

**ANALYSIS OF INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN FACING
GEOPOLITICAL DYNAMICS IN THE INDO-PACIFIC:
COMPARATIVE FOREIGN POLICY OF SUSILO BAMBANG
YUDHOYONO (2004-2014) AND JOKO WIDODO (2014-
ONWARDS) ADMINISTRATIONS**

A Thesis

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Analysis of Indonesian Foreign Policy in Facing Geopolitical Dynamics in the Indo-Pacific: Comparative Foreign Policy of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Joko Widodo (2014-Onwards) Administrations

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ABSTRACT

Today the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region has become a question of international concern. The area is also a theater of conflict between regional and great-power countries. Therefore, considering that Indonesia is the Indo-Pacific region's epicenter, the country must adjust its foreign policy in the region. This study examines distinct approaches to the management of the geopolitical dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region during the administrations of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), with particular focus on how Indonesia responds to conflicts in the South China Sea. The research method in this study is qualitative, using a descriptive approach and developing theories and concepts in the analysis process based on the data collected. This study uses primary and secondary data to gain information about Indonesia's policy strategy and behavior. In analyzing Indonesia's foreign policy, this study looks at the enmeshment strategy from the perspective of hedging theory. Furthermore, this study uses idiosyncratic theory as an analytical knife to see why the two governments took different positions. The results of this study indicate that Indonesia's foreign policy during both the SBY and Jokowi administrations in dealing with geopolitical turmoil in the Indo-pacific, especially in the South China Sea conflict, used an enmeshment strategy. However, the difference is that during SBY's time, Indonesia's foreign policy approach was more likely to be normative and globalist, while during the Jokowi administration, it has tended to be more assertive and pragmatic. In addition, the results of the idiosyncratic theory analysis found that the leader's personality type had implications for leadership style and foreign policy decisions. Therefore, the SBY and Jokowi administrations have different foreign policy approaches in dealing with geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-pacific.

Keywords: *Indo-Pacific, South China Sea, Indonesia, Foreign Policy, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), Joko Widodo (Jokowi), Hedging, Enmeshment, Idiosyncratic.*

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ABBREVIATION DIRECTORY

ACFTA	: ASEAN-China Free Trade Area
ADMM+	: ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus
AIPR	: ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation
AMF	: ASEAN Maritime Forum
AMM	: ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting
AOIP	: ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific
APEC	: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	: ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASO	: ASEAN Security Outlook
AUKUS	: Australia, United Kingdom, and United States
BIT	: Bilateral Investment Treaty
BRF	: Belt and Road Forum
BRI	: Belt and Road Initiative
CBM	: Confidence-Building Measures
CEPA	: Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement
COC	: Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea
CPA	: Comprehensive Partnership Arrangement
DFA	: Defense Framework Arrangement
DIB	: Defense Institution Building
DOC	: Declaration on the Conduct
EAS	: East Asia Summit
ECOTECH	: Economic and Technical Cooperation
EEZ	: Exclusive Economic Zone
FMF	: Foreign Military Financing
FMS	: Foreign Military Sales Free Trade Agreement (FTA),
GMA	: Global Maritime Axis
GMF	: Global Maritime Fulcrum

GPC	: Great Power Competition
IPEF	: Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
Jokowi	: Joko Widodo
JWG	: Joint Working Group
MEF	: Minimum Essential Force
MoUs	: Memoranda of Understanding
PTA	: Preferential Trade Agreement
QUAD/QSD	: Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
RCEP	: Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
SBY	: Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono
SDGs	: Sustainable Development Goals
SEANWFZ	: Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone
SMEs	: Small and Medium Enterprises
SOEs	: State-Owned Enterprises
SOM	: Senior Officials Meeting
TAC	: Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
UN	: United Nations
UNCLCS	: United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf
US	: United States

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A. Problem Statement

Today, the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific has become a question of international concern. The transformation of the Asia-Pacific into the Indo-Pacific has led to debates within geopolitical studies regarding its conceptual interpretation. Several countries have tried to conceptualize the Indo-Pacific according to their perspectives, such as the United States, Japan, India, Australia, and even Indonesia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) (Yadav, 2022).

Despite its recent surge in popularity during the 21st century, it is worth noting that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is not entirely novel. This term of Indo-Pacific has been in existence since the 19th century. In his article titled "*The Influence of Sea Power Upon History: 1660-1783*," published in 1890, Alfred Thayer offers insights into the dynamics of sea power conflicts within the Indo-Pacific region (Yadav, 2022). Moreover, in the 1920s-1930s, Karl Haushofer, a prominent German geographer and geopolitician, introduced the concept of the "*Indopazifischen Raum*" or "*Indo-Pacific space*". Haushofer aimed to establish a connection between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, envisioning this region as a means to promote Asian anti-colonialism and advance Germany's geopolitical objectives on a global scale (Li, 2022).

However, prior to the early 21st century, the term was not part of the economic, political, or security lexicon (Li, 2022). Consequently, it was inconsequential within the area of international politics and international relations literature. It was only in 2005 that the term Indo-Pacific began to emerge in international relations literature in an article on Australia-Southeast Asia relations, and a security article discussing India-Japan cooperation on sea lanes in 2007 (Richardson, 2005; Khurana, 2007).

The concept of the Indo-Pacific gained traction in the political sphere when Shinzo Abe, the prime minister of Japan, in 2007, introduced the Indo-Pacific concept in a speech titled "Confluence of the Two Seas". In his speech, Abe presented a concept of a dynamic strategic relationship between the Indian and Pacific Oceans through expanding and strengthening cooperation to create a free and open Indo-Pacific region (D'Ambrigo, 2021).

Since then, the development of concepts related to the Indo-Pacific has become increasingly popular. In 2010, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton noted "how important the Indo-Pacific basin is for trade" (Clinton, 2010). By 2013, Australia had, in its Defense White Paper, made the Indo-Pacific the focus of its economic and military strategy (Government of Australia, 2013). It was not until 2017 that the concept of the Indo-Pacific once again captured the world's attention, particularly the states in the region. This was triggered when the US, under the leadership of President Trump, promoted a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" strategy (White House, 2017).

Various views, foreign policies, and even regional alliances toward the Indo-Pacific have been formed, including the FOIP, the US Indo-Pacific Command, the Act East Policy, the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), the New Southern Policy, the European Union Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and various alliances, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD/QSD) and the Australia, United Kingdom, and United States (AUKUS) defense partnership, as well as other interventions and propaganda from superpowers towards small and medium countries (Yadav, 2022, p.vi).

The various conceptions of the Indo-Pacific have recently emerged as a focal point of strategic debate on the political stage, which certainly also affects the dynamics of global politics and security. As a result, this change in the utilization of geographical concepts affects the way states perceive the regional strategic order, regional challenges and issues, and how they manage and respond to regional conditions.

Furthermore, the Indo-Pacific has risen as a significant region for global strategy, including the growth of military power projections of Indo-Pacific countries and superpowers. As a region at the center of strategic geopolitical security, the Indo-Pacific is not only a locus of opportunity for cooperation, it is also a theater of conflict between regional countries and great powers. The South China Sea dispute is one of the significant geopolitical issues that has become a central point of contention in the Indo-Pacific region.

The geographical scope of the varying interpretations of the Indo-Pacific extends from India to Southeast Asian nations, as well as the oceanic expanse from the eastern Indian Ocean to the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea (Haruko, 2020). In this regard, the South China Sea is considered a crucial area within the Indo-Pacific. The South China Sea's potential and strategic value for the economy has given it immense geopolitical and strategic importance in the Indo-Pacific region. Not only is it a crucial trade route for major countries like China, India, Australia, and the US, it is also home to diverse ecosystems and rich biodiversity. Furthermore, the South China Sea is the main pulse of world trade traffic, global supply chains, international distribution networks, centers of economic gravity, politics, and strategic interests.

Amid its economic significance, various disputes and conflicts exist. As a result, whatever happens in the South China Sea will significantly impact regional political stability and security. Moreover, the political landscape of the South China Sea is complex and multifaceted. Despite the tensions between disputing countries over overlapping territorial claims, it is a scene of geostrategic contestation and competing interests between great powers (Laksmana, 2018). The South China Sea is a major area of contention in the broader context of the Indo-Pacific, with many countries vying for control and influence in the region.

China's ongoing expansion of territorial claims and increasing military capabilities and presence have prompted efforts from great powers, including Japan, India, Australia, and particularly the US, to prevent Chinese dominance. These countries have begun to strengthen cooperation and build regional alliances to increase their bargaining power and economic, political, and military influence

the Indo-Pacific region (Scott, 2018, p.26). Hanif and Khan (2018) notes that to cooperate and strengthen relations with countries in the region, the US is trying to ensure that developing countries in Asia-Pacific receive equal military assistance that will continue to be increased, which aims to contain China's power (Hanif & Khan, 2018).

Tensions between the US and China could potentially create fuel for a geopolitical fire. Lynch and Saunders (2022) say the strategic interests of China and the US in the Indo-Pacific region are not aligned with other regions (Lynch & Saunders, 2022). Hence, the Indo-Pacific region is used as a geostrategic focus for China and the US and as a great power competition (GPC) area. Consequently, the dynamics of conflict in the South China Sea have become more complex with the involvement of many actors and the intersection of various strategic interests. At the end of the day, this poses a complex and diverse set of long-term strategic and short-term operational challenges that affect political stability and security in the region. Therefore, with increasing geopolitical and geostrategic competitiveness, Asian countries face an increasing set of strategic challenges.

