

The Effect of External Interventions on Civil War Duration

A Thesis

Submitted to the Master's Study Program of Political Science at the Faculty of Social Sciences in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts (M.A.)



by:

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(02222120019)

UNIVERSITAS ISLAM INTERNASIONAL INDONESIA

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Abstract

This study aims to explore the impact of third-party interventions on the duration of civil wars, which are characterized by varying durations ranging from a few days to several decades. So under what conditions can third party interventions shorten the duration of civil wars? To address this research objective, two primary hypotheses have been identified to guide the investigation: (1) the effect of regional versus non-regional interventions, (2) the influence of neighboring versus distant interventions, in reducing the duration of civil wars. To provide a comprehensive examination of this phenomenon, a systematic review of the existing literature has been undertaken, employing quantitative and qualitative research methods. The insights obtained from this study will significantly contribute to the discourse on the role of external actors in resolving civil conflicts by highlighting the conditions under which third-party interventions are most effective in reducing the duration of civil wars. These findings hold valuable implications for the design and implementation of future intervention strategies and for the broader theoretical and empirical debates on the effectiveness of third-party interventions in resolving civil conflicts.

Keywords : *Civil War, External Interventions, Regional, Neighboring, Analysis .*

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ABBREVIATION DICTIONARY

AU	African Union
COW	Correlates of War
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States'
ESD TY	External Support Dataset
EU	European Union
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
PRIO	Peace Research Institute Oslo
UN	United Nations
USDP	Uppsala Conflict Data Program

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Background

Political science and conflict studies both have significant areas of inquiry in the study of intervention in civil conflicts. Civil wars are intricate battles that frequently involve a number of parties, including rebel organizations, governments, and outside forces. Many sorts of external interference are possible, such as military, economic, and diplomatic support. For the purpose of resolving conflicts and preventing future ones, it is essential to comprehend how these actions affect the length of civil wars.

Almost 60 percent of all civil wars between 1946 and 2019 featured foreign intervention, according to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, demonstrating the pervasiveness of external participation in civil wars (Gleditsch et al., 2020). There are a number of reasons why outside parties can decide to get involved in a civil war. One reason is strategic interest, such as securing access to resources or maintaining regional influence.

Another reason is humanitarian concern, such as the desire to prevent mass atrocities or refugee crises. The effect of outside involvement on the length of civil war has been thoroughly researched by academics. One important conclusion is that outside interference can lengthen civil wars by extending the conflict and boosting incentives for both sides to keep fighting (Licklider, 1995).

Yet interventions do not necessarily have a negative effect on the length of a conflict. In certain instances, third parties have helped to resolve disagreements and shorten their length (Walter, 2009). The effect of regional players on civil war duration is one area of study that has attracted a lot of interest recently. Regional players, neighboring states and regional organizations frequently have more urgent and direct stakes in a conflict's resolution than do international powers (Gizelis & Karakoç, 2016).

Research has shown that regional actors can have both positive and negative effects on civil war duration. For instance, neighboring countries may get involved in a civil war to defend their borders or to aid distant relations of a similar ethnicity or religion. Sometimes,

this involvement lengthens the war by intensifying the violence and encouraging both sides to keep fighting (Bapat & Gleditsch, 2013). Regional intervention, however, can occasionally result in conflict settlement and reduced violence. For instance, the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) participation was vital in bringing an end to the civil conflict in Sierra Leone (Kreutz, 2010).

The study of intervention in civil wars is beneficial for several reasons. Firstly, it can help guide policy decisions by highlighting the kind of interventions that are most likely to be successful in resolving disputes and shortening their duration. Second, it can deepen our comprehension of civil wars' intricate dynamics and the part played by outside parties in these conflicts. Lastly, it can aid in the creation of ideas and models for resolving conflicts that can be used in a variety of international disputes.

B. Problem Statement

Civil wars can last anywhere from a few months to a number of years. Some last only a few days, while others last for decades. What accounts for certain wars' great intractability while others are quickly resolved? The length of a civil war is significant for two reasons. First understanding how and why civil wars are concluded by negotiated settlements necessitates an examination of why settlements take so long. Second, the expenses of war are usually proportional to the length of the conflict. In recent years, the international community has been more aware of these costs and has expressed a stronger interest in resolving or at the very least containing long-running civil wars. The international community has paid a high price for these interventions, both in terms of lives lost and the financial cost of long-term peacekeeping operations. Understanding the variables that drive some wars to drag on indefinitely is essential because it can help politicians devise more effective solutions to them (Cunningham, 2006).

In the study of conflict and political science, civil wars are defined as internal armed conflicts that take place within the borders of a single country and involve multiple armed groups that are fighting for political power or control. According to Regan's definition, a civil war is characterized by the use of armed force between two or more organized groups, each of which has a command structure and is fighting for political control over territory within the same state (Regan, 1996). In the world, between 1946 and 1997, civil conflicts occurred more

than four times as frequently as interstate wars, according to Brandt, et al. (2008). Since 1994, the average length of these conflicts has grown despite reducing the number of new hostilities, lasting about four times as long as interstate wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003).

Although civil conflicts cause fewer losses per year than do wars, the total number of deaths they cause during their relatively longer course is substantially higher. Another characteristic of civil wars is the exceptionally high stakes involved. In the case of defeat, both rebel leaders and followers are frequently eliminated since the fighting groups are confined inside the same borders and must coexist once the conflict is over. The duration of a civil war is the single biggest predictor of whether a particular war will end in a decisive victory or a negotiated settlement, according to Mason and Fett (1996), who found that the length of civil wars is directly related to their results (Linebarger, et al., 2017).

Given the importance of a civil war's length in determining how the conflict will end, many researchers have examined and tested the duration of civil wars considering a variety of elements that might lengthen or shorten it (Buhaug et al, 2009). The length of a war is affected by outside interventions, both beneficial and harmful, such as external parties aiding in talks or backing one of the parties to a conflict. However, there are still many variables that need to be studied in the case of external intervention and its impact on the duration of the civil war. In this study, I will try to analyze the effect of the intervention of neighboring countries on the duration of civil wars and the effect of intervention from countries within the region, as these factors are very important in determining the effect of the intervention on the duration of the civil war.

The duration of civil wars is unexpectedly influenced by a number of endogenous mechanisms, which experts have only just begun to thoroughly investigate. The outcome of third-party interventions depends on what transpires within the dispute as well and is affected by an interactive process that frequently includes numerous states as interveners.

Interventions in civil wars may vary greatly according to the type of intervention, the nature of the intervention, and the goal of the intervention. The effect of the intervention may also vary according to the time of the intervention and which side the intervention supports. The interventions are also affected by the identity and regime of the intervening party.

According to the data provided by the UCDP website, external interventions in civil wars have increased in recent times. Interventions are carried out by former colonial powers, regional powers, neighboring countries and superpowers, in addition to international

organizations (Gleditsch et al., 2020). According to Regan (2000), both the rebels' and the government's decisions to continue fighting are functions of their expectations of future victory, current costs, and anticipated costs. Both the timing and type of intervention affect these decisions.

According to Hironaka, "On average, civil wars with interstate intervention, broadly defined, are 300 percent longer than wars without intervention. This effect is extremely large, suggesting that intervention is one of the biggest factors in lengthening contemporary civil wars." (Hironaka, 2005, p. 51). Many scholars agree that all interventions increase civil war duration. "I find no empirical evidence that external intervention is likely to make civil war shorter. Whether interveners are motivated by humanitarian concerns or self-interest, they tend to fail to achieve their best outcome: a faster victory for their protégé or a faster negotiated settlement." (Sang Ki Kim, 2012, p.1). However, other scholars found that interventions could shorten civil war duration if the intervention was designed properly, including Regan and Aydin (2009, 2011) and Lektzian and Regan (2016) as we will see in the literature review.

C. Research Question

Under what conditions can third-party interventions shorten the duration of civil wars?

D. Objective and Significant of Study

The objective of this study is to investigate the impact of third-party interventions on the duration of civil wars. Specifically, the study aims to:

- Analyze the effectiveness of interventions by regional powers and neighboring countries in reducing the duration of civil wars, as compared to interventions by non-regional powers or distant countries.

- Identify the circumstances under which interventions are most likely to be successful in influencing the duration of civil wars and understand the motivations and interests of neighboring countries in intervening in civil wars, and how these factors influence their behavior.

- Examine how the effect of interventions by regional and neighbor countries may differ in their impact on the duration of civil wars, depending on the side they support.

In order to accomplish these goals, a multi-method approach will be used, which will involve the analysis of information on civil wars and interventions from various sources, such as databases on armed conflicts and third-party interventions, as well as primary and secondary sources like academic literature, news articles, and policy reports. The importance of this study rests in its ability to give guidance on the planning and execution of third-party interventions, as well as to shed light on the geographical environment in which civil wars occur and the ways in which outside parties might affect the end of hostilities. Understanding the mechanisms through which interventions can influence the duration of civil wars can help policymakers and practitioners more effectively target their efforts and maximize their chances of success. Given the high financial, social and human consequences of civil wars, which may have a long-lasting effect on the nations and communities involved, this is especially crucial. This study aims to advance our knowledge of the variables influencing the end of civil wars and provide information for the creation of more effective tactics for promoting peace and stability in affected areas by examining the efficacy of interventions by regional powers and neighboring states.

