiai, both from the NU group and especially the FPI, had a direct interest at the national level in winning the 2019 presidential election. Second, voters generally do not have a direct interest in certain presidential and vice-presidential candidates. In satirical language, *sapa'a bhai se kapeleh, mon ngakana pagghun alako dhibi'* (whoever is chosen, if you want to eat, you still have to work alone). Whoever is elected by the community will receive assistance, construction will continue, including Suramadu Bridge, which will remain free. Administrators, cadres and sympathizers of certain parties play a role, but they will not be able to break the waves of the presidential election. Its influence will not go beyond the kiai. That is why when discussing the presidential election in Madura, at least what happened in 2019, it is difficult to separate the role of the kiai. In fact we can draw conclusions, as also expressed by Kiai Imam. The 2019 presidential election in Madura was a battle between the NU group's kiai and the FPI group's kiai. Jokowi-Ma'ruf was predominantly supported by NU kiai and Prabowo-Sandi by FPI kiai. The power of polarization was that strong, as a consequence the struggle for voter support was unavoidable. Kiai were involved as political parties, in the language of Scott (1972) they indulged in patronage and political clientelism. The context of the relationship between the patron-client is established between an individual

with a higher socio-political-economic status (patron) and a person with a lower status (client). The motive for this relationship is the protection or benefits provided by the patron to the client.

In the context of the kiai's patronage, he provides benefits as a teacher, guide, and role model, in which many of the activities in traditional society are related to and involve the kiai. The community feels the benefits of the kiai's role in their daily life, from here, reciprocity occurs. When the kiai needs support, or supports certain candidates in elections, the community automatically, because they feel an obligation provides support for the candidate supported by the kiai. The power relationship that occurs between the kiai and society allows the domination and influence of the kiai. Even though there has been a change in the social and cultural structure in Madura after the 1998 Reform, after Suramadu Bridge, and amid the digital era, it seems that the power of the kiai's patronage cannot be denied. The kiai, with their network at the grassroots, have an influence on the political environment in Madura.

This sort of thing does not only happen in developing countries, even in developed countries, there are elite groups that also influence the political environment in their countries. This is because the democratic space is an open space, where everyone with various backgrounds and personalities can play a role to influence and be influenced by each other. The intertwining of patronage culture and democratic culture, which have similarities on one hand, at least in the open space for fighting for influence, has increasingly made the kiai's position in the Madurese political context relevant.

What happened in Madura, to borrow Rubaidi's term (2016), falls into the category of "old clientelism" which has been widely described in the findings of anthropological and sociological studies in traditional agrarian societies, which are described as relationships between patrons and clients that are relatively stable, enduring and characterized by a high degree of mutual loyalty due to certain cultural, religious and ideological interests. Community obedience to kiai in Madura is mostly driven by non-material factors, namely the benefits of religious teaching and guidance, furthermore eschatological safety.

While regarding the involvement of the kiai, it is certainly not without motive, referring to the findings of Pribadi (2012), the involvement of the kiai in electoral politics is preceded by a calculation of political benefits, the support, furthermore, the political role of the kiai depends on their interests, if it is profitable, the kiai will be closer to the state/government/elites politics, while if it is neutral or even does not benefit at all, the kiai will distance himself. This context can be seen in the 2019 presidential election, kiai who

had an interest in the victory of one of the candidates tended to be aggressive, be it on the basis of ideology, economy, or cultural advantage to maintain the reputation, influence, and existence of the kiai as also revealed in Zamroni's (2008) research findings on the role of kiai politics.

Gill in *Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic Church and State in Latin America* (1998) states that even in institutional power struggles involving religious institutions, there are always worldly motives to gain economic and political advantage. It is not much different from that in Madura, even though the bases of patronage and clientelism of the voters are relatively pure, the kiai's relationship with the political elite cannot simply be separated from worldly motives. Gill invites us to criticize every relationship building that occurs between the state-government and religious institutions such as pesantren-kiai. Several findings in this study confirm the suspicion of more critical power than Gill's findings; the kiai's influence-personality motives, the orientation of material rewards, and the power and networks at the national level.