Asian countries, including Indonesia, are becoming more vigilant, especially with the increasing competition between the US and China. As a country with significant influence, instability could pose a danger to Indonesia's leadership and influence in the region, especially in Southeast Asia (Sulaiman, 2019, p.6). However, the geopolitical turmoil in the Indo-Pacific has created a security dilemma that Indonesia must pay close attention to in taking comprehensive strategic measures for the country's development and defense. Sung Chul Jung (2020) emphasizes that the individual and collective behavior of the middle-powers countries, such as Indonesia, can potentially affect great power competition in the region.

Given its very dynamic position at the geopolitical junction of the region, Indonesia needs to make an effort to influence geopolitics to support a better regional ecosystem and not allow the region to become an arena for mere contests of interest. In 2013, through foreign minister Marty Natalegawa, Indonesia proposed the "Indo-Pacific Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" to emphasize

strengthening mutual trust and ruling out the use of force in resolving disputes (Anwar, 2020). Marty highlighted the importance of perceiving alterations in regional equilibrium not solely as a source of concern but also as a potentially propitious transformation that generated prospects for collaboration across diverse domains such as economics, politics, and security. Embracing the principle "a thousand friends and zero enemies", the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) government was committed to nurturing favorable associations with all countries while actively steering clear of confrontation or animosity.

Later, in 2014, during the tenure of President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), the Indonesian government embraced the concept of the "World Maritime Axis" as a framework for shaping the country's foreign policy and strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. This approach was driven by national interests with an emphasis on projecting Indonesia's influence as a prominent maritime power within the Pacific and Indian Ocean Region (Setkab., 2014). In addition, during the Jokowi administration, Indonesia's foreign policy shifted to be more economic in focus. Furthermore, in 2017, the government proposed creating an Indo-Pacific cooperation framework, now known as the AOIP, in response to the escalating tensions among major powers in the region (BPPK, 2019).

As a country that is in the middle of the contest of great powers, especially the US and China, Indonesia must observe the situation and take the right steps in its foreign policy and the patterns of interaction between them so as not to be trapped in a power struggle that could certainly disrupt regional stability in fighting for its national interests (Laksmana, 2021, p.3). Therefore, considering that Indonesia is the epicenter in the Indo-Pacific region, it must adjust its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia needs a comprehensive and objective analysis of its foreign policy's basic principles and objectives. As a middle power, Indonesia's response to the turbulent situation in the Indo-Pacific region will have a significant effect on the political stability and security of the region. Thus, in taking a more active role, Indonesia must be careful in determining its foreign policy.

The existing literature on the Indo-Pacific has several recurring themes (see: Khuhro, 2019; Lynch & Saunders, 2022; Hanif & Khan, 2018; Zafar, 2022; Khasru, 2017). Nevertheless, most literature focuses only on the competition between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific region. It does not include a significant discussion of Indonesia's role as one of the region's most influential countries in dealing with the existing contest and maintaining regional security stability. Hence, it seems to assume that Southeast Asian countries are only spectators in the upheaval in the Indo-Pacific region. In fact, Indonesia is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that have a significant role in shaping regional dynamics in the Indo-Pacific and creating regional security stability. There have been discussions about Indonesia's strategy in the Indo-pacific (see example: Messelaar, 2017; Laksmana, 2021; Anwar, 2020; Agastia & Perwit, 2015; Sulaiman, 2019; Jung, 2020; Shekar, 2018), but the previous literature only focuses on AOIP and Indonesia and Jokowi's maritime fulcrum policy.

There is not much scholarly literature examining Indonesia's foreign policy as a pivotal player in the Indo-Pacific region amid tumultuous times, spanning from the SBY administration to the current Jokowi administration. Assessing the trajectory of Indonesia's political and diplomatic stance within the region is both imperative and stimulating. To augment prior research, the crucial aspect that will differentiate the analysis the author will undertake pertains to the execution of Indonesia's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region through hedging theory. This study centers on scrutinizing the strategy of engagement and enmeshment employed to navigate circumstances in the Indo-Pacific. It will examine the trend of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy strategy in responding to geopolitical turmoil, achieving its interests and maintaining political and security stability in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this study will analyze idiosyncratic theory to determine the differences between SBY and Jokowi's foreign policy approaches.

B. Research Question

How did Indonesia's foreign policy approaches in facing Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamics differ between the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Joko Widodo (2014-present) administrations?

C. Objective of Study

The main objective of this study is to analyze how Indonesia's foreign policy approaches in facing Indo-Pacific geopolitical dynamics differ between the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Joko Widodo (2014-present) administrations. Why is this study focused on the SBY and Jokowi administrations? Because in both these periods, the idea of the Indo-Pacific began to reemerge and became the focus of the policies of great powers and the countries of the Indo-Pacific region. In addition, there are differences in foreign policy orientation during the SBY and Jokowi administrations. Consequently, it is essential to investigate the orientation of Indonesian foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific during the SBY and Jokowi administrations.

D. Significance of Study

Currently, the Indo-Pacific is a hot topic of discussion at the international level, making the Indo-Pacific strategic, substantial and interesting to explore further. Moreover, geopolitical constructions, opportunities, potential threats, and responses to dynamic situations in the Indo-Pacific region are interesting to discuss. The Indo-pacific region has become a battlefield and locus of competition for great powers to expand their influence, so real threats to regional stability cannot be avoided. Thus, this turbulent situation is a problem that must be studied to see how the coordination and growth of regional security will be improved in the future.

Moreover, Indonesia has significant influence in the region. Its strategic position at the center of Indo-Pacific coordination requires it to play an active role in the region. Indonesia must be able to maintain and position itself appropriately, especially as a non-aligned power (Yanuarti et al., 2020, p. 43). If it does not have

the right strategy, its position as the Indo-Pacific focal point will actually become a boomerang against it. Therefore, looking at Indonesia's foreign policy strategy in the Indo-Pacific is an exciting and important study.

Academically, this study aims to contribute further information and understanding to the Indo-Pacific discussion, especially in examining Indonesia's foreign policy orientation as a middle power with a strategic position in facing the situation in the Indo-Pacific. Thus, it is expected to be used as a reference in further research related to the discussion in this thesis. In addition, it is expected to be a comparison for other students with the same concerns while providing the practical benefit of offering more detailed information in additional literature to find out more about Indonesia's policies in the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, it can contribute ideas for academics and the government, especially policymakers, in evaluating and formulating further policies to produce a more comprehensive policy strategy.

CHAPTER II

THEORITICAL FOUNDATION

A. Theoretical Framework

a. Hedging Theory

Many researchers and analysts have observed that countries in Southeast Asia are using hedging strategies in response to the current evolving geopolitical situation and regional order. The research of Gill Bates, Evelyn Goh, and Chin Hao Huang demonstrates that Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia are some of the countries in Southeast Asia that employ the most dominant hedging strategies (Gill, et.al., 2016, p.7). Strategically located at the crossroads of the Indo-Pacific, Indonesia's responses, attitudes, and policies will significantly impact how it interacts with other players in the region. Therefore, this study will use hedging strategic theory to review and analyze Indonesian foreign policy toward the turbulent situation in the Indo-Pacific region under SBY and Jokowi administrations.

When discussing a behavior of how a state handles changes in the dynamic balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, more recent research literature and policy publications have begun to utilize the word "hedging" as an alternative to the terms "balancing" and "bandwagoning". According to Amitav Acharya (2003), the narrow paradox between balancing and bandwagoning is not comprehensive enough to understand the various responses of Southeast Asian countries in the face of geopolitical instability in the region. He claims that the behavior of Southeast Asian countries might be characterized as "hedging" (Acharya, 2003, p.153). This term refers to a circumstance in which countries are confused whether to strike a balance, join a bandwagon, or maintain their neutral position. Acharya further explains that ASEAN countries espouse the term "double binding", where countries are reluctant to choose one of the two great powers: the US and China. They instead establish institutional relationships with both (Acharya, 2003, pp. 149-64).

This is similar to Medeiros' research, which states that economic interdependence encourages the region to call for economic integration and expand multilateral cooperation so that Southeast Asian countries tend to adopt a hedging strategy by establishing good relations with the US and China and not choose just one of them (Medeiros, 2005, p.146). Moreover, the article "The Indo-Pacific Strategy and US Alliance Network Expandability: Asian Middle Powers' Positions on Sino-US Geostrategic Competition in Indo-Pacific Region" by Sung Chul Jung explains that to maintain order according to the rules and save themselves from being entangled in a power struggle by the great powers, the medium and small states prefer to engage in regional multilateral cooperation rather than choosing one side over the other. These states are cautious in their stance by ensuring that their strategy is economically beneficial and enhances security while at the same time helping to de-escalate potential damage amid great power competition (Jung, 2020, p.4).

Meanwhile, Fiori notes that a hedging strategy is a set of procedures and policies that a country uses to make sure it does not choose the wrong side of a conflict or issue, which could jeopardize the state because it cannot be sure of other countries' intentions (Fiori, 2013, p.8). According to Brock, in the midst of unipolarity, Southeast Asian countries take into consideration that the US is the world police that guarantees regional security (Brock, 2012). Therefore, hedging strategies can help second-tier countries, in particular, overcome the threats and constraints of strategic uncertainty due to the rise of new regional powers. The hedging strategy will serve as a policy tool to maintain the security stability created by the existing hegemony and, at the same time, protect themselves from threats from rising regional powers (Brock, 2012).