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

A. Literature Review

Many scholars (Regan, 2002; Elbadawi & Sambanis, 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, & Söderbom, 2004; Lektzian & Regan, 2016; Cunningham, 2006; Mouritsen, 2020; Norrevik & Sarwari, 2021) have discussed and tested the duration of civil wars, considering many factors that may affect their duration and whether these factors increase or decrease the duration of the civil war, because of the importance of the duration of the civil war in influencing the outcome of the war. External interventions, whether negative, such as those that support one of the parties of the war, or positive ones, such as those that support negotiations, all affect the duration of the war.

Regan PM (2002) investigates ideas regarding the nature and timing of foreign interventions and the length of civil wars in his research. He used data from 150 wars that occurred between 1945 and 1999, with 101 of them involving outside intervention. There were a total of 1,036 individual interventions in those 101 cases. He utilized hazard analysis, and the results showed that third-party interventions tended to lengthen rather than shorten predicted lifetimes. Interventions that spawned opposing interventions, as well as practically any military or economic action, greatly increased the projected length beyond baseline expectations. His empirical findings indicate that interventions are more frequent during cold war years and in conflicts with large overall deaths, whereas intensity (annual casualties) and the number of state boundaries make them less likely. According to Regan, neutral interventions are less successful than biased treatments. Although Regan specified whether the intervention was military or economic, he did not consider whether the intervening country was a neighbor or superpower, or both. Regan focused on many variables that affect interventions, such as the intensity of casualties and the type of war, and this reduced the focus on the extent to which the type of intervention affected the duration of the war.

By simulating the dynamics of external military involvement and conflict length, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) have added to the theory of civil war duration. They claim that if the government intervenes in favor of the rebels, the cost of sustaining a revolt by a tiny

ethnic minority will be lower and that if the government does not intervene, the uprising will be suppressed quickly. As a result of foreign interference, it is possible that societal division is not a required cause of long-term civil warfare. External involvement, on the other hand, might lower the cost of coordinating a revolt for a given level of ethnic fractionalization, making it easier to maintain a revolt throughout levels of ethnic fragmentation. Intervention may also reduce the cost of fighting a revolt directly if it raises the chance of victory, improves rebel recruitment levels or discourages defections. Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) look at the end of civil war through the prism of the military capacity balance between government and rebel forces, with external involvement as a key factor in that balance. The authors employ anticipated intervention as an explanatory variable instead of present external involvement, which they find to be positively and substantially connected with civil war duration (p. 15). Because of the consistency and importance of this conclusion, they rule out the possibility of inverse causation between the variables (i.e., that interventions occur primarily in wars that are already long-lasting). The authors point out that their findings contradict earlier research, such as Betts (1994), who claims that external involvement has a detrimental impact on conflict duration. However, the authors admit that the results presented are preliminary and need further testing and elaboration (p.16). In addition to the preliminary results, the authors also suggested testing the effect of the intervention in part and whether the partial intervention had the same effect on the duration of the civil war.

Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) conclude that intervention on the side of the rebel side shortens conflict length in their study examining the important structural and variable features that determine conflict duration. The authors classify the intervention as a month-by-month, time-varying variable rather than a dummy variable, in contrast to prior research. They evaluate both economic and military action, as does Regan, but conclude that economic intervention has little influence on war duration. The authors likewise come to the conclusion that military involvement on the government's side is futile and that only military action on the rebels' side is effective in shortening the conflict (p. 267). This idea is also reflected in the work of Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009). The authors focused on several factors that affect the duration of the war other than intervention, such as geography and the type of civil war, while they tested the effect of the intervention on the duration of the war on the one hand and where the intervention leads on the other, without delving into other factors of the intervention. Overall, the study provides important insights into the factors that influence the duration of civil wars, and suggests that certain forms of intervention, such as economic sanctions, may be effective at reducing the length of conflicts. However, the authors

caution that the impact of intervention on civil war duration is likely to be complex and context-specific and that further research is needed to better understand the mechanisms through which different interventions may affect the duration of civil wars. One argument that has been made against the findings of this study is that the authors' focus on economic sanctions as a factor influencing the duration of civil wars may be too narrow. Some scholars have argued that other factors, such as the type of conflict (e.g., ethnic vs. ideological), the level of external support for the parties to the conflict, and the motivations of the parties themselves may be more important in determining the duration of civil wars. Additionally, some scholars have pointed out that the findings of the study may be limited by the data set used, which only includes civil wars that occurred between 1960 and 1999. This means that the findings may not be representative of more recent civil wars, or of civil wars that occurred in other time periods.

Lektzian and Regan (2016) studied the effect of economic sanctions on civil war duration to understand the conditions under which sanctions could affect civil conflict outcomes. According to Lektzian and Regan, sanctions alone are not expected to have an impact on how long civil wars last. Sanctions can, however, support conflict resolution techniques that shorten civil wars when used in conjunction with military operations. The researchers experimentally evaluate these hypotheses using data on civil conflicts from the Armed Conflict Database of the Uppsala Conflict Data Program and data on economic sanctions from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions Database. According to their findings, the deployment of institutional sanctions and military operations as part of a comprehensive international response offers the best chance for sanctions to reduce the length of civil conflicts.

Cunningham's (2006) work comes closest to refining the concept of power each rebel group holds over the government by applying the veto player framework in his analysis of civil war durations. He counts the number, strength, and preferences of veto players, the parties whose agreement is required to end the disagreement. Veto players are self-contained, viable, and independent organizations. His approach, on the other hand, ignores the ramifications of inter-rebel relations, such as the dense alliance between two ideologically opposed groups and its impact on war outcomes, as was the case in Ethiopia's internal conflict, where the Eritrean Liberation Front and the TPLF collaborated to overthrow the government. Cunningham uses the literature on "veto players" to argue that civil wars should be expected to last longer as the number of parties with differing interests who must ratify a war-ending deal grows. According

to Cunningham's empirical findings, the number of participants in the opposition has a significant influence on the length of the civil war.

According to Regan and Aydin (2011), the interrelationships between interveners in a civil conflict can have a cumulative effect on the duration of the conflict. They argue that interveners who act cooperatively and align their interests are more likely to be successful in ending a civil war, while interveners who act independently and pursue their own interests may prolong the conflict. Their findings, based on analysis of post-1945 civil wars, suggest that interveners who assist opposite sides may lengthen the duration of the conflict, while interveners who join forces with opposing sides may be more successful in ending the conflict if the parties involved have similar goals. Regan and Aydin (2011) also note that most interventions in civil wars are not successful in helping to end the conflict, despite the importance of alignment patterns in the cumulative influence of interveners on civil wars. They suggest that the complicated reasons for civil wars, as well as conflicts among interveners, can hinder and complicate attempts at intervention from outside parties. However, they also point out that collaboration among interveners may be beneficial in some circumstances. Using a network technique, they were able to simulate the interdependencies between interveners' actions and the influence of third-party governments' independent activities on the preferences of combatants, providing a more accurate representation of the role of interveners in civil wars.

The study conducted by Mouritsen (2020) sought to determine how involvement influences the length of a civil war. After hypothesizing that foreign intervention causes longer civil wars, the study linked the presence of intervention to the bargaining model of war to explain the relationship. Particularly, the author proposes that intervention distorts the bargaining process, resulting in longer civil wars. The empirical findings of the linear regression analysis demonstrated a substantial, positive link between intervention and the duration of civil wars, corroborating the conclusions of various prior researchers such as Regan (2002) and Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000). Focusing on distinct, more particular features of intervention, it becomes obvious that numerous factors, most notably the presence of competitive intervention, rival intervention and interventions, may be impacting the results.

Norrevik and Sarwari's study is focused on the relationship between the regime type of a foreign military sponsor and the outcome of civil wars. The authors argue that the regime type of an external military sponsor can affect the duration of a conflict and the possibility of a lopsided victory for the backed group based on two dynamics: selection effects and signaling effects (Norrevik, Sarwari, 2021). The study uses a dataset of all intrastate conflicts from 1975 to 2012 to explore this relationship and provides evidence to support the hypothesis that the

regime type of an external intervener can influence the outcome of a conflict. The study suggests that democracies' provision of military backing to belligerents shortens civil conflicts and increases the possibility of a lopsided victory for the backed group.

There has been considerable research on the relationship between third party interventions and the duration of civil wars, but much of this work has focused on the type of intervention (e.g. military, diplomatic, economic), the identity of the intervening party (e.g. the influence of veto players, international organizations, and the type of regime of the intervening party), and the side on which the intervention is taking place (government or rebel groups). However, there has been relatively little attention given to the role of indirect interventions and the effect of interventions by neighboring countries on the duration of civil wars. Additionally, while previous studies (e.g. the influence of veto players and the type of regime of the intervening party) have examined the impact of interventions by powerful states on the duration of civil wars, it has not specifically focused on the effect of interventions by regional powers and neighboring states on the duration of civil wars. This gap in the literature suggests a need for further research on the effect of partial and non-partial interventions on the duration of civil wars.