The kiai's political support, his pesantren network and religious institutions, refers to Gill's view that it is always marked by a worldly orientation. This means that our reading of kiai support in politics cannot only be seen as an ideological battle, but also leads to power struggles and political pragmatism. As voters, the Madurese must of course critically grasp the meaning of any kiai support. What is more, it is obvious that the kiai is a political kiai or a member of a political party, of course the worldly motives of his support will become even more obvious. We are not attributing negative motives to the kiai, but there are also many kiai who slip into practical politics and are trapped in the confines of political pragmatism.

However, we do not deny that there are kiai who have an ideological orientation, as described by several informants in this research, whose support is purely from the *limeslahatil ummah* (Kiai Imam, Kiai Wafi, Kiai Busyro, Kiai Fauzan, and Kiai Yahya) and upholding Islamic teachings (Kiai Ersyad and Kiai Asy'ari), which Kiai Busyro criticized for the fact that electoral politics is muddy and dirty, therefore the kiai should not play at politics or engage in populist and national politics. The later inclusion of Prabowo and Sandiaga in the Jokowi-Ma'ruf cabinet emphasizes how politics cannot be carried out in plain ways, or sincerely in the language of pesantren.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

There are two important conclusions from the findings and analysis of this study. First, regarding the political role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. The Madurese political landscape cannot be separated from the existence of the kiai as an influential figure. Kiai in Madurese cosmology are included in three influential and decisive figures. The cosmology of *Bhuppa Bhabhu Ghuru Rato, Guru* and *Raja* drives awareness and influences the mass behavior of the Madurese people. The kiai's influence is even greater if the person concerned is a direct *santri* from a particular pesantren or a network of pesantren. The emotional bond is bigger.

In the 2019 presidential election in Madura, there were two major divisions among the kiai, the NU kiai group which supported Jokowi-Ma'ruf and the FPI kiai group (which at the time of the 2019 presidential election had not been disbanded by the government) which supported Prabowo-Sandi. The division of the two kiai had implications for electoral politics in Madura. The mass and *santri* bases of the two kiai groups were involved in supporting the presidential and vice-presidential pairs of their choice.

In the context of the 2019 presidential election, limited information and knowledge of voters regarding candidates, the distance between candidates and the capital city of Jakarta, and the strong personality of the clerics in Madura, according to Kiai Busyro, further magnified the influence and role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. The political pragmatism of voters in the presidential election was relatively low. What happened in Madura confirmed the kiai's conception as the selectorate in electoral politics, which could influence the composition of the ruling coalition and the population in a broader sense as well as voters in a special sense (Mesquita et al, 2003). The kiai's strategy, support and active involvement determined the position and victory of the candidate he supported. Kiai as community leaders as well as religious leaders, become the real selectorate who played a major role in determining who would be elected in the presidential election in Madura.

Second, the cultural paradox of kiai politics, which was marked by the defeat of Jokowi-Ma'ruf and the victory of Prabowo-Sandi. Why do I call it a paradox? Because Jokowi-Ma'ruf represented kiai and NU as two entities that have a big influence on

Madurese culture. The influence and role of the kiai is very large and Madura is a base of NU. Jokowi teamed up with Kiai Ma'ruf, partly because of the consideration that the figure of the influential kiai and NU could attract Muslim voters, especially those in the moderate group. However, in Madura, this assumption did not come to pass.

The political paradox of the defeat of Jokowi-Ma'ruf in Madura is at least due to four basic things. First, the issue of identity politics. The claims that Jokowi was of PKI descent, his alleged criminalization of ulema, and other issues related to the identity of candidates in the 2019 presidential election influenced the political map in Madura. Moreover, the FPI kiai network in Madura had links with the 212 Alumni network whose political choice was Prabowo-Sandi. This group is widely known for using identity politics. One of the kiai said that a paid buzzer was deliberately trained in Jakarta by a right-wing Islamic party to spread hatred and division among voters. Identity politics like this harms the sanctity of Islam as a religion of *rahmatat lil'amain*, which should be the axis of peace.