Moreover, experts such as Evelyn Goh and Cheng-Chwee Kuik, have been staunch proponents of hedging strategies as a way to determine the response of governments in Southeast Asia in the face of volatile geopolitical situations. Evelyn Goh asserts that strategic hedging is a set of strategies, attitudes, or responses adopted by the states in a circumstance in which the state

is unable to pick options in balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead, it chooses to be in the middle of the power to reduce losses (Goh, 2005, p. viii).

Goh further explained that this hedging strategy could be applied when a country was able to simultaneously implement engagement policies and indirect policies, or soft balancing, so that the country could build a middle position that aimed to prevent the country from being forced to choose one party by ignoring and harming the other party. In the theory of hedging strategies, Goh emphasized that countries can adopt three variations of strategies. The first is soft balancing or indirect balancing. The second is engagement, which is complex engagement at political, economic, and strategic levels. Third are enmeshment strategies, namely the involvement of major countries in the region aiming to ensure the regional order's stability (Goh, 2005, pp.3-4).

While Goh describes strategic hedging as a middle position, Kuik interprets strategic hedging as an opposite or contradictory position because it simultaneously applies two sets of opposing policies, which Kuik refers to as "return maximizing" and "risk contingency" (Kuik, 2013, p.7). In other words, strategic hedging is a two-pronged approach. On the one hand, the state executes a hedging strategy through policies that can expand and strengthen constructive relations with great powers to maximize economic, political and diplomatic benefits. Nevertheless, at the same time, the state tries to minimize losses or long-term dangers from the potential threat of emerging great powers. The goal is to protect its national interests if the strategy or policy does not work as planned (Kuik, 2008, p.171).

Furthermore, Kuik explained that there are five policy instruments that the state can carry out in the hedging strategy, namely indirect balancing, dominance denial, economic pragmatism, binding engagement, and limited bandwagoning (Kuik, 2008, p.166). In addition, Kuik stated that three conditions were necessary to implement the hedging strategy. First, no direct threat could force a country to ally with a power to get protection. Second, ideological differences had to be absent, as they could divide countries into opposing camps, such as during the Cold War. Third, great power competition

had to be absent, as it could force small countries to choose a particular side. If one of these conditions existed, Kuik maintained, ensuring the continuity of its survival would allow a country to switch from a hedging strategy to a pure balancing or bandwagoning strategy (Kuik, 2008, p.165).

However, each country has decided to take different policy options in implementing hedging strategies based on its respective perceptions. In order to analyze Indonesia's hedging strategy in the context of relations with great powers in the region, this thesis will consider the hedging strategy from Evelyn Goh's perspective. The hedging strategy policy instruments proposed by Goh will be analyzed to identify and explore Indonesia's hedging strategy in dealing with the region's geopolitics. Furthermore, this thesis will operationalize Indonesia's hedging strategy in relation to the US and China by focusing on the spectrum of engagement and enmeshing strategies. This thesis will employ an engagement and enmeshment strategy to understand Indonesia's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific during the SBY and Jokowi administrations.

b. Enmeshment Strategy

The term "enmeshment" arises from constructivist law and international relations theory. Compliance with a set of rules and regulations is the primary objective of an enmeshment approach. Involvement and collaboration are the primary mechanisms by which actors get "entangled" in a rule framework (Jackson, 2012, p.40). In the enmeshment strategy, participation in a system or regime is assumed to have a socializing impact on actors, who subsequently align their interests with those of other participants and modify their long-term behavior appropriately (Jackson, 2012, p.40). A more positive set of assumptions regarding socialization's efficacy and the constraints of laws and norms underpins the enmeshment framework.

Evelyn Goh, in his article "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing Regional Security Strategies", identifies the strategic behavior patterns of Southeast Asian countries. Goh argues that one of the most apparent threats to Southeast Asian countries is the shift toward a multipolar

regional system, where major powers compete with one another. According to him, the best way that countries in Southeast Asia can do this is through an omni-enmeshment strategy. Goh then defines this strategy as:

“[A] process of engaging with a state so as to draw it into deep involvement into international and regional society, enveloping it in a web of sustained exchanges and relationships, with the long-term goal of integration. In the process, the target state’s interests are redefined, and its identity possibly altered, so as to take into greater account the integrity and order of the system” (Goh, 2007, p. 121)

This demonstrates that the enmeshment strategy involves including all major powers in regional strategic affairs rather than sidelining them or favoring one over the other. The strategy refers to an action that promotes regional security structures by increasing the participation of great powers through their involvement in regional institutions and through bilateral and multilateral cooperation with individual member states (Goh 2007, p.122).

Furthermore, Goh portrays the omni-enmeshment strategy as a way for secondary countries to avoid a competitive multipolar regional system by engaging with various regional and international partners through economic relations, security, and political dialogues. As a result, countries create a network of sustainable relationships based on long-term integration to agree on a code of conduct based on common interests that refer to forming a security community. With the belief that countries have interrelated interests, they are less likely to act aggressively towards each other. Beyond this, the relationship will strengthen economic ties and build more dialogue on security and political issues (Goh, 2007, pp. 121-2).

The main focus of this strategy lies in the value of state interaction within regional and international institutions that support norms of non-aggression and transparency (Goh, 2007, pp. 121-3). Meanwhile, the goal is to prevent and deal with various threats that can occur between major powers in the regional scope or aggression by superpowers against small and weak countries to ensure regional stability (Goh, 2005, p. 34). In addition, the purposes of implementing enmeshment strategies by each country can also be

different, including the desire to increase regional leadership and the ambition to change great power behavior.

Subsequently, Goh categorizes this enmeshment strategy into two levels. The first is "smaller-scale". The focus of cooperation at this level refers to "intraregional security". At this level, small states expand cooperation and strategic relationships with certain major powers to minimize their security risks due to shared intraregional security concerns. The second is the "developed-scale", where policymakers at this scale try to change the geopolitical reality of the major powers for their benefit. At this level, the state has broader goals and interests so that the state enlarges bilateral relations with great power countries to regulate regional stability. Where these bilateral relations are referred to as "building blocks" for "opening up, tying down, and binding" the main actors in the region (Goh, 2007, pp. 126-127).

According to Goh, the enmeshment strategy can be executed in three ways. The first is through "legitimate inclusion", which can be accomplished by establishing bilateral economic and political-military relations with certain great powers and simultaneously involving them as partners in regional multilateral institutions. Secondly, "institutionalized interaction" can be executed by inviting great powers to participate and engage in various bilateral and multilateral agreements and frameworks. Third is "cooperative security," where states cooperate by binding themselves to the norms and principles of applicable law and through informal dialogue and exchange. This is in contrast to common security, which aims to counter the threat of third countries or parties through the formation of strategic alliances or agreements. The goal of cooperative security is to prevent conflict and enhance functional cooperation, especially in areas of common interest (Goh, 2007, pp. 130-1).

In the midst of China's rise to power and the increasing competition between China and the US in the region, Goh believes that by using omnienmeshment policies, Southeast Asian countries will benefit rather than balance forces against great powers. Through the enmeshment strategy, Southeast Asian countries can use regional frameworks such as ASEAN to set rules for norms

and boundaries as a non-military strategy in the face of regional competition. (Goh, 2007, pp.120-6). Meanwhile, Meena Messelaar's study entitled "The Politics of Power Balancing Vs. Enmeshment Theory: An Analysis of Indonesia's Response to Regional Power Competition in the Asia-Pacific Region", analyses Indonesia's policy strategy in the face of power competition in Asia (Messelaar, 2017).

Messelaar (2017) poses the research question of whether, in the face of regional political conditions, Indonesia, as a secondary state in the Southeast Asian region, is more likely to use the balance of power or institutional strengthening strategy. Using a case study of the South China Sea, his paper focuses on Indonesia's relationship with ASEAN, China and the US by comparing the arguments of Robert R. Ross and Evelyn Goh. The results of his research show that in the face of power competition in the Asia-Pacific, especially in the case of the South China Sea dispute, Evelyn Goh's argument related to enmeshment strategy can better explain Indonesia's capabilities and policy strategies compared to Ross's argument related to the balance of power theory. Messelaar found that the balance of power theory was insufficient to analyze Indonesia's response to China's rising power. Indonesia needed to utilize enmeshment, not just be limited to the fact that it was counterbalancing China's power with the help of the US military (Messelaar, 2017).

c. Idiosyncratic Theory

Foreign policy decisions generally result from the distinct perspective of a governing figure. In this regard, decision-makers are swayed by idiosyncratic concepts that pertain to individual personality traits. Consequently, it is unavoidable that every leader possesses a unique leadership style and generates distinct strategies and policy orientations. In order to examine the divergence in foreign policy approaches between SBY and Jokowi, we will employ the idiosyncratic analysis model. This is an approach to foreign policy analysis that emphasizes the role of individuals. Because foreign policy is established and managed by elites (individuals), this approach is helpful for explaining foreign

policy. Therefore, comprehending the policy-making process means understanding the individuals responsible for its formulation. Valeri Hudson said that:

“All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision-makers acting singly or in groups. In a sense, the ground of IR is thus the same ground of all the social sciences. Understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them, is central to the inquiry of social scientists, including those in IR.” (Hudson, 2005, p.1)

In "Man, the State, and War", Kenneth Waltz delineates three levels of analysis that account for the origins of war, namely the individual, state, and system levels (Waltz, 1954). According to Waltz, at the individual level, the occurrence of war is attributed to selfishness, aggressiveness, and ignorance. All of these are subject to individual factors. Hence, analyzing human behavior can provide insight into all political orders and actions. Having the same view as Waltz, Robert Jervis (1976) also asserts that the decision-making elite determine the state's actions. In his work entitled "Perception and Misperception in International Politics," Jervis writes:

“It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their images of others” (Jervis, 1976, p. 28).

Thus, distinct individual factors mean that diverse leaders will generate varying policies. This can be attributed to the distinct character traits inherent to each individual that differentiate them from their peers. As per the statement made by Jack Levy:

“Individual leaders have a causal impact on outcomes. The counterfactual implication is that if a different individual with different characteristics had occupied a key leadership position, the outcome might very well have been different” (Levy, 2013, pp. 302-303)

This particular approach belongs to a category of approaches that utilize political psychology. The theoretical framework posits that foreign policy emanates from discrete decision-makers objectives, computations, and perspectives (Jervis, 1976). As per Keller's perspective, the leadership style of a leader pertains to their underlying convictions, the manner in which judgments

are rendered, and the leader's mode of engagement with their peers. Margaret Hermann provides a more comprehensive definition of how leaders establish relationships with their constituents, advisers, or other leaders. This includes structuring interactions and the establishment of norms, rules, and principles that guide such interactions (Hermann, 1999).

Meanwhile, Rourke (2008) identifies five key indicators that significantly impact an individual's diverse foreign policy decisions. These are personality, physical and mental health, ego/personality and ambition, political history and personal experiences, perceptions, and operational reality. In addition, Lovell (1970) also emphasizes that policymakers are subject to various factors that shape their foreign policy conceptualization. These factors may include cultural context, the role of actors involved in policymaking, and the impact of personality on individual behavior (Lovell, 1970).

Furthermore, in the study titled "Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making", Alex Mintz categorizes different leadership styles into multiple types (Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010). The first is "goal-driven", and the second is "context-driven". Goal-driven leadership style is characterized by a focus on tasks and objectives. This leadership style prioritizes resolving problems, demonstrating a proclivity for addressing and surmounting any obstacles that impede the development of foreign policy decisions. Furthermore, goal-driven leaders tend to make prompt and resolute decisions, as they typically have reduced sensitivity toward the political environment. Furthermore, leaders driven by their goals encounter challenges when modifying their stances and ideologies. Therefore, when advocating for policies or making decisions, task-oriented leaders do not necessarily require coalitions, whether on an international or domestic scale (Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010).

Meanwhile, context-driven leadership tends to exhibit a heightened sensitivity toward the political environment. As a result, such leaders place a greater emphasis on engaging in consultation and seeking compromises. This leadership style exhibits a preference for engaging in discussions, being receptive to various solutions when addressing problems, and actively pursuing

the establishment of international coalitions. These leaders demonstrate a higher risk aversion and tend to adopt a cautious approach, often avoiding conflicts.

Additionally, Mintz categorizes various types of leadership, including crusade leadership, strategic leadership, pragmatic incremental leadership, and charismatic leadership. First, leaders of crusades are individuals who contest political frontiers, yet exhibit a tendency to be unreceptive to novel information. This category of leader exhibits an unrestricted approach toward realizing their worldview. The classification of the crusader leader archetype is bifurcated into two distinct categories:

- 1) **Expansionist**, which denotes an individual who is averse to relinquishing power. The individual in question exhibits a high need for power, coupled with a low level of conceptual complexity that limits their ability to consider multiple options in decision-making. Additionally, they display a strong sense of nationalism toward their country, while placing little emphasis on the significance of friendship, as evidenced by their low need for affiliation.
- 2) **Evangelist**, the evangelist exhibits a proclivity toward cultivating relationships and exerting influence akin to an evangelist.

The second type of leadership is characterized by a strategic leader with a well-defined vision and who actively seeks relevant information to achieve their objectives. Individuals who possess political courage tend to exercise caution when pursuing their ambitious goals (Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010). The third type of leader is the pragmatic leader, who comprehends the political limitations encountered but tends to disregard new information. According to Mumford and Doorn (2001), pragmatic leadership is characterized by a leadership approach that prioritizes practicality, adaptability, and the utilization of analytical and practical problem-solving skills. Leaders who embrace a pragmatic approach prioritize identifying and implementing efficient solutions, basing their actions on what proves most effective within a specific context, intending to optimize benefits while minimizing costs.

Pragmatic leaders exhibit distinct qualities, such as adeptness in evaluating intricate scenarios, analyzing resources and limitations, and formulating decisions grounded in practical considerations and attainable objectives. They prioritize flexibility and responsiveness, adjusting their strategies to cope with changing circumstances and achieve desired results. In addition, Mintz and DeRouen Jr. (2010) have classified the pragmatic leadership into four subtypes, namely:

- 1) Directive and Consultative:** The directive focuses on issues when faced with political challenges. While consultative leaders focus more on relationships and, therefore, will carefully track the positions of other elites (Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010).
- 2) Reactive and Accommodative:** Leaders with a reactive leadership style are typically driven to concentrate on the issue and exercise caution when making foreign policy decisions. This process involves evaluating multiple alternatives and assessing their feasibility in terms of political acceptability. Any challenges are addressed by prioritizing options that align with political criteria. Meanwhile, leaders with the accommodative leadership style prioritize cultivating positive relationships with other nations and are often characterized as "bridge-builders" Their primary objective is to foster consensus and enhance accountability (Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010).

Fourth, the incremental leader type is a leader who encounters challenges and constraints but remains receptive to information, thereby exhibiting strategic behavior. Additionally, such a leader is motivated by maneuverability. Finally, the charismatic leader type is a leader that seeks relationships and challenges restrictions while also being receptive to strategic information. This type of leader emphasizes fostering relationships and motivating others to take action (Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010).

In the meantime, various leadership styles exist, such as normative, assertive, and internationalist/globalist. The normative leadership style is based on promoting and enforcing ethical values, standards, and moral principles. This leadership involves leaders setting high standards of behavior, inspiring

others to act in alignment with those standards and creating a culture of ethics and integrity within the organization or group (Johnson, 2012).

Subsequently, the assertive leadership style can be defined as a leader willing to express their desires or convictions without hesitation or fear. When leaders exhibit assertiveness, they possess a well-defined understanding of problem-solving strategies and the ability to advocate for their perspectives or those of others while refraining from engaging in aggressive behavior (Sulton, 2021). Through assertiveness, a leader can effectively communicate amid challenging circumstances and interactions with individuals with difficulties. Furthermore, Folkman (2013) states that leaders who exhibit assertiveness are perceived to possess greater honesty and integrity than leaders who lack assertiveness.

Then, internationalist/globalist leadership refers to a leadership style that emphasizes global collaboration, cooperation, and a focus on addressing global challenges. It involves leaders who understand the world's interconnectedness and recognize the importance of working together to achieve common goals and solve problems. They prioritize diplomacy, negotiation, and dialogue to resolve conflicts and foster international understanding. These leaders also tend to advocate for international institutions and frameworks that promote cooperation and collective decision-making, such as the United Nations and other multilateral organizations (Deudney & Ikenberry, 1999; Jahn, 2018).

B. Hypothesis

In light of the insight presented above, this thesis aims to analyze the possible hypotheses to explain the distinct hedging strategy taken by Indonesia during the administrations of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Jokowi in facing geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-pacific region. The hypothesis is that Indonesia's foreign policy during the SBY and Jokowi administrations in dealing with geopolitical turmoil in the Indo-pacific, especially in the North Natuna Sea dispute in the South China Sea, used an enmeshment strategy. But the difference is that during SBY's period, Indonesia's foreign policy approach was more likely to be

normative and globalist, while during the Jokowi administration, it tended to be more assertive and pragmatic. This difference is indicated due to the influence of the personality and leadership style of both administrations, which ultimately shapes their foreign policy decision-making.

CHAPTER III

RESEARCH DESIGN

A. Research Approach and Data Collection

The research method in this study is qualitative, using a descriptive approach by developing theories and concepts in the analysis based on the data collected. Through qualitative descriptive analysis, this study aims to provide a comprehensive picture of Indonesia's foreign policy approach in the Indo-Pacific during the SBY (2004-2014) and Jokowi (2014-onward) administrations. This research was conducted in Indonesia, in Depok and Jakarta, from November 2022 to June 2023. This thesis uses primary and secondary data to gain information about Indonesia's policy strategy and behavior. Primary data is obtained from an in-depth interview with the foreign ministry, official government policy documents, and government statements (from the President, ministers and state officials). The author will use the purposive sampling technique to determine the interviewees in the interview process.

Meanwhile, according to Sugiyono, secondary data does not directly provide data to researchers, but data will be obtained through other people or searched through documents (Sugiyono, 2006). This secondary data can be defined as data or writing in reports from other people's research obtained by conducting literature and document studies. Then the data obtained will be arranged systematically according to the conceptual framework to show the correlation between one fact and another. Therefore, to obtain data in this study, the author will conduct a literature and documentation study (archive method). The collected data and information will be obtained from official documents in the form of official government and organizational reports, books, newspapers, journals, reports, mass media, and the internet, such as official government websites and news that focuses on problems related to the formulation of the situation in this study. In addition, this study also uses a combination of literature review and narrative analysis of speeches and statements from high-level leaders

and diplomats either through transcripts, press statements, opinions or audiovisual media.

B. Data Analysis

In order to answer the research question raised in this thesis about how Indonesia's foreign policy strategy is implemented in facing the geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific during the SBY (2004-2014) and Jokowi (2014-onward) administrations, hedging theory will be used to analyze the policy. This thesis adopts Evelyn Goh's definition of hedging, which views strategic hedging as a set of strategies, attitudes, or responses adopted by states in a circumstance in which the state is unable to effectively choose among balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead, it chooses to be in the middle of the power to reduce losses. This thesis also sees the enmeshment strategy as a component of strategic hedging where the state manages to execute engagement policies alongside indirect or soft-balancing policies, thereby establishing a middle stance that seeks to prevent the state from having to choose one side by ignoring and harming the other side.

Furthermore, this thesis will also use idiosyncratic theory as individual level analysis in order to examine why SBY and Jokowi adopted different policies. Moreover, the hypotheses in this thesis will be tested through a case study related to Indonesia's policy toward the South China Sea, particularly the North Natuna sea dispute. Why is the South China Sea the relevant and important case? The South China Sea is an important area within the broader Indo-Pacific region that encompasses a range of issues related to territorial disputes, resource extraction, and strategic influence. There are many complexities and challenges in the region, including China's assertiveness in the South China Sea, the role of the South China Sea in broader geopolitical dynamics, and the development of various strategic frameworks to promote a rules-based order and open engagement. Overall, the South China Sea is seen as an important area of competition and tension in the Indo-Pacific, with many countries vying for influence and control in the region.

The vast potential of natural resources, in particular oil and gas, and its strategic location as a gateway for international trade, have become the primary triggers for disputes among the nations located in the South China Sea to control the area. Additionally, the US's response as a great power attempting to balance and limit China's dominance in the South China Sea region exacerbates the conflict. The South China Sea dispute is complicated by the junction of several strategic interests, which creates a number of issues. Therefore, the circumstances can potentially play a role in the escalation of the conflict on a larger scale. It is certainly a complicated and multidimensional issue. Consequently, as a key component of the Indo-Pacific region, any disruption or conflict in the South China Sea can threaten the security and stability of the broader Indo-Pacific region, thereby having an impact on global economic and political dynamics (Depua, et.al., 2020, pp. 887-880).

The case study will investigate Indonesia's relationship with the Indo-Pacific countries, especially the great powers (China and the US), using enmeshment strategies as a part of a hedging strategy. Furthermore, the examination trend and behavior analysis are based on primary and secondary sources such as scholarly articles, media reports, and official government statements related to the case study. This thesis will subsequently analyze the distinctive orientation of Indonesia's foreign policy in conducting hedging strategies between presidents Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-2014) and Joko Widodo (2014-present) in response to geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

After the data collection stage is complete, the next stage is the data analysis process. Data analysis is a process of arranging the data sequence, organizing the data obtained, sorting the data into manageable units, finding patterns, finding essential things, and deciding what the reader can be informed of. Data analysis techniques used in qualitative research include transcribing interview results, data reduction, analysis, and data interpretation. Along with this study, the data collection process starts by developing basic assumptions about

Indonesian foreign policy toward the Indo-Pacific from the SBY administration to the Jokowi administration.

First, author will look at the SBY and Jokowi administrations to see the foreign policy strategy of Indonesia toward the Indo-Pacific in this period, especially in addressing the North Natuna Sea in the South China Sea. Hence, as stated before, the study's objective is to find the differences in the SBY and Jokowi administrations' strategies. Therefore, the author explores the differences in Indonesia's foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific region during SBY and Jokowi administrations. Second, the author will examine the literature to identify related statements or arguments. The author organized and prepared various data sets related to the study.

Moreover, the author begins the discussion by describing the problem. In this case, the problem of interest is how Indonesia addressed the turbulent situation in the Indo-Pacific through its independent and active foreign policy during the SBY and Jokowi administrations, as well as what policies Indonesia used to achieve its interests and the role it played to maintain regional security and political stability. Then author will analyze the data that has been obtained and describe precisely the strategic foreign policy of Indonesia toward the Indo-Pacific during the SBY and Jokowi administrations, particularly in the case of the South China Sea dispute. Through this analysis, this paper tries to show how Indonesia responds to the turbulent situation in the Indo-Pacific by adhering to the principles of an independent and active foreign policy. Then from the results of this data analysis, conclusions can be drawn as a result of the research.

CHAPTER IV

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Each period of government administration has its way of carrying out foreign policy. Likewise, the SBY and Jokowi governments had different foreign policy approaches. This chapter will discuss the different foreign policy approaches of the SBY and Jokowi governments in maintaining Indonesia's maritime defense and security, especially in the South China Sea conflict. Considered a crucial area within the Indo-Pacific region, the South China Sea dispute is widely regarded as a potential flashpoint for conflict, notably for China and claimed states. The intersection of multiple strategic interests complicates the South China Sea dispute and raises various problems (Messelaar, 2017).

Considering the intensification of militarization attempts and heightened tensions in the South China Sea, it is essential for Indonesia to recognize this region as a matter of strategic and security significance. This is due to Indonesia's direct geostrategic borders with the South China Sea, such as the waters of North Natuna, notably the issue concerning China's claim of Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in North Natuna. Between 2010 and 2016, Indonesia, on multiple occasions, seized Chinese vessels for entering Indonesian waters without its permission. Also, incidents of intimidation from Chinese patrol boats that were forced to release fishing boats detained by Indonesia had the potential to trigger a rift between Indonesia and China (Muhaimin, 2018).

In addition, some of Indonesia's outer islands are also very close to the border with the South China Sea. This geographical position has taught Indonesia that its national security depends on regional stability, security and prosperity. Therefore, as a country with significant influence in the region, it is important for Indonesia to consider its diplomatic strategy toward great powers and its position toward regional countries as the axis of its foreign policy.

A. Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Enmeshment Strategy Under the SBY Administration (2004-2014)

During the presidency of SBY, Indonesia's foreign policy prioritized international engagement as a key area of focus. He guided Indonesia's foreign policy toward an international orientation based on democratic values. SBY began his presidency by establishing a framework for engagement and strengthening Indonesia's regional and international positions. His foreign policy philosophy has been defined as "a thousand friends and zero enemies" also known as "all-direction foreign policy" (Yu, 2019, 17, p.32). This paradigm became SBY's foreign policy principle.

If Mohammad Hatta utilized the "rowing between two reefs" metaphor to elucidate the concept of Indonesia's "independent-active" foreign policy (Hatta, 1953). Meanwhile, SBY employed the metaphor of "multiple reefs" and "navigating a turbulent ocean" to define Indonesia's "independent-active" foreign policy in the face of geopolitical instability in the Indo-Pacific region (Shekhar, 2018, p.14). Subsequently, Marty Natalegawa, the foreign minister during SBY's second term, popularized the term "dynamic equilibrium" to improve the effectiveness of this paradigm at the regional level. Natalegawa emphasized that this term underlined that there was no dominant power and no one was excluded in the region. He proposed managing the dynamic situation in the region by establishing connections with three key elements: security, common interests, and partnership (Andika, 2016, p.4).

Moreover, Indonesia's engagement with the global community exhibited significant advancement during the tenure of SBY. Indonesia has been acknowledged globally as a regional and emerging power. The administration of SBY has established significant diplomatic relations and strengthened ties with partner states, both developed and developing. The endeavors of the Indonesian government are implemented through diverse strategic or comprehensive partnership frameworks (Widiatmaja & Albab, 2019, p. 85). In addition, the SBY government also sought to encourage Indonesia's strong involvement in various regional and global cooperation frameworks (Messelaar, 2017, pp.21-22).

According to Sukma (2010), the SBY administration's foreign policy strategy was primarily focused on three key priorities. First, Indonesia prioritized the establishment of regional communities through the promotion of multilateralism. Indonesia's commitment to active participation in multilateral forums is evinced by its involvement in various organizations, including but not limited to ASEAN, Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN+3, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the East Asia Summit (EAS). Second, in addition to prioritizing multilateral relationships, Indonesia also emphasizes cultivating bilateral ties with major and regional powers, including but not limited to China, South Korea, Australia, Japan, and the US. Third, Indonesia is poised to contribute significantly to global concerns, including climate change, energy security, the economy, and food security (Sukma, 2010).

The actions taken by Indonesia are part of a strategy to boost international trust, build global cooperation, and foster positive relationships to promote peace and security in the area. Using a "constructivist" approach, the SBY government aimed to demonstrate that Indonesia was a peacemaker, problem-solver, and bridge-builder (Habir, 2014). SBY's leadership style shows that soft diplomacy and direct talks with state leaders are essential to problem-solving.

Even though Indonesia's growth in the global world has greatly improved, on the other hand, Indonesia has displayed a less assertive stance in various conflicts, particularly in territorial disputes like the Ambalat and the South China Sea, particularly in the case of the North Natuna Sea. Indonesia's strategic vision of "a thousand friends and zero enemies" makes Indonesia avoid choices that would trigger conflict and international condemnation and prioritize a diplomatic approach to secure Indonesia's position internationally.

a. SBY Response to South China Sea Dispute

Throughout the tenure of the SBY administration from 2004 to 2014, Indonesia implemented three interconnected policy principles in its approach to the South China Sea dispute (Laksmana, 2018). First, Indonesia is classified as a "non-claimant state" due to its abstention from submitting claims in contested maritime territories. Second, Indonesia's non-claimant status presents a

favorable circumstance for assuming the role of an "honest broker" among the claimants, facilitating peaceful dispute resolution. Third, Indonesia is a "confidence-builder". The role of Indonesia as an "honest broker" can be interpreted as fostering trust and assurance among the nations involved in the territorial dispute, thereby promoting the peaceful resolution of conflicts by employing multilateral mechanisms (Laksmana, 2018).

However, Indonesia's capacity to participate in conflict resolution as a "non-claimant" state is restricted. Therefore, Indonesia employs a "dual-track" strategy approach, namely multilateral and diplomatic policies, and unilateral measures to manage regional tensions and prevent conflicts within the region (Laksmana, 2018). In this regard, Indonesia's attempt to integrate the concept of "external institutional balancing" by leveraging ASEAN's potential to engage conflicting nations in conflict resolution and "domestic internal balancing" by enhancing the domestic economy and national security (Laksmana, 2018).

Furthermore, Indonesia's stance on the South China Sea is shaped by its ambivalent position toward China. On one side, China's actions in the South China Sea potentially threaten Indonesia's security. On the contrary, it is noteworthy that the economy of Indonesia is intricately linked to that of China, given that the latter serves as the former's primary trade partner (Sukma, 2002).

1) SBY's Unilateral Approach: Strengthening Economic and Security Cooperation

Indonesia is addressing the South China Sea dispute through a policy of unilateralism, which involves the implementation of official diplomatic measures and the pursuit of strategic partnerships in the areas of both economics and security with major global powers. In 2009, China claimed Indonesia's EEZ territory in the North Natuna waters, prompting the SBY government to lodge a protest through the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) in 2010 (Gischa, 2020). However, Indonesia did not want this issue to cause serious tensions jeopardizing

regional security. Thus, Indonesia sought to avoid regional security threats by pursuing a non-coercive approach through collaborative dialogue.


Furthermore, the Indonesian unilateral policy during the tenure of SBY was exemplified by a sequence of measures related to advancing military defense and establishing strategic partnerships in economic and security sectors with various regional powers. As we know, Indonesia's response and policies toward China in the South China Sea dispute are inextricably linked to the bilateral relationship between the two countries. Consequently, Indonesia seeks to resolve its problems through diplomacy without jeopardizing other aspects of the bilateral relationship (Messelaar, 2017, p.23).

Indonesia's policy toward China is reflected in its efforts to accommodate the country. Indonesia established communication with China at a high level, driven by economic and diplomatic considerations, and also began to build defense cooperation. The SBY administration made significant progress in normalizing diplomatic relations between Indonesia and China following a period of strained relations. This was commemorated with the signing of a joint declaration on strategic partnership by the two countries in 2005. This strategic partnership declaration is a turning point between two countries in their bilateral relationship, intending to foster heightened political cooperation and national security, economic development, and sociocultural connection. The agreement continued to grow stronger; in 2013 President Xi Jinping visited Jakarta to augment the strategic partnership to become a comprehensive strategic partnership. The agreement encompasses multiple domains, including economics, military operations, and educational initiatives (Messelaar, 2017, p.19).

Furthermore, the establishment of this comprehensive partnership created additional prospects for Indonesia to gain increased investment and aid, as well as facilitate market access for Indonesian products. In 2013, the bilateral trade volume escalated to US\$52.45 billion, exhibiting a rise from the preceding year's value of US\$51.05 billion. Significant progress was also observed in the investment sector. In 2013, China's direct investment in

Indonesia was US\$292.1 million, an increase from the previous year's investment of US\$141 million. (Zuhri, 2015). Following the normalization of diplomatic ties between China and Indonesia, there was a notable increase in the value of Indonesia's exports to China. Below is a graph of Indonesia's exports to China from 2005 to 2014:

Graph 4.1: Indonesia's Exports to China, 2005-2014



Source: Statistika Ekonomi Keuangan: Bank Indonesia

<https://www.bi.go.id/id/statistik/ekonomi-keuangan/seki/Default.aspx#headingFour>

Meanwhile, in the defense sector, SBY cooperated with China to advance Indonesia's national interest in modernizing its defense. In his second term, SBY aimed to enhance Indonesia's military capabilities by initiating a Minimum Essential Force (MEF) policy and forging partnerships with nations possessing advanced defense technologies (Arifin, 2014). The MEF was established to enhance the TNI's military capabilities by establishing a minimum standard of military power (Indonesian Defense Ministry, 2015). Several collaborations are being pursued to prevent Indonesia from relying solely on one country for military support and establish a capable military force to safeguard Indonesia's sovereignty and national security.

The military's development under the SBY administration was not intended for offensive purposes. Rather, it was implemented as a defensive strategy to uphold territorial sovereignty. Notably, this approach did not involve a balancing strategy that specifically targeted any particular countries. Moreover, the enhanced relationship and cooperation between Indonesia and China do not imply that Indonesia is aligning itself with the Eastern Bloc. Instead, it signifies Indonesia's desire to diversify its foreign relations and avoid overreliance on a single major power. Therefore, in dealing with China's claims in the South China Sea, Indonesia tends to be cautious in determining the direction of its foreign policy.

Furthermore, in order to maintain peace and order in the region, Indonesia established strategic partnerships not only with China but also with the US, Australia, Japan, India, and Russia through economic cooperation, military drills, the transfer of military equipment, and so on. Indonesia engaged in 88 acts of defense diplomacy between 2003 and 2008. Meanwhile, between 1999 and 2014, Indonesia signed 86 defense, bilateral security, and strategic partnership agreements with other nations (Laksmana, 2015, p.37). Then in 2008, Indonesia organized joint military exercises in areas directly bordering or within the South China Sea. This was also a response to Indonesia's border issues with Malaysia at the time and China's increasing activity and assertiveness in the region. The joint exercise, which involved 30,000 troops, focused on dealing with potential future challenges to Indonesia's northern border (Kompas, 2008).

Indonesia's restricted military capacity prompted the country to seek out strategic partners that were capable of providing assistance. Indonesia has engaged in diverse collaborative efforts pertaining to security matters with the US. In 2010, the Indonesian government and the US ratified two strategic partnerships, namely the Comprehensive Partnership Arrangement (CPA) and Defense Framework Arrangement (DFA) (Hiebert, et.al., 2013). Then in 2012, bilateral relations between the two countries further increased, marked

by more than 170 military-to-military engagements through large-scale exercises (Messelaar, 2017, p. 18).

Moreover, the Indonesia-US strategic partnership cooperation not only provides political support but also assists in increasing defense capacity through grant programs, training assistance, joint exercises, and Defense Institution Building (DIB). In addition, Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Foreign Military Financing (FMF) can provide access to imports of defense equipment from the US. This cooperation successfully proposed a MEF program for the TNI and developed a better defense system (Montratama, 2016). The augmentation of the security aspect of US-Indonesia relations led to a rise in the annual FMS agreement with Indonesia, which escalated from approximately \$14 million in 2006 to almost \$40 million in 2011. In the year 2012, the aggregate value of agreements experienced a significant surge, surpassing the mark of \$700 million (Hiebert, et.al., 2013).

The strategic relationships that Indonesia has built with China and the US demonstrate its impartiality and commitment to maintaining positive relations with all partners. Through strategic partnerships, Indonesia tries to enmesh China and the US in economic, political and security networks. Establishing strong diplomatic ties between China and the US will make it easier for Indonesia to involve China and the US in forums aimed at conflict resolution in the South China Sea and stem political polarity that can threaten regional stability (Kusumasomantri, 2018, p.70).

2) Multilateral Approach: Strategy of Institutional Interaction

In the turmoil of competition between great powers in the region, Indonesia does not use the balancing power or bandwagoning strategies. As a country that upholds the principle of "independent-active" foreign policy, which is not taking sides between one of the blocs, Indonesia carries out a hedging strategy through enmeshment as an alternative strategy by establishing relationships and binding great power countries, such as China and the US, institutionally into regional frameworks, such as ASEAN and EAS.

"Dynamic Equilibrium" proposed by Natalegawa is a series of mechanisms to create regional stability by utilizing multilateral forums through the expansion of regional institutions. According to Armandha (2018), this dynamic equilibrium doctrine is one of the responses to the US-China rivalry (Armandha, 2018). In order to deal with the South China Sea issue, Indonesia adopted a strategy to mediate conflict resolution based on the principle of "independent-active" foreign policy, which means that Indonesia does not take any actions that favor just one of the countries in conflict. Then, Indonesia actively engages with major global powers such as China and the US through bilateral, multilateral, and regional cooperation.

Under the SBY administration, Indonesia's approach to the South China Sea conflict was primarily focused on diplomatic efforts. The country aimed to serve as a "confidence builder" by advocating for peaceful and benign norms of behavior. Then, the SBY administration endeavored to advance peaceful methods by employing the "ASEAN Way", prioritizing dialogue and consensus as the optimal means of settling disputes. Indonesia urges ASEAN countries involved in territorial disputes to engage in partnership, cooperation, and dialogue with China to prevent potential tensions that could trigger regional conflict (Fahmi, 2014). In this regard, Indonesia has proactively assumed the role of mediator between conflicting states to preserve regional tranquility.

At the multilateral level, Indonesia's foreign policy initiatives are mostly carried out under the ASEAN umbrella and its related institutions (Weatherbee, 2010: 55), such as EAS, ARF, ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus (ADMM+), and expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF), as well as a growing network of bilateral and trilateral relationships across the region, such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), ASEAN+3, ASEAN+6, the APEC, and others (Poling, 2013) (Yadav, 2020) (Kemeterian Luar Negeri RI, 2011). For Indonesia, ASEAN and its related institutions are platforms to engage with and balance the major powers in the region.

ASEAN is even considered a "security shield of friendship", as a security guard against possible external challenges (Laksmana, 2018).

Indonesia's multilateral policies encompass a diverse range of initiatives, including promoting regional norms, facilitating dispute resolution dialogues within the ASEAN-China framework, and establishing various informal technical workshops and novel cooperation mechanisms. Indonesia and ASEAN seek to bind China to a cooperative agreement and declaration on the delicate handling and management of the South China Sea. Through ASEAN, Indonesia succeeded in encouraging the formation of the Bali Declaration on ASEAN Community in a Global Community of Nations called Bali Concord III. This declaration represents a form of joint commitment to establish a framework for addressing global issues in a more coordinated, cohesive and coherent manner (Kemeterian Luar Negeri RI, 2012).

Subsequently, in realizing the *ASEAN Political-Security Community* (APSC), Indonesia succeeded in reaching an agreement regarding the implementation of the APSC Blueprint. In the meantime, Indonesia has played a significant role in conflict management and resolution by advocating for the establishment of the ASEAN Institute for Peace and Reconciliation (AIPR). This institution will be used as a platform for enhancing the conflict resolution and management capabilities of ASEAN member states within the region. Also, Indonesia successfully concluded negotiations and discussions on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) Protocol with the Nuclear Weapon States after a decade-long impasse (Kemeterian Luar Negeri RI, 2012).

During Indonesia's tenure as chair of ASEAN in 2011, ASEAN agreed on the necessity of enhancing collaboration in maritime cooperation. As a result, the ASEAN members reached an agreement to reinforce such cooperation through the AMF. As a follow-up to the AMF forum, a year later, in October 2012, the 1st expanded AMF was held, which was not only attended by ASEAN member states but included China, the US, Australia,

India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Russia. The forum aimed to improve Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and preventive diplomacy among participating countries through a non-security-centric approach. Also, ASEAN has reached a consensus regarding the significance of augmenting maritime collaboration and comprehensively addressing transnational crime.

In addition, Indonesia has effectively promoted enhanced cooperation in defense through the ADMM and ADMM+ mechanisms. This has resulted in establishing the ASEAN peacekeeping centers network and the ASEAN industry defense collaboration and adopting the standard ASEAN Security Outlook (ASO) format. The ASO format is designed to foster greater transparency, trust, and comprehension of defense policies and security perceptions among the member nations of ASEAN (Kemeterian Luar Negeri RI, 2012).

Moreover, during its chairmanship Indonesia succeeded in engaging the US and Russia to participate in the 6th EAS in Bali and officially become EAS members (Kemeterian Luar Negeri RI, 2012). To avoid the dominance of power, Indonesia developed the EAS cooperation mechanism by encouraging the acceptance of the US and Russia as EAS members. The presence of the US and Russia plays a vital role in trust-building in the region and in efforts to balance regional architecture. This is Indonesia's way of ensuring regional stability by using multilateral institutions and economic agreements to attract major powers to the region. Involving major powers in regional organizations, such as the US, helps alleviate concern about big powers' continuous commitment to regional stability.

Furthermore, through ASEAN, Indonesia is actively facilitating meetings among claimant and non-claimant nations to discuss issues related to the *Code of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea* (COC) and the management of the South China Sea dispute by using a multilateral approach to build mutual trust and prioritizing lobbying and the approach of the role of diplomats in negotiating a settlement of the South China Sea dispute (Yu, 2019). Indonesia has implemented a strategic approach by organizing a

"Workshop on managing Potential Conflict in the South China Sea." The workshop in question represents Indonesia's implementation of "second track" diplomacy, aimed at promoting dialogue and fostering cooperation among conflicting parties in the context of regional security management and peaceful dispute resolution.

Then, during Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN, Indonesia succeeded in making a significant breakthrough, namely in formulating and approving the "Guidelines for the operation of the Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea". This agreement then paved the way for discussions on the elements of a regional code of conduct in the South China Sea, which serves as a functional mechanism related to conflict prevention by regulating the behavior of disputing countries effectively in the South China Sea region (Dipua, et.al., 2020). In 2012, ASEAN encountered an impasse in reaching a unified communiqué owing to divergent perspectives on addressing the South China Sea situation. In response, Indonesia initiated a "shuttle diplomacy" approach with ASEAN foreign ministers to facilitate negotiations and establish a shared stance among ASEAN member states. The endeavor yielded fruitful results by attaining the "Six-Points Principle in the South China Sea" (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2013).

SBY's proactive and diplomatic multilateral approach shows that Indonesia plays an essential role in the region while increasing Indonesia's credibility in international eyes. Indonesia has taken on the role of peacemaker in this dispute by promoting dialogue between states that assert territorial claims and those that do not, utilizing regional forums. In addition, ASEAN serves as a platform for Indonesia to enhance its positive reputation, as its neighboring nations perceive Indonesia as a country committed to advancing peace and resolving disputes through regional organizations.

Furthermore, the former foreign minister of Indonesia, Marty Natalegawa, on May 16, 2013, proposed the establishment of an Indo-Pacific Treaty for Friendship and Cooperation (Natalegawa, 2013). Natalegawa underscored the significance of peace and prosperity in achieving regional

stability and security. Hence, it is imperative to establish a framework of collaborative relationships and partnerships to effectively manage regional security matters, thereby mitigating the risks of rivalry and conflict. The objective of this concept is to enhance reciprocal confidence and eliminate the utilization of coercion in the settlement of conflicts. The Indo-Pacific Treaty is deemed to be consistent with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (TAC) of ASEAN (Suryadinata, 2018).

Thus, it is evident from the aforementioned explanations that Indonesia's binding engagement in regional institutions holds great importance owing to its active principle. Indonesia was concerned that China's aggressive South China Sea claims would create polarity among ASEAN members. Ultimately, a hedging strategy was implemented through the utilization of enmeshment. Indonesia and other nations in the region can establish a dynamic equilibrium between the various forces at play by fostering positive relationships with China and other countries with vested interests in the South China Sea. Indonesia posits that collaborative efforts can mitigate the repercussions stemming from China's territorial assertions in the South China Sea and potentially avert the escalation of hostilities. Hence, the involvement of China and other nations with vested interests in the South China Sea, such as the US, holds significance in the process of resolving the conflict.

The optimal approach for SBY's administration to uphold regional stability was to establish enhanced and extensive collaborations. Enhancing economic cooperation and promoting multilateral security measures may prove effective in mitigating regional tensions instead of pursuing regional equilibrium. Facilitating and preserving amicable relations among nations is crucial in establishing a favorable regional environment. Moreover, through engagement as an institutional membership, it could indirectly restrict the potential aggressiveness of major global powers. The major powers will engage in the region through positive political relationships, extensive economic cooperation, preferential dialogue, and defense partnerships. The

purpose is to establish an integrated network and foster an interdependent sphere of influence in order to encourage stability. Consequently, the major powers will engage in mutual surveillance while serving as a deterrent against intense rivalry among themselves.

By looking at Indonesia's strategic position and foreign policy principles. The hedging strategy through enmeshment is the appropriate solution for Indonesia in dealing with South China Sea claims, as compared to balancing or bandwagoning. The enmeshment strategy is a rational response in the face of strategic uncertainty by seeking to utilize the political economy of all partners. The binding values and norms in the regional framework will create a great sense of interdependence in the region, which leads to countries that are bound to have common interests which are not mutually exclusive. Eventually, countries are more likely to engage constructively in the regional framework through economic cooperation than to counterbalance or attack other countries using military force, which can be more costly (Acharya, 2014).

B. Indonesian Foreign Policy and the Enmeshment Strategy Under the Jokowi Administration (2014-onward)

Unlike his predecessor, Jokowi employs an "inward-looking" strategy known as "pro-people" diplomacy that is "down to earth" (Andika, 2016, p. 7). Jokowi's approach emphasizes that Indonesia's foreign policy must benefit domestic needs rather than just building a global image. The belief that Indonesia did not profit sufficiently from extensive foreign diplomacy under the previous administration led to this change in policy direction, with the conviction that a robust domestic foundation is the key to achieving national strength and global leadership. Finally, Jokowi proposed an Indonesian foreign policy approach that prioritized satisfying domestic interests while combining external possibilities and internal strengths (Jemadu & Lantang, 2021). Nevertheless, it does not necessarily abandon his concern for the international stage. Maintaining an international presence is still vital to further fulfilling national goals.

In the annual speech on Indonesia's foreign policy in 2015, Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi stated that the country's foreign policy had three priority agendas, namely maintaining Indonesia's sovereignty, improving citizen protection, and intensifying economic diplomacy (Marsudi, 2015). In addition, as a derivative of implementing a "Pro-people" foreign policy, Jokowi also initiated the "Nawa Cita" program. The initiative represents Indonesia's strategic and policy priorities to transform the country into a politically sovereign nation while achieving economic independence and fostering a distinct cultural identity (Wedhaswary, 2014).

Moreover, under Jokowi's leadership, Indonesia's foreign policy has been characterized by a pragmatic and transactional orientation, shifting its focus toward economic diplomacy. This was confirmed in a statement by Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi, who stated, "We have a vision. Obviously, economic diplomacy will be a priority" (Maharani, 2014). In line with that, the Foreign Ministry established an "economic diplomacy task force" to ensure business opportunities, development cooperation and economic agreements could be implemented as soon as possible (Antara, 2014). President Jokowi highlighted that with strong national economic growth, the nation's defense industry would be indirectly strengthened. As a result, the Jokowi administration's foreign policy is pragmatic and selective. It solely concentrates on diplomatic ties and cooperation that benefits domestic interests (Rosyidin, 2017). The pragmatic approach of the Jokowi government's foreign policy represents a concerted effort to uphold national sovereignty and advance the country's strategic interests.

a. Jokowi's Response to the South China Sea

The South China Sea dispute has shifted in Indonesia's approach during the tenure of President Jokowi. The SBY administration tended to employ a proactive multilateral strategy and a gentle approach in its unilateral policy. In contrast, the Jokowi administration's approach exhibits greater assertiveness and boldness in its unilateralism to defend Indonesia's position in North Natuna while simultaneously adopting a more comprehensive multilateral approach to

maintain regional stability. The Jokowi administration's policy reorientation towards "maritime sovereignty" and a "global maritime axis" prompted the adoption of measures aimed at strengthening the enforcement of Indonesia's maritime sovereignty and highlighting Indonesia's presence in the North Natuna region in reaction to China's territorial claims over the area (Fathun, 2018).

1) Jokowi's Unilateral Approach

a. Strengthening National Defenses and Security Measures

During the Jokowi administration, Indonesia has taken a more assertive stance in the South China Sea dispute, positioning itself not only as an active participant in the pursuit of peaceful resolutions but also as a critical player in this regard, surpassing the efforts of the previous administration (Connelly, 2016, p. 2). Indonesia has taken decisive action in response to China's unilateral claims regarding traditional fishing grounds and the infringement of Chinese fishing vessels upon Indonesia's EEZ in the North Natuna area.

Specifically, Indonesia has issued a memorandum of protest to the Chinese Embassy in Indonesia. It has been observed that under the Jokowi administration, Indonesia has issued official letters of protest to the Chinese government on multiple occasions, specifically in 2016, 2019, and 2020 (*Indonesia.go.id*, 2020) (Hastuti, 2020), in contrast to his predecessor, SBY, who only sent a protest note once. These protest notes emphasize that China has violated Indonesia's EEZ territory, and Indonesia rejects China's claims regarding traditional fishing grounds and the nine-dash line because they have no legal basis and are contrary to UNCLOS as decided by the UNCLOS Ruling Tribunal in 2016 (Kementerian Luar Negeri RI, 2019).

Not only through diplomacy, the Jokowi administration's resolute stance is also shown through the direct presence of President Jokowi in the North Natuna Sea. In 2016, Jokowi made two visits to the North Natuna Sea region. During his first visit in June 2016, President Jokowi held a cabinet meeting on board the warship KRI Imam Bonjol to discuss

economic and defense developments in the North Natuna region (Setkab RI, 2016.a). His second visit in November was conducted to review the Air Force's *Angkasa Yudha 2016* combat exercise. This is Indonesia's signal to China that it considers North Natuna waters part of Indonesian territory and that China should not violate the boundaries of the territory (Setkab RI, 2016.b).

Furthermore, Jokowi's decisive and brave action is evinced by the government's decision in 2017 to release a new map of Indonesia by changing the name of the northern part of the Natuna Islands from the South China Sea to the “Laut Natuna Utara (North Natuna Sea)”. I Made Andi Arsana, an expert on International Law of the Sea at UGM, said the naming represented Indonesia's diplomatic and political affirmation of its intentions in the area. According to him, even though it does not have legal force, the action conveys a clear message diplomatically (Allard & Munthe, 2017). This step is considered appropriate in responding to this dispute (Dipua, et.al., 2020). Because that policy action, apart from being a form of government commitment and securitization to assert its maritime sovereignty. It is also to maintain good relations between China and Indonesia without extreme measures such as military confrontation or withdrawal of diplomatic missions from their respective embassies (Ariandana & Abrar, 2017).

The way Jokowi deals with the South China Sea is quite distinct from what previous governments did. Jokowi's unilateralist approach seemed more assertive toward China. Jokowi focuses on strengthening Indonesia's sovereignty, including strengthening Indonesia's presence in the North Natuna Sea. The Indonesian government has sought to improve the North Natuna area in terms of its people, economy, and defense. This was demonstrated through the evidence that President Jokowi gave land ownership certificates to 102 people in Natuna (Kuwado, 2020). The government also encourages the transfer of fishing boats that are already very crowded on the island of Java to sail in Natuna waters; around 470

fishermen have registered to be willing to enliven Natuna waters (CNN Indonesia, 2020).

In addition, the government also promotes infrastructure development, such as transportation systems (roads, bridges), as well as infrastructure that serves marine activities such as public ports, fishing ports, and also Integrated Marine and Fisheries Centers (SKPT Natuna, 2020). The government has also built a mini oil refinery in the middle of the North Natuna Sea with a capacity of around 20,000 barrels per day with an investment value of more than Rp 250 billion (Kementerian ESDM, 2016). The existence of activities in the North Natuna Sea is meant to show that the area is part of Indonesia. Indirectly, this is also a way to convey to China that Indonesia will utilize existing resources to defend Indonesia's EEZ.

Moreover, as a direct response to the conflict in the South China Sea, through security and defense policy President Jokowi has progressively raised the country's military budget with the intention of modernizing and expanding the country's defensive capabilities. In particular, he has prioritized the purchase of new ships, planes, and weaponry that can reach the Natuna Block border region. Despite this, Jokowi continues to keep a high priority on the defense policy of defense support prosperity, which is an attempt to settle problems using an active defensive approach without resorting to aggressive action. This is accomplished by erecting fortifications on the remotest of the country's many minor islands in order to preserve the political integrity of the nation and territorial sovereignty through the conduct of military operations, keep the populace safe, and make the best possible use of available resources to bolster the economy (Asana, et.al., 2017).

Subsequently, the Indonesian government has adopted a flashpoint-based defense strategy within the MEF for the TNI to enhance the country's sovereignty over its territory and bolster its defense capabilities. This strategy involves reinforcing military bases and deploying personnel to

areas of potential conflict, such as those surrounding the South China Sea (Dipua et al., 2020). In this case, the government deployed the Indonesian Air Force and Navy to patrol intensively in the Natuna Sea area. The TNI also conducts joint military exercises around the North Natuna Sea (*Indonesia.go.id*, 2020). In 2016, there was an exercise in June and an Air Force war exercise in October (Setkab, 2016.b). Furthermore, to bolster defensive and military capabilities in the North Natuna Sea, the government has deployed three frigates, five F-16 fighter jets, and one TNI battalion to Ranai. In 2020, the government deployed four additional warships to operate in the North Natuna Sea (Damarjati, 2020). Furthermore, in March 2022, President Jokowi enacted Presidential Regulation No. 41/2022 on the zoning plan for the inter-regional area of the Natuna-North Natuna Sea as a strategy to realize defense and security in the region (Natalia, 2022).

Meanwhile, through a geopolitical approach, Jokowi initiated the doctrine of the World Maritime Axis. The geopolitical policy of the maritime axis is implemented in several ways, namely (1) maritime diplomacy related to state boundary issues, (2) commitment to ensuring territorial integrity and the welfare of the outer islands, (3) securing natural resources and exclusive economic zones, (4) reducing the rivalry of territorial disputes between countries, and (5) massive defense diplomacy (Fathun, 2018).


However, Indonesia's assertive stance toward China has not had a terrifying effect on China or damaged relations between the two countries. On the one hand, Indonesia sees China's aggressive actions and unilateral claims in the South China Sea as worrying and something to be dealt with assertively. Nevertheless, on the other hand, Indonesia enjoys economic relations with China. The dilemma of economic relations makes it impossible for the two to be overtly antagonistic toward each other. Indonesia cannot be overly antagonistic toward China because China is a potential investor in infrastructure projects in Indonesia (Connelly, 2016).

Likewise, Indonesia for China is a potential trading partner, a large market for China. Thus, Jokowi's foreign policy focuses on economic issues that provide tangible benefits to Indonesia (Delanova, & Yani, 2021).

b. Maintaining Great Power Cooperation

Indonesia's policy of unilateralism during the Jokowi administration is exemplified by a series of actions to build strategic partnerships in the economic and security sectors with various regional powers, especially China. Notwithstanding its apprehensions regarding China's actions in the South China Sea, the Indonesian administration persists in augmenting its two-way ties with China as a crucial economic partner. The value of trade and investment experienced a notable increase during the tenure of Jokowi's administration. Presented here is a graphical representation of Indonesian exports to China by value and Chinese investment in Indonesia.


Graph 4.2: Indonesia's Exports to China, 2005-2022



Sources: Statistik Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia: Bank Indonesia

<https://www.bi.go.id/id/statistik/ekonomi-keuangan/seki/Default.aspx#headingFour>

Graph 4.3: China's Investment in Indonesia 2005-2022



Sources: Statistik Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia: Bank Indonesia

<https://www.bi.go.id/id/statistik/ekonomi-keuangan/seki/Default.aspx#headingFour>

Therefore, based on the benefits gained from trade and investment from China, it is difficult for Indonesia to adopt balancing or bandwagoning to protect its EEZ in North Natuna while maintaining economic relations with China. This is because balancing, whether internal or external, has the potential to cause an adverse reaction from China, which affects not only diplomatic relations but also economic relations between the two. So hedging using the enmeshment method is a rational strategy used by Indonesia and most countries in Southeast Asia in dealing with geopolitical contests in the South China Sea (Goh, 2007). This enmeshment strategy is carried out through involvement in regional multilateral institutions, multilateral and bilateral free trade agreements, as well as bilateral and multilateral security exchanges and cooperation.

In 2015, Jokowi embarked on a diplomatic visit to China to release a statement of cooperation between both countries. The meeting ended up resulting in the signing of several Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), which included agreements on the economic sector, the development of the Jakarta-Bandung High-Speed Rail, tax coordination, maritime and search and rescue operations, support agreements between State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and the China Development Bank, cooperation in the

field of space from 2015-2020, and cooperation in infrastructure and industry (Harnifah, et.