The "Interventions as Influence" study done by Regan and Lemke explores trends and the efficacy of interventions between 1945 and 1999 and offers a conceptual framework for comprehending how interventions are used to influence the conduct of players in civil conflicts. The study defines many types of interventions, such as direct military support, indirect assistance, mediation, and negotiation, and demonstrates that interventions are more frequent in conflicts involving strategic resources or geopolitical interests. Although acknowledging their dangers and limits, the authors conclude that interventions can have a major influence on the length and result of civil conflicts. The study's careful empirical research and application of statistical techniques are among its advantages. However, the study has some limitations, including the exclusion of recent interventions and the lack of specific analysis of neighbor interventions, which may have distinct dynamics and outcomes compared to non-neighbor interventions. (Regan, Lemke, 2006)

In "The Geopolitics of Civil War Intervention" by Kathman, the author examines the geopolitical factors that drive external interventions in civil wars and their impact on conflict dynamics. The study finds that conflicts involving strategic resources and those in regions of geopolitical importance are more likely to attract external interventions. Kathman also

highlights the risks and limitations of external interventions, including unintended consequences and blowback. The study's strength lies in its focus on the strategic calculus of external actors and its rigorous statistical analysis. However, the study does not provide a detailed analysis of neighbor interventions, which may have different dynamics and outcomes compared to interventions by non-neighbor countries. Despite this limitation, the study is a valuable contribution to the literature and sheds light on the factors driving external interventions in civil wars and their impact on conflict dynamics (Kathman, 2010).

Jacob D. Kathman investigates the regional reasons that lead third-party governments to interfere in civil wars in other nations in his article "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention". He contends that prior research on the analysis of intervention decisions has not sufficiently taken into account the geographical interests of interested parties. According to Kathman's study, when third-party nations decide whether or not to assist in civil conflicts, they take into account the repercussions of regional destabilization. He creates dynamic measurements to simulate the threat of contagion to third-party regional interests in order to test his theory. His claim that third parties are more inclined to interfere when the risk of dissemination threatens their regional interests more and more is supported by analyses of these metrics. The article claims that while considering whether to interfere in a civil war, regional powers take into account elements including economic interests, political allegiances, and the potential of animosity transmission. The risk of outside interference in the conflict increases if there is a chance that the civil war will spread to a valuable neighboring region. The report, however, makes no mention of the possible drawbacks of local initiatives, such as unintended repercussions or backlash (Kathman, 2011).

The author of the paper "Foreign Military Interventions in Civil Disputes," Pelin Eralp Wolak, focused on the importance of shared ethnicity and religion between the intervener and the conflict parties while examining the elements that contribute to foreign military interventions in civil wars. According to the study, shared ethnicity and religion between the intervener and one or more conflict sides were significant predictors of foreign military interventions. The study examined data on 141 civil disputes that occurred between 1946 and 2002. In particular, the study indicated that the likelihood of military intervention rose by 60 percent if the intervener shared ethnicity with one of the conflict sides. The likelihood of military involvement increased by 43 percent if the intervener shared a religion with one of the dispute sides. The study also discovered that a crucial element in foreign military interventions was regional closeness between the intervener and the scene of the conflict. If the intervener came from the same area as the dispute, there was a 69 percent higher chance

of military involvement. These results underline the significance of linkages to certain ethnic and religious groups in foreign military involvement in civil wars, as well as the impact of proximity to other regions. Understanding the causes of the possibilities for foreign military interventions has significant ramifications for policymakers and conflict resolution experts (Eralp, 2014).

B. Hypotheses

In this section, two main hypotheses on external intervention in civil wars are presented. The first hypothesis examines how well regional powers' interventions, as opposed to those of non-regional powers, may shorten civil conflicts. The second hypothesis investigates whether interventions by close allies are more successful than those by foreign adversaries in shortening civil conflicts. These hypotheses seek to advance knowledge of the function of outside involvement in civil conflicts and offer perceptions into the variables that might affect the resolution of conflicts.

Hypothesis 1: Third party interventions by regional powers are more effective at reducing the duration of civil wars than interventions by non-regional powers.

Explanation: There are several reasons why third-party interventions by regional powers may be more effective at reducing the duration of civil wars. First, regional powers may have a greater stake in the outcome of the conflict due to the potential impacts on their own security or economic interests. This may make them more motivated to take decisive action to bring about a resolution and may also give them leverage in negotiations with the parties to the conflict.

Second, regional powers may have a greater understanding of the local context and dynamics of the conflict, which could allow them to design more targeted interventions that are better suited to address the root causes of the conflict. Third, regional powers may have additional resources and capabilities, such as military, economic, or diplomatic levers of power, that they can use to apply pressure on the parties to the conflict or to provide incentives for them to negotiate a resolution. In comparison to neighboring countries, which may also have a greater understanding of the local context and dynamics of the conflict, regional powers may have additional resources and capabilities that allow them to exert a greater influence on the conflict and potentially facilitate a resolution (Jones, 2018). However, it is important to note that the relationship between the type of intervention and the duration of the civil war is

likely to be complex and multifaceted, and there are likely to be many other factors that also influence the resolution of civil wars.

Hypothesis 1A: A regional power's intervention that supports the government's side can shorten the duration of civil war.

Explanation: Due to their proximity and stake in preserving stability in their region, regional powers may be more successful in helping the government's side during civil wars, which can shorten the length of the conflict. Regional authorities can provide initiatives that are more focused and successful because they frequently have a greater awareness of the local context, culture, and political dynamics (Gleditsch & Beardsley, 2004). Regional authorities may also exert more control on the government and other conflict participants, which can aid in talks and the settlement of the conflict (Walter, 2002).

In a civil war, supporting the government's side can increase the government's ability to put down a rebellion and restore peace more swiftly (Gent, 2008). To avoid the conflict spreading to their own territory or disrupting the area as a whole, regional powers could be more inclined to assist the government (Kathman, 2010). Regional powers may also have more resources and clout to offer incentives to the warring parties to settle their differences through the provision of economic help, assurances of security, or political backing (Walter, 2002). It is crucial to remember that the success of regional interventions in assisting the government depends on a number of variables, including the type of assistance provided, the capacity of the government to make use of it, and the objectives of the regional power intruding. The civil war may go longer if the intervention makes things worse or makes the government look less legitimate (Regan, 2002).

Hypothesis 2: Third-party interventions by neighboring countries could prolong civil wars in comparison to interventions by distant countries.

Explanation: Interventions by neighboring countries can indeed increase the duration of civil wars for several reasons. One rationale is that neighboring countries' operations may inspire new, opposing initiatives by other nations. When neighboring countries view an intervention by a particular country as a threat or involvement in their own regional affairs, this phenomenon, known as the "spillover effect," takes place. Because of this, they could feel under pressure to step in on behalf of the other side, increasing the dispute and lengthening its duration.

This idea of spillover effects in civil conflicts is supported by research by Regan and Aydin (2011). They discovered that neighboring nations' engagement in civil conflicts frequently results in a "contagion effect," wherein one nation's involvement sets off a series of other countries' involvement. This ripple effect can intensify the conflict, as each intervention further exacerbates the tensions and prolongs the fighting.

Furthermore, if ethno-religious dynamics are at play, armed interventions by neighboring countries can further lengthen civil conflicts. Civil wars are frequently sparked by ethnic or religious conflicts within a country. When neighboring nations engage in military action, they could support one group because of shared racial or religious beliefs. The warring sides may become even more motivated by identity, which might exacerbate their divides and make them less willing to engage in negotiations or look for a peaceful settlement.

The involvement of neighboring nations can give their favored group military, financial, and logistical assistance, allowing them to continue the struggle, particularly if they unite along ethnic or religious lines. As a result, the civil war lasts longer since the combatants are more entrenched and less willing to compromise.

There are a number of ways that neighboring nations might unintentionally lengthen civil conflicts. First, neighboring nations' activities could be motivated by their own agendas and interests, which might alter the dynamics of the conflict and make resolving it more challenging (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, 2011). Securing resources, increasing influence, or halting the spread of violence to their own region are a few examples of these goals. Because of this, their actions may not just be concerned with ending the fight but also with attaining their own goals, which could make the war last longer.

Neighboring countries could be more invested in the war's outcome, which might result in more forceful actions that prolong rather than end the conflict (Regan, 2002). To balance the impact of other regional actors, they could, for instance, assist one side of the conflict, resulting in a proxy war that exacerbates the conflict and lengthens its duration. As they may not have as much invested in the outcome of the war, interventions by far-off nations may be more unbiased and committed to conflict settlement. A resolution between the warring parties may be encouraged by the fact that distant nations have greater resources and international backing to aid in peace discussions (Walter, 2002). It is crucial to keep in mind that depending on the precise circumstances of the conflict and the type of intervention, the goals and outcomes of interventions by both nearby and far-off nations might differ dramatically. As a result, although a civil war in a neighboring country may have the potential to last longer, this is not always the case and relies on a number of variables, such as the reasons behind the neighboring country's participation, its nature, and the dynamics of the conflict.

Hypothesis 2A: Neighbor interventions in the form of weapons support can decrease the duration of civil war.

Explanation: Under some circumstances, the deployment of weapons support by neighboring countries may result in a reduction in the length of civil conflicts. Because of their closeness to and knowledge of the conflict, neighboring countries may be more successful in providing the fighting parties with military assistance (Cunningham, 2010). This assistance could shift the scales in favor of one party, compelling the other to seek a resolution through negotiation more rapidly (Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, & Joyce, 2008). The specifics of the disagreement and the intervening neighbor's intentions will determine this conclusion, though. The weapons support is driven by the neighbor's own interests and could also prolong the conflict by escalating violence and making a negotiated settlement more difficult (Salehyan et al., 2011).

Hypothesis 2B: Interventions from neighboring countries in favor of the government side can shorten civil wars.

The government's ability to put down the uprising and rapidly restore calm may be strengthened by interventions from nearby countries that support the government side (Gent, 2008). In order to stop the conflict from spreading to their own territory, neighboring nations may be more sympathetic to the government and have a better grasp of the local situation (Kathman, 2010). This result, though, depends on the type of assistance provided and how well the government can make use of it. The civil war may go longer if the intervention makes things worse or makes the government look less legitimate (Regan, 2002). The success of neighborly interventions in civil wars relies on a number of variables, including the nature of the intervention, the neighbors' intentions, and the dynamics of the conflict. While some types of intervention, such providing weapons or aid to the government side, may have the potential to shorten civil wars, other elements may work against these benefits and cause a protracted conflict. By contributing resources and assistance to one side of the conflict, for example, neighboring nations' involvement may unintentionally contribute to the escalation of violence by escalating hostilities and making it harder to reach a negotiated settlement (Findley & Marineau, 2015).

Additionally, neighboring countries may have their own agendas and interests, which might alter the nature of the dispute and make resolution more difficult (Salehyan et al., 2011). Furthermore, the reasons why neighboring countries get involved in civil conflicts might vary, and they could have other motives, such as geopolitical objectives or a desire to preserve regional peace, that could affect their actions (Tamm, 2016). A proxy war that worsens the conflict and lengthens its duration might result when neighboring nations enter a conflict to offset the impact of other regional entities (Byman, 2016). The degree of coordination and collaboration between the intervening countries may also have an impact on how well neighboring initiatives work. When many neighboring countries step in to resolve a crisis, their activities could be more successful if they coordinate their efforts and work together to accomplish a shared objective (Cunningham, 2013). However, if neighboring countries pursue divergent interests or compete for influence in the conflict, their interventions may be less effective and could even prolong the conflict (Salehyan et al., 2011).

C. Theoretical Framework of study

Standard definitions of civil war stress conflict within a state that includes the government and rebels and which produces deaths above a certain number. Civil wars between states can be distinguished from one another by concentrating on their intrastate aspects. To distinguish civil war from one-sided violence, such as terrorism or genocide, it is helpful to specify that the violence involves both the national government and the rebels (Young, 2016). The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) definition of state-based armed conflict, which I have employed in this study for data selection and analysis, is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year.” (UCDP code book, p.1)

Regan (2002a) and Rosenau (1971) define "external interventions" as "convention-breaking military, economic or political activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country that are biased, in support of the government or the opposition, or neutral, and that are directed at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the parties in the conflict." On the other hand, the UCDP defines external interventions or external support as “the provision of militarily relevant assistance by an

outside party to a primary warring party in a state-based armed conflict with the intent to assist that party in that conflict.” (UCDP code book. p.6)

A regional power or regional country is defined as a country that shares the same region with a civil war country, based on the regions defined by the UCDP. The UCDP defines five regions as follows: 1) Europe (GWNo: 200-399), 2) the Middle East (GWNo: 630-699), 3) Asia (GWNo: 700-999), 4) Africa (GWNo: 400-626), and 5) the Americas (GWNo: 2-199).

According to the theory of third-party intervention, external interventions by regional powers may be more effective at reducing the duration of civil wars due to their ability to act as a neutral and unbiased mediator and facilitate dialogue and trust-building between the parties to the conflict (Mitchell, 2002). This may be particularly true for regional powers, as they may have a greater understanding of the local context and dynamics of the conflict and a greater stake in the outcome, which could make their intervention more targeted and effective (Fisher & Keashly, 2009).

Neighboring countries refer to countries that share a common border or are separated by a narrow body of water. These countries are often closely connected geographically, economically, socially, and politically, and their relationship can be characterized by both cooperation and conflict (Dixon, Moon, 2002). Neighboring interventions in civil conflicts are a common phenomenon, with empirical evidence showing that states intervene frequently in their neighbors’ civil conflicts (Gates and Hegre 2015). There are several reasons for choosing to interfere, including worries about war transfer, threats to the stability of border regions, and the potential for refugees (Walter 1997). The possibility of conflict spillover might encourage leaders to act militarily in the conflict because they may see the war in the adjacent state as a danger to their own security (Hegre et al., 2013). Because their citizens might be worried about how the conflict might affect their own security, leaders may also receive domestic support for their decision to intervene.

A neighbor's intervention, however, can also have unfavorable effects, such as aggravating the dispute and escalating the bloodshed, as well as perhaps deteriorating ties between adjacent nations (Sambanis 2004). Therefore, prior to making any decisions, careful thought must be given to and evaluation of the potential risks and benefits of intervention is required. Contiguity may enhance the likelihood that neighboring governments will use military force to intervene in civil wars, but it does not always indicate which side they will

choose to assist. Based on their current connection with the adjacent government, neighboring leaders may choose which side to support (Bremer 1992; Diehl 1985; Gleditsch and Singer 1975). Which side the neighboring government will support in the civil conflict can be greatly influenced by the degree of interaction and nature of the connection between it and the intervening government. The security dilemma theory is one theoretical framework that might assist in explaining the drivers for neighboring involvement in civil wars. This theory contends that nations compete with one another and build up their arsenals in reaction to perceived threats from other states. This can create a security dilemma since one state's efforts to strengthen its security may be seen as a threat by other states (Jervis, 1978). When neighboring governments interfere militarily to defend their own interests during civil disputes, the conflict may become worse and result in more bloodshed. Surrounding states may perceive the conflict as a danger to their own security.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Research Design

This chapter's goal is to explain the research methodology used in this study. The chapter's first section will focus on the instances included in the dataset, explaining the methods utilized for data collecting and coding as well as the operationalization of the independent and dependent variables. The chapter will first give the data description before going into detail on the statistical models that were used to examine the hypotheses. Other crucial methodological issues important to the research design will also be covered in the chapter's next section.

The study will be conducted in a global context, focusing on civil wars that have happened between 1975 and 2017. The countries that have gone through civil war during this time period will serve as the research environment. The analysis will span the years 1975 to 2017, which include the most recent civil conflicts worldwide. The UCDP is one of the secondary data sources that will be used in the study.

The UCDP databases, which include details on the duration and extent of civil wars as well as the presence of outside interventions, will be used as research materials and tools for this project. For the analysis and interpretation of the study findings, the data's validity and correctness are absolutely essential. As a result, during the research process, the sources and validity of the data will be reviewed.

This study uses a quantitative research design, employing descriptive and inferential statistics to analyze the data. It will be a comparative study that compares the duration of civil wars with and without external intervention of the civil wars that occurred between 1975 and 2017, with a total of 187 conflicts noted yearly, 148 of these conflicts had an end date. Over 8,000 instances of external support were also provided to the populations during this time. To do statistical analyses and evaluate research hypotheses, the population dataset, which takes into account both civil wars and outside intervention, have been used. Civil conflicts that meet

the inclusion criteria are included in the study's sample, which consists of 8,986 observations. 250 of these observations do not have any outside interventions.

B. Data Sources

The dataset used to conduct this research is the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset version 22.1, which includes all civil wars that took place between 1946 and 2021. The dataset's main goal is to discover armed conflicts—defined as contentious disputes involving government and/or territory, where at least one side is the government of a state—between two parties that include the use of deadly force.

The UCDP/PRIO dataset's use of a variety of conflict intensity levels to categorize civil conflicts, allowing researchers to identify conflicts with varied levels of violence, is one of its notable features. This characteristic is especially important for this study since it enables testing of the hypotheses using a wide range of examples with various levels of conflict intensity. The dataset divides conflicts into two categories based on their level of severity: those with battle fatalities between 25 and 999 people and those with more than 1,000 battle deaths annually. The UCDP/PRIO dataset takes a more subtle approach to detecting conflicts than previous civil conflict datasets. One of the most popular databases on civil wars, the Correlates of War (COW) project, for instance, only considers battles that had at least 1,000 fighting casualties a year instances of civil war. Regan's dataset, on the other hand, requires a conflict to have 200 total fatalities to be considered a civil war. Therefore, the wider range of intensity levels in the UCDP/PRIO dataset offers a more thorough understanding of the dynamics of civil conflicts.

The unit of observation in the dataset is the conflict-year, where each conflict is recorded in all years where fighting in one or more dyads caused at least 25 battle-related deaths. The basic unit of measurement for each observation is the year. As a result, if 30 people die in a fight between June and September, the year will be considered a year of conflict. However, if the conflict did not result in 25 battle-related fatalities in either calendar year and the same number of casualties occurred between November and February, neither year would be considered one of conflict.

The dataset underwent cleaning to remove all but two forms of conflict in order to guarantee consistency and accuracy in the study. Intrastate conflict is the first and has the code “3”. The government is always on side A in this kind of battle, and there may be one or more rebel organizations on the other side. No foreign nations provide soldiers in this class of conflict, hence there are no side “a” second or side “b” second codes. Internationalized intrastate conflict, which is categorized as type 2, is the second form of conflict. The government is always on side “a” in this kind of battle, and there may be one or more rebel organizations on the other side. Foreign nations send soldiers in this category, thus at least one of the sides is classified as side “a” second or side “b” second.

This study employed multiple datasets to identify interventions in civil conflicts, including the invaluable UCDP External Support Dataset (ESD TY). Especially in complex and prolonged wars, establishing successful methods for conflict resolution and prevention necessitates an understanding of the effects of external players on civil war length.

The UCDP requires that outside support for armed conflicts be deliberate, explicit, and geared toward boosting military capabilities. This excludes advocacy, mediation, humanitarian help, and diplomatic support as well as unintended support brought about by state weakness or by indirect actions like sanctions. If any of the ten categories of external help are present, a score of 1 is assigned. References to outside support that don't name the source or receiver are excluded

The ESD TY dataset offers detailed information on the existence, nature, and source of all parties engaged in civil wars from 1975 to 2017 on a yearly basis. This dataset may be used to identify certain outside parties participating in a conflict and analyze their actions to determine how long the civil war lasted as a result. The ESD TY dataset offers a wealth of information that can be used to investigate the effect of external interventions on civil war duration. It provides a comprehensive and detailed view of the actors involved in a conflict, the type of support they provide, and the timing of their interventions. Overall, the ESD TY dataset is a valuable addition to any research design seeking to understand the complex dynamics of civil wars and the role of external actors in these conflicts.

C. Data Procedures

The dependent variable under examination is the duration of civil war, which is measured in months. All of the study hypotheses that aim to ascertain the efficacy of various interventions in reducing the length of civil wars use this variable as their foundation for testing. Calculating the difference between the civil war's start date – the year in which at least 25 casualties were recorded – and end date yields the duration measurement. The final recorded observation, which is made once a year, is used to determine the end date. It is a well-established methodology in the literature to utilize length as a dependent variable in research on civil wars (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006; Lujala, Gleditsch, & Gilmore, 2005). To precisely calculate the duration of civil wars in this study, we used the widely accepted method of subtracting the start date of the conflict from the end date. The start date was defined as the year in which at least 25 casualties were recorded, while the end date was obtained from the last recorded observation. Using the second start date assures that the conflict has reached a specific degree of intensity before it is regarded to have started, allowing for a more uniform and standardized way to evaluating the commencement of a dispute. By doing so, the issue of incorporating minor skirmishes or occurrences that do not amount to a full-blown battle is alleviated (Lars-Erik, et al., 2013). The end of continuing civil conflicts, which were considered to have occurred on Dec. 31, 2017, was likewise determined using this method. This approach, which has been used in earlier research to determine the length of civil wars (Gates & Humes, 2002; Lujala et al., 2005; Mason, 2011), is regarded as legitimate and dependable.

The type of intervention (regional power vs. non-regional power) and the distance of intervention (neighboring country vs. distant country) are some of the independent variables. The independent variables for each hypothesis are clearly defined and determine in table 3.1.

For Hypothesis 1, the independent variable is the type of intervention, which is categorized into regional power or non-regional power. Regional power is defined as "A state that is able to assert its interests and shape the behavior of states in its region through the use of economic, military, or other means" (Art & Jervis, 2015, p.32). The linear regression equation to test Hypothesis 1 can be written as:

$$Y = b_0 + b_1 * X_1 + e$$

where Y, the dependent variable, in this research design is the duration of civil war, measured in months. To calculate this duration, we consider the difference between the start

date and the end date. The start date refers to the specific date when a particular episode of conflict activity reached 25 battle-related deaths within a year. This date is recorded as accurately as possible. For ongoing wars, where the conflict has not yet ended, we assign the end date as Dec. 31, 2017. This date serves as a proxy for ongoing conflicts and allows for consistent comparison across different cases. By subtracting the start date from the end date, we obtain the duration of civil war in months, which serves as the dependent variable in this research design.

X_1 is the dummy variable representing the type of intervention (1 for regional power, 0 for non-regional power), b_0 is the Y intercept, b_1 is the coefficient for the effect of the type of intervention on the duration of civil war, and e is the error term.

The regional variable for this study was obtained using the COW Country Codes, particularly the Gleditsch and Ward country codes. These codes were used to identify the state participating in the civil war and the sponsoring state. Europe (GWNo: 200-399), the Middle East (GWNo: 630-699), Asia (GWNo: 700-999), Africa (GWNo: 400-626), and the Americas (GWNo: 2-199) were the designated regions. In order to precisely define the regional variable, we utilized a coding process whereby the variable was set to 1 if the third-party intervention was from a country in the same region as the civil war country. By using this method, the geographical variable was accurately defined and the data was ready for statistical analysis. The dataset had 2,138 observations of regional country interventions in total. The coding scheme we used in this study is consistent with other work (Gates and Humes, 2002; Hegre et al., 2013; Melander and Sundberg, 2015) that used GWNo coding to designate regional nations correctly. Cross-national investigations that call for exact geographic classifications can benefit most from this method.

According to hypothesis 1A, regional measures in favor of the government side might shorten the length of the civil war. The support of the government variable was taken from the ESD dataset in order to operationalize this hypothesis. This variable represents the amount of outside assistance given to the government of the civil war-torn nation by neighboring states.

For Hypothesis 2, the independent variable is the country of intervention, which is categorized into neighboring country and non-neighboring country. A neighboring country is defined as "a country that is located in close proximity to another country, sharing a border or a maritime boundary" (Roskin & Berry, 2014, p. 34). The regression equation for testing.

Hypothesis 2 using a linear regression can be written as: duration of civil war = $b_0 + b_1 \cdot \text{neighboring intervention} + \text{error}$, where the duration of civil war is the dependent variable, neighboring intervention is the independent variable (dummy variable for neighboring country and non-neighboring country), and error is the random error term.

In order to obtain the independent variable "neighbor", the COW Country Codes were used. These codes were used to identify both the supporting state and the civil war state. After these states were located, the Direct Contiguity data set (v. 3.2) was used to locate neighboring countries that were not parties to the civil war. After that, a dummy variable for adjacent interventions was generated using the list of bordering nations. A variable was created to test Hypothesis 2, which looks at the impact of distance on outside intervention in civil conflicts, and nearby nations were identified as a result of this approach. Using the COW Country Codes and Direct Contiguity data collection offered an accurate means for locating adjacent nations and assuring the accuracy of the resulting variable. According to the dataset, the number of interventions by neighbor country equaled 1096 observations.

In hypothesis 2A, we investigate how neighborly interventions—in the form of supplying weapons—affect the length of civil conflicts. A binary variable, the weapons support variable, is recorded as 1 if there is evidence of neighboring countries supplying weapons and 0 otherwise. This method enables a clear and accurate calculation of the volume of weaponry support given by neighboring nations during civil conflicts. We seek to test the hypothesis that the provision of weapons by neighboring countries can significantly reduce the length of civil conflicts by studying the influence of this variable on the length of conflict. In hypothesis 2B, we investigate whether interventions by neighboring countries in support of the government side may shorten civil conflicts. In order to operationalize this variable, we used a dummy coding scheme in which situations where neighboring countries offered assistance to the government side were given the number 1. Testing our hypothesis and examining how regional actions affected the length of civil wars depended on this variable.

In this study, the data from the original sources was extracted and put into a panel dataset with yearly observations from 1975 to 2017 using the statistical program Stata (14.2). This dataset was used to run multiple regression models to assess the research hypotheses. Data cleaning was done initially, then descriptive statistics, bivariate analysis, and multivariate analysis was done. The distance of intervention will be the independent variable in the linear

regression model, and the length of civil wars will be the dependent variable, in order to examine the impact of distance on civil war duration.

The analysis's findings are provided in tables and graphs along with thorough justifications. The study's limitations are also examined, and recommendations for more research are made. Stata may be used to analyze data quickly and accurately, giving researchers a solid framework to look into the correlations between their key variables. The study's conclusions offer insightful information on the dynamics of civil wars and outside interventions, which may be used to guide future research in this area and inform policy decisions.

Variables	Frequency	Percent
Regional intervention	2,138	23.79
Neighbor intervention	1,096	12.20
Neighbor intervention# weapons support	357	3.97
Neighbor intervention# government support	472	5.25
Regional intervention # government support	1,153	12.83

Table 3.1

CHAPTER IV

RESEARCH RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

A. Results

In this study, we used linear regression and logistic regression models to examine the relationship between third-party interventions and civil war duration and outcomes. We were able to examine how third-party interventions by regional states and neighboring countries affected the length of civil wars using the multiple linear regression model. We compared the coefficients for the intervention variables and looked at their statistical significance to evaluate our hypothesis. In addition, logistic regression was used to examine the possibility of a civil war ending while accounting for binary outcomes. With the use of this model, we were able to look at aspects other than time that may have an impact on when civil wars end.

Table (4.1) shows the results of linear regression analysis examining the relationship between various intervention variables and the duration of conflicts. The model examines the impact of regional intervention, neighbor intervention, weapons support, and support for the government on conflict duration. The variables are examined separately as well as in interaction with each other to explore potential differences in their effects. The goal of the regression model employed in this investigation is to comprehend the variables affecting conflict length. The duration of disputes, measured in some unit of time (months), is expressed by the dependent variable "duration_m". "Regional_intervention," "neighbor_intervention," "weapons," and "support_government" are among the independent variables. Understanding the links between different intervention variables and conflict length is possible due to the regression analysis. The findings emphasize the significance of regional and neighboring action, the use of force, and political backing as factors impacting conflict duration. The degree and direction of these factors' effects on conflict duration are shown by the coefficients linked to them.

Based on Hypothesis 1, the regression result in table (4.1) demonstrates that regional state interventions are more effective than international interventions at reducing the duration of civil wars. The regional variable's coefficient is -30.90, which means that, intervention by regional power could reduce the duration of civil wars by 30.90 months, all other things being

equal. The geographical variable's p-value is less than 0.001, indicating that the coefficient may be statistically significant. Only 0.5 percent of the variance in conflict length, as indicated by the R-squared value of 0.0050, can be attributed to the regional intervention variable. However, even this small impact size might still be significant, considering the statistically significant coefficient for regional intervention.

In hypothesis 1A, the outcomes of the linear regression analysis in Table (4.1) suggest that conflicts receiving more assistance from regional interventions tend to have shorter durations, as indicated by the negative coefficient for the variable 'government' (-23.05826). Moreover, the negative coefficient for the interaction term 'regional intervention # support government' (-21.12924) implies that conflicts with regional interventions supporting the government often last less time than conflicts with regional interventions supporting rebel groups. Overall, the R-squared value of 0.0178 indicates that only a small proportion of the variance in conflict length can be explained by the examined variables.

Hypothesis 2 claims that interventions by neighboring governments are more likely to increase a civil war's duration than those by faraway countries. According to the results in the regression table (4.1), the variable "neighbor" has a coefficient of 20.44151 and a standard error of 5.897121. After accounting for all other factors in the model, it follows that the length of civil wars should, on average, increase by 20.44 months for each unit increase in neighbor interventions. The neighbor variable's t-value is 3.47, which is statistically significant at the 0.05 level and shows that it is improbable that neighbor interventions have a random influence on how long civil wars last. The regression model's intercept term, which is 247.772, states that the estimated length of civil wars when the degree of neighbor interventions is zero is 247.77 months, or around 20.65 years. This value doesn't have any practical meaning; thus, it should be read carefully. The model's R-squared value is 0.0013, which is extremely low and shows that just 0.13 percent of the variance in civil conflict length can be attributed to differences in neighbor interventions. This implies that additional variables that were left out of the model could have a greater impact on how long civil wars last.

However, hypothesis 2A claims that intervention by neighboring countries can decrease the duration of civil war if that intervention is supported by providing weapons. The regression results on table (4.1) show that the variables of interest (neighbor intervention, support weapons, and their interaction) are statistically significant in explaining the variation in duration_m based on the output that was provided. The coefficient for 1. neighbor is positive

and significant ($t=3.74$, $p<0.001$), demonstrating that intervention by neighboring states is related to longer civil conflict duration. The coefficient for 1. support weapons are similarly significant ($t=12.67$, $p<0.001$), demonstrating that interventions with weapons are related to shorter civil conflict length. When neighboring states supply weapons in their interventions, it may result in a civil war lasting less time than when other countries intervene (interaction term $\text{neighbor\#support_weapons}$ is significant ($t=-2.83$, $p=0.005$) and negative). The R-squared value of 0.0208 suggests that the model explains just a tiny amount of the variation in the dependent variable.

Regarding hypothesis 2B, when the government intervention variable was introduced to the regression analysis, it became clear that neighboring states' activities supporting the government side were strongly related with a reduction in the duration of civil wars. For neighboring countries that side with the government, the coefficient was 71.17, meaning that intervention on the side of the government could decrease the duration of civil war. Neighboring intervention on the side of government can further reduce the duration of civil war. However, the opposition-supporting neighboring states' actions had little impact. Indicating that the impact of government intervention on the length of civil wars relies on whether the neighboring state supports the government or the opposition side, the interaction term between government intervention and nearby countries was also significant.

Through these examinations, we gained a greater understanding of how interventions by regional states and neighboring countries affect the length of civil conflicts while taking into account a number of key variables. The findings of the linear regression analysis confirmed Hypothesis 1, showing that third-party interventions by regional powers significantly affect how long civil conflicts last. The regional intervention coefficient demonstrated that interventions might shorten civil wars and was statistically significant. Also, the regression findings confirmed Hypothesis 2, showing that support from nearby countries may make civil conflicts last longer. Despite the low R-squared values, the regression model's results and coefficients nevertheless offer important insights and further our knowledge of the connection between outside interventions and the length of civil wars. The direction and degree of the relationships between the independent and dependent variables are shown by the coefficients of the intervention variables and their statistical significance.

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m
regional_intervention	-30.90*** (-6.40)					-35.62*** (-4.24)
neighbor_intervention		20.44*** (3.47)				79.23*** (7.71)
neighbor_intervention=1			27.35*** (3.74)		71.17*** (8.94)	
weapons =1			60.18*** (12.67)			57.70*** (11.62)
neighbor_intervention=1 # weapons =1			-34.85** (-2.83)			-76.86*** (-6.27)
regional_intervention=1				-23.06** (-2.99)		
support_government=1				-37.28*** (-7.95)	-22.38*** (-4.95)	-25.71*** (-4.67)
regional_intervention=1 # support_government=1				-21.13* (-2.16)		-13.70 (-1.31)
neighbor_intervention=1 # support_government=1					-128.5*** (-11.75)	-130.1*** (-10.89)
Constant	257.6*** (116.90)	247.8*** (117.49)	232.6*** (94.09)	281.3*** (72.64)	262.0*** (69.79)	262.3*** (52.61)
Observations	8986	8986	8736	8986	8986	8736
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.001	0.020	0.017	0.023	0.053
AIC	119456.5	119489.6	115974.7	119344.0	119289.6	115686.3
BIC	119470.7	119503.8	116003.0	119372.4	119318.0	115742.9

Robust SE in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.1 Linear Regression Results for Regional and Neighboring Interventions

The results of the logistic regression analysis were informative, offering important insights into the connection between outside interventions and civil war settlement. After three rounds, the model showed signs of convergence, with the log probability rising from -6154.0575 in the first iteration to -6091.6699 in the third iteration. The logistic regression model was shown to be statistically significant by the chi-square test of overall significance

(LR $\chi^2(2) = 124.78$, $p < 0.001$), confirming the existence of a link between the independent factors and the dependent variable.

We found that neighbor involvement and regional intervention considerably impacted the end-dates of civil wars by looking at the coefficients of the independent variables. Higher levels of neighbor involvement were linked to a lower chance of a civil war settlement, as shown by the neighbor intervention's negative coefficient (-0.4719892, $p < 0.001$). Nonetheless, a positive coefficient for regional intervention was seen (0.5569435, $p < 0.001$), indicating that greater regional intervention was associated with a higher chance of civil war settlement. A substantial negative coefficient (-0.4010784, $p < 0.001$) was also evident for the constant term or intercept (`_cons`), which represented the log chances of a civil war ending when all other independent variables were equal to zero.

The results of the logistic regression table (4.2) help us better understand the variables affecting how civil wars are resolved. The findings show that neighborhood and regional interventions both have a significant impact on how civil disputes turn out. The fact that neighboring states' involvement in civil wars has a negative correlation with chances of resolution is indicated by the negative coefficient for neighbor intervention. The complexity and difficulty of foreign interventions are highlighted by this conclusion, since adjacent nations may have competing interests or such interventions may deepen rifts already present. In contrast, a higher level of regional involvement is linked to a better chance of a civil war ending, according to the positive regional intervention coefficient. This conclusion implies that regional players' coordinated actions might potentially promote stability and aid in conflict resolution in civil war settings. The findings presented should be interpreted within the constraints of the particular dataset that was utilized in this study, it is vital to mention. Furthermore, the model's explanatory capacity, as shown by the Pseudo R², suggests that variables other than local and regional intervention contribute to the end of civil wars, indicating the need for future studies to investigate these and other drivers.

	(1) failure
failure	
regional_intervention	0.557*** (10.96)
neighbor_intervention	-0.472*** (-6.27)
Constant	-0.401*** (-14.94)
Observations	8986
Adjusted R^2	
<i>AIC</i>	12189.3
<i>BIC</i>	12210.7
Robust SE in parentheses	
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$	

Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Results for Regional and Neighboring Interventions

B. Discussion

The findings of this study help explain how regional state interventions, as opposed to international interventions, are more effective at shortening civil conflicts. These results are in line with earlier studies that emphasized the significance of regional players in processes of conflict resolution and peacebuilding. For instance, studies have shown that regional organizations may be extremely important in resolving disputes and enabling peace accords (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009; Tavares, 2010). Examples of these organizations are the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU). For instance, the AU has played a crucial role in resolving crises in nations like Sudan, Somalia, and Mali by sending peacekeeping forces, mediating peace negotiations, and offering humanitarian aid (Williams, 2011). Similar to how it has done elsewhere, the EU has made a substantial contribution to fostering peace and stability in the Western Balkans through diplomatic efforts, financial support, and the promise of membership as a motivator for change (Anastasakis, 2008).

Moreover, regional actors may have a better understanding of the local context and the underlying causes of conflicts, which can enhance the effectiveness of their interventions (Wallensteen & Svensson, 2014). This is due to the fact that regional players frequently have linguistic, cultural, and historical links to the warring states, which can help with communication and trust-building between the parties (Nathan, 2005). As they are more likely to be directly impacted by the spillover consequences of violence, such as refugee flows, arms

trafficking, and the propagation of extremist ideology, regional players may also have a strong interest in settling conflicts in their area (Salehyan, 2007).

Regional actors may also foster inclusive peace processes that deal with the underlying causes of conflicts by drawing on their connections with local stakeholders (Pinfari, 2009). For instance, by collaborating with a variety of actors, such as civil society organizations, women's groups, and religious leaders, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), a regional organization in East Africa, was instrumental in facilitating the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan in 2005 (Deng, 2010). This inclusive strategy served to solidify widespread support for the peace process and aided in the CPA's effective implementation.

Recognizing that regional players may experience obstacles and constraints in their attempts to settle disputes and advance peace is crucial. For instance, if regional players have strong political, economic, or security links to one of the parties engaged in the conflict, they may be seen as biased or partisan (Brosché & Elfversson, 2014). The ability of regional players to promote peace accords may be hampered and their reputation as unbiased mediators may be questioned. Additionally, regional players might not have the tools, knowledge, or institutional strength to resolve complex and prolonged disputes in a productive manner (Lotze & Terlingen, 2010). To improve their ability for conflict resolution and rebuilding in such circumstances, regional players may need to work in tandem with international partners, such as the UN (Gowan & Stedman, 2013).

The findings also align with previous research that highlights the role of neighboring states in shaping the dynamics of civil conflicts (Gleditsch, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). As they are more likely to be directly impacted by the spillover consequences of violence, such as refugee flows, arms trafficking, and the propagation of extremist ideas, neighboring governments may have a strong interest in the outcome of civil conflicts (Salehyan, 2007). As a result, other states could be more likely to become involved in civil wars, either to defend their own interests or to stop the bloodshed from getting worse. The capacity of neighboring governments to obtain timely and reliable information about the situation on the ground may also be facilitated by their closeness to the conflict zone, which can improve the efficacy of their operations (Gleditsch, 2007). Additionally, there may be historical, cultural, and linguistic linkages between bordering states and the countries at war, which can help with communication and trust-building between the parties (Salehyan &

Gleditsch, 2006). These elements might have a role in the correlation between the length of civil conflicts and adjacent state involvement that has been documented.

It is significant to note that the low R-squared values in the regression models imply that additional variables not considered in the models may potentially have a major impact on how long civil wars last. For instance, the length of civil wars may also depend on variables including the intensity of the conflict, the existence of natural resources, and the degree of economic growth in the afflicted nations (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009; Fearon, 2004). Natural resources may offer financial incentives for the continuance of violence, but the severity of the conflict may alter the desire of the warring parties to talk and seek a solution (Collier et al., 2009). Additionally, the ability of the state and society to endure the strains of civil war and to recover from its effects may be influenced by the degree of economic growth in the afflicted countries (Fearon, 2004). To further understand the complex dynamics of civil war length and the efficacy of various forms of interventions, future study should include other factors and possible interconnections. For instance, it could be possible to investigate the role that international organizations like the UN and regional organizations like the AU and EU play in mediating disputes and enabling peace accords (Bercovitch & Gartner, 2009; Tavares, 2010). Additionally, it is important to look at how external variables like geopolitical rivalry and general economic conditions affect how long civil conflicts last (Gleditsch, 2007).

In addition, it is important to take into account the possible difficulties and restrictions brought on by adjacent state interventions. For instance, close political, economic, or security links to one of the parties engaged in the war may cause adjacent governments to be seen as biased or partisan (Brosché & Elfversson, 2014). This can damage the neighboring governments' reputation as objective mediators and limit their capacity to promote peace deals. Also, it is possible that surrounding governments lack the tools, knowledge, or institutional strength to resolve complex and prolonged disputes in a successful manner (Lotze & Terlingen, 2010). In these situations, surrounding governments might have to work together with international partners to improve their capacity for peacebuilding and conflict resolution (Gowan & Stedman, 2013).

The results of the analysis imply that while interventions by neighbors alone could prolong civil conflicts, interventions by neighboring countries in conjunction with weapons support may shorten their duration. Examining the fundamental dynamics of civil conflicts and the influence of outside players on their outcomes can help to clarify this seeming

discrepancy. According to Salehyan (2007), one reason for this occurrence is that neighboring countries' non-military actions might unintentionally extend civil conflicts by giving one or both combatants access to resources, safe havens, or other types of assistance. The likelihood of a negotiated settlement may be hampered, and the violence may continue.

Contrarily, military help from nearby nations may result in interventions that have a more significant influence on the balance of power between the fighting parties and might hasten the end of the conflict (Cunningham, 2010). The intervening neighboring countries' strategic goals should also be taken into account. Instead of hastening the end of the conflict, interventions without backing from armed forces may be motivated by a desire to preserve the status quo or stop the escalation of violence (Gleditsch, 2007). In such circumstances, neighboring states could be more likely to follow a cautious and gradual approach to engagement, thus extending civil conflicts unintentionally. On the other hand, interventions backed by weapons could signify a more forceful and proactive position by the intervening neighbors, demonstrating a desire to bring the dispute to a final conclusion (Cunningham, 2010).

Furthermore, the way that neighboring countries support the warring parties may affect how they act and how likely they are to engage in peace talks. Armed interventions may change the relative strength of the warring parties, incentivizing the weaker side to seek a negotiated settlement (Walter, 2002). In contrast, interventions devoid of the provision of weapons may not significantly alter the balance of power, allowing both sides to carry on in the hope of securing a more favorable conclusion (Fearon, 2004). It's also crucial to take into account any potential interactions between the features of the relevant civil conflicts and the various forms of interventions. For instance, a number of variables, like the intensity of the conflict, the availability of natural resources, and the degree of economic development in the affected nations, may impact the success of interventions, including the provision of weaponry (Collier, Hoeffler, & Rohner, 2009; Fearon, 2004). To better understand the circumstances in which various sorts of interventions are more or less effective at influencing the length of civil wars, future study should explore these possible interaction effects.

According to the study's findings, interventions by neighboring and regional countries in favor of the government side can shorten civil conflicts. This may be explained by taking a closer look at the fundamental dynamics of civil conflicts, the influence external players have on how they turn out, and the particular effects of backing the government side in these conflicts. The ability of the government to effectively combat the insurgency and restore peace

may be strengthened with the assistance of interventions from nearby and regional countries (Regan, 2002), which is one reason for this phenomenon. This may be done in a number of ways, including by offering financial support, training, intelligence sharing, and military help. By strengthening the government's capacities, these interventions can help the war end more quickly since the government will be better able to put down the rebels or coerce them into talks.

The signaling impact of actions by neighboring and regional countries backing the government side is another aspect to take into account. The rebels and other possible spoilers may be discouraged from continuing their violent campaign by these operations, which might convey a clear message that the government has the support of strong external players (Cunningham, 2010). This may improve the conditions for peace talks and the eventual settlement of the war. Furthermore, the support that insurgents may receive from other external factors, such as neighboring countries harboring grievances against the government or transnational networks of ideologically motivated supporters, can be balanced out by interventions by regional and neighboring countries that support the government side (Salehyan, 2007). Providing assistance to the government will help level the playing field and keep the dispute from escalating into a lengthy and hopeless battle.

The complexity of civil war dynamics has been discussed, as well as the influence of regional and neighboring countries' activities on the course of these conflicts. According to the research, actions in support of governments and those that provide them with weapons can shorten civil conflicts, while those that do not could unintentionally make them last longer. These outcomes can be traced to the influence of interventions on the balance of power between combatants, the strategic goals of intervening countries, and the possible interaction effects between various forms of interventions and the features of the relevant civil conflicts. The discussion has also made clear how crucial it is to take into account the particular circumstances and environment in which certain interventions are more or less successful in reducing the length of civil conflicts. The strength of the conflict, the existence of natural resources, and the degree of economic development in the impacted nations can all have a substantial impact on how effective interventions are. To contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of civil war length and the efficacy of various forms of interventions, future research should study these variables and any interaction effects that may result. The discussion has also highlighted the need to take into account the potential drawbacks and obstacles to local and regional state interventions, such as the perception of

bias or partisanship and the lack of institutional capacity or the necessary resources to effectively address complex and protracted conflicts. Collaboration with foreign partners may be required in these situations to improve the capacity for peace-building and conflict resolution. Overall, the debate emphasizes how crucial it is to comprehend the complexity of civil war duration and the influence outside parties have on these wars' results. Policymakers and practitioners may create more effective plans for dealing with civil conflicts and fostering peace and stability in conflict-affected areas by looking at the numerous variables and dynamics at work.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

A. Summary of Findings

This study explored the impact of third-party interventions on the duration of civil wars, which are characterized by varying durations ranging from a few days to several decades. So under what conditions can third-party interventions shorten the duration of civil wars? To address this research objective, two primary hypotheses have been identified to guide the investigation: (1) the effect of regional versus non-regional interventions, (2) the influence of neighboring versus distant interventions. To provide a comprehensive examination of this phenomenon, a systematic review of the existing literature has been undertaken, employing both quantitative and qualitative research methods. The insights obtained from this study will significantly contribute to the discourse on the role of external actors in resolving civil conflicts, by highlighting the conditions under which third-party interventions are most effective at reducing the duration of civil wars. These findings hold valuable implications for the design and implementation of future intervention strategies and for the broader theoretical and empirical debates on the effectiveness of third-party interventions in resolving civil conflicts.

The results of this study suggest that regional and neighboring interventions can play a crucial role in shortening civil conflicts. Scholars and decision-makers have disagreed on the effect of regional interventions on the length of civil wars. The findings of this study suggest that regional interventions may significantly affect the relative strength of the warring parties, thereby hastening the end of the conflict. This result is in line with other studies that highlighted the significance of external support in determining how civil wars turn out (Cunningham, 2010; Regan, 2002). Nevertheless, it is crucial to note that neighboring interventions may unintentionally extend the duration of civil wars by providing resources, safe havens, or other types of support to one or both sides of the conflict. This may encourage conflict to continue and lessen the likelihood of a negotiated settlement. Therefore, policymakers and practitioners should carefully explore the dangers and restrictions that may be associated with initiatives that don't include the provision of arms and evaluate how those factors might affect how long civil conflicts last. But the findings of this study also suggest

that neighboring interventions, in conjunction with the provision of weapons, might significantly alter the relative strength of the fighting parties, thereby hastening the end of the conflict.

Additionally, by strengthening the government's capacity to put an end to the insurgency and restore peace, interventions by regional and neighboring countries backing the government side can shorten the duration of civil wars. This may be done in a number of ways, including by offering military aid, instruction, intelligence sharing, and financial support. By forcefully conveying to the rebels and other potential spoilers that the government is supported by powerful international parties, such activities may deter them from continuing their violent campaign. In order to contribute to a more nuanced understanding of the complex dynamics of civil war length and the efficacy of different forms of interventions, future research should study these components and possible interaction effects.

Furthermore, policymakers and practitioners should take into account the particular contexts and circumstances in which various interventions are more or less successful in influencing the length of civil conflicts. More potent tactics for combating civil conflicts and fostering peace and stability in conflict-affected areas can be devised by looking at the many elements and dynamics at work. In order to effectively address complex and protracted conflicts, neighboring and regional countries should carefully consider the potential obstacles and constraints associated with their interventions, such as the perception of bias or partisanship and the lack of necessary resources, knowledge, or institutional capacity. Collaboration with foreign partners may be required in these situations to improve the capacity for peace-building and conflict resolution.

B. Contributions to the Field

The study "The Effect of Intervention on Civil War Duration" makes significant contributions to the field of conflict studies and international relations. It adds depth and knowledge to the complex dynamics of conflicts and the role played by other parties by looking at the effect of foreign interventions on the length of civil wars. The main contributions of this work will be outlined in this section, including improved comprehension of outside interventions, empirical data on civil war duration, implications for conflict resolution policies, and theoretical development.

This study's capacity to improve our knowledge of outside intervention in civil conflicts is one of its most significant contributions. It offers important new insights into the intricate interaction between internal disputes and outside participation by examining the causes, forms, and impacts of interventions. Through thorough analysis, the study offers a nuanced understanding of how interventions impact the length of civil wars, giving scholars and researchers a more complete perspective of conflict dynamics.

By providing empirical data on the impact of interventions on civil war duration, the study makes a contribution to the discipline. It adds to the body of knowledge by methodically evaluating data and performing in-depth case studies, and it offers a solid framework for additional investigation. For researchers and decision-makers, the combination of quantitative and qualitative study offers a thorough grasp of the elements determining conflict length.

The results of this study have real-world applications for decision-makers and conflict resolution specialists. Its findings can be used to plan and carry out intervention techniques that shorten conflict durations and support long-lasting peace processes. Policymakers can design effective methods to lessen disputes and promote peace by recognizing the elements that lead to effective interventions.

In addition, this work advances the area of conflict studies in terms of theory. The research presents theoretical frameworks and models that help explain the processes through which interventions might alter conflict dynamics by increasing our understanding of the link between the frequency of external interventions and the length of civil wars. These theoretical developments offer a strong basis for further investigation and development of ideas related to external interventions and conflict resolution.

Finally, the research on how involvement affects civil war length significantly advances the fields of conflict studies and international relations. This research enriches our understanding and provides useful information for academics, decision-makers, and practitioners through improved understanding of external interventions, empirical data on civil war length, policy implications for conflict resolution, and theoretical developments. This work serves a critical role in improving the discipline and directing future research and policies in conflict resolution initiatives by illuminating the intricacies of interventions and their effect on conflict dynamics.

C. Suggestions

Researchers should continue to explore the potential interaction effects between different types of interventions and the characteristics of the civil wars in question. This could contribute to a better understanding of the complex dynamics affecting civil war duration and the efficacy of various types of interventions by identifying the circumstances under which different types of interventions are more or less effective in influencing the duration of civil wars. The involvement of international institutions like the UN and regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) in mediating disputes and enabling peace accords should also be examined in future research. This can provide valuable insights into the effectiveness of different types of interventions and the potential for collaboration between neighboring and regional countries and international partners in addressing civil wars. Researchers should look at how external variables like geopolitical rivalry and global economic conditions affect how long civil conflicts last. This can assist in identifying the larger factors influencing how these disputes turn out and help design more potent conflict resolution and peacebuilding tactics.

The limitations of the study should be noted. Other possible confounding variables that may have affected conflict dynamics and results were ignored in favor of relying on a particular dataset and concentrating on the sort of intervention. Also, control variables like GDP and which side of the conflict the intervention supported were not taken into consideration in the analysis. Future research should take these variables into account because they could have affected the findings. Conflict dynamics and results can be greatly influenced by the economic circumstances of the parties at war and the financial resources available for intervention. The alignment of the intervention with a specific side in the dispute may also generate biases and reduce the intervention's efficacy.

In conclusion, our study has shed important light on the intricate dynamics of civil war duration and the influence of regional and neighboring countries activities on the course of these wars. Policymakers and practitioners may create more successful strategies for tackling civil conflicts and fostering peace and stability in conflict-affected countries by taking into account the unique context and circumstances under which certain forms of interventions are more or less effective.

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Appendix

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Table (3.1): Percentage of Variables for Regional and Neighboring Interventions.

Variables	Freq	Percent
Regional intervention	2,138	23.79
Neighbor intervention	1,096	12.20
Neighbor intervention# weapons support	357	3.97
Neighbor intervention# government support	472	5.25
Regional intervention # government support	1,153	12.83

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m	duration_m
regional_intervention	-30.90*** (-6.40)					-35.62*** (-4.24)
neighbor_intervention		20.44*** (3.47)				79.23*** (7.71)
neighbor_intervention=1			27.35*** (3.74)		71.17*** (8.94)	
weapons =1			60.18*** (12.67)			57.70*** (11.62)
neighbor_intervention=1 # weapons =1			-34.85** (-2.83)			-76.86*** (-6.27)
regional_intervention=1				-23.06** (-2.99)		
support_government=1				-37.28*** (-7.95)	-22.38*** (-4.95)	-25.71*** (-4.67)
regional_intervention=1 # support_government=1				-21.13* (-2.16)		-13.70 (-1.31)
neighbor_intervention=1 # support_government=1					-128.5*** (-11.75)	-130.1*** (-10.89)
Constant	257.6*** (116.90)	247.8*** (117.49)	232.6*** (94.09)	281.3*** (72.64)	262.0*** (69.79)	262.3*** (52.61)
Observations	8986	8986	8736	8986	8986	8736
Adjusted R ²	0.005	0.001	0.020	0.017	0.023	0.053
AIC	119456.5	119489.6	115974.7	119344.0	119289.6	115686.3
BIC	119470.7	119503.8	116003.0	119372.4	119318.0	115742.9

Robust SE in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table (4.1): Linear Regression Results for Regional and Neighboring Interventions

	(1) failure
failure	
regional_intervention	0.557*** (10.96)
neighbor_intervention	-0.472*** (-6.27)
Constant	-0.401*** (-14.94)
Observations	8986
Adjusted R^2	
<i>AIC</i>	12189.3
<i>BIC</i>	12210.7

Robust SE in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Results for Regional and Neighboring Interventions

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


Figure (1) Relationship between regional intervention and the duration of civil war.




Figure (2) Interaction effect of regional intervention and government support on the duration of civil war.




Figure (3) Scatter plot showing the relationship between regional intervention and civil war duration.




Figure (4) Scatter plot showing the relationship between regional intervention and government support on the duration of civil wars.




Figure (5) Relationship between neighbor intervention and the duration of civil war.




Figure (6) Scatter plot showing the relationship between neighbor intervention and duration of civil wars.




Figure (7) Interaction effect of neighbor intervention and government support on the duration of civil war.




Figure (8) Scatter plot showing the relationship between neighbor intervention and weapons support on the duration of civil wars.




Figure (9) Scatter plot showing the relationship between neighbor intervention and government support on the duration of civil wars.