Second, the dominance of social media. Jokowi-Ma'ruf's defeat in Madura could not be separated from the intense political battle that took place on social media. The Prabowo-Sandi support group succeeded in igniting public emotion through provocative content. The content sparked the public's emotions as a whole and in an instant was able to spread widely. One of the fundamental roles of social media is to help transform individual, localized and community-specific dissent into structured movements with a collective consciousness (Philip N. and Hussain, 2011). The dominance of this social media also showed a new political era in Madura. Political tendencies in Madura in the disruption era, at least as illustrated in the 2019 presidential election, use identity politics as a way of dominating issues and influencing voters.

Third, the influence of political ideology. Islam as the majority religion in Madura holds great sway, Islam apart from being a religion and practice of morality, is also an ideology influencing the political tendencies of the Madurese people. It cannot be denied that religion plays a major role in the life of the Madurese people. Religion is the spirit of life, from everyday life to political activities. This fact emphasizes the work of ideology from ideas to levers/social movements (Satori, 1969). In this context, the kiai plays a major role as a religious teacher as well as a model for implementing Islamic teachings. When there is an ideological clash, especially when it comes to Islamic interests, there is no bargaining. Devotion towards Islam made Jokowi-Ma'ruf not very popular in Madura. The view of voters in Madura was that Jokowi was not pro-Islam. This ideological obstacle for most Madurese was a big problem.

Fourth, the kiai's political aggressiveness. There was a big division between the kiai groups supporting Jokowi-Ma'ruf and those supporting Prabowo-Sandi. The two groups represent two mass organizations, Jokowi-Ma'ruf supporters from the NU kiai and Prabowo-Sandi supporters from the FPI kiai. The political segregation of the two indicates that the kiai had an interest in the winner of the 2019 presidential election. Why did I come to this conclusion? For at least two reasons, first, the structural and cultural networks of the kiai, both from the NU group and especially the FPI, had a direct interest at the national level in the victory of the candidate they supported in the 2019 presidential election. Second, voters generally do not have a direct interest in certain presidential and vice-presidential candidates. In satirical language, *sapa'a bhai se capeleh, mon ngakanaan pagghun alako dhibi'* (whoever is chosen, if you want to eat, you still have to work alone). Whoever is elected by the community will receive assistance, construction will continue, including Suramadu Bridge, which will remain free. Administrators, cadres and sympathizers of certain parties play a role, but they will not be able to break the waves of the presidential election. The influence of other networks will not go beyond the kiai.

B. SUGGESTIONS

This study has topical and time limitations, limited to the role of the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. There are many other possible studies that could be developed related to the kiai in the 2019 presidential election. There are at least two interesting things that can be developed from this research.

First, political ideology lay behind the electoral contest that took place in Madura. One of the findings in this study, for example, is why Jokowi lost in Madura, one of the obstacles is because the party base supporting Jokowi had different ideological roots than the majority of voters in Madura, besides that, why the PDIP had great difficulty in Madura because of the constraints of a different ideological base. For me it is interesting to develop research on the work of political ideology in electoral contests in Madura, both in the context of the 2019 presidential election or other electoral studies.

Second, cultural-based Islamic devotion. Even though NU is in the majority in Madura, there is cultural devotion towards kiai and habaib. Prabowo-Sandi's victory in Madura, partly because of the support of many *habaib* and kiai, when the two of them united to provide support for the Madurese community, was something that was not negotiable. This means that the choice must be followed. In my opinion, further research

related to this is interesting, to photograph and read the devotion of the kiai, NU and Islam in general and how the three are intertwined with electoral politics in Madura.

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B. Interview

Interview with K.H. Abuya Busyro Karim was held on April 24, 2023.

Interview with K.H. Kamalil Ersyad was held on April 25, 2023.

Interview with K.H. Kholil Asy'ari was held on May 2, 2023.

Interview with K.H. Kholilurrahman Wafi was held on May 6, 2023.

Interview with K.H. Imam Bukhori Kholil was held on May 13, 2023.

Interview with K.H. Yahya Hamidudin was held on May 15, 2023.

Interview with K.H. K.H. Achmad Fuazan Zaini was held on May 16, 2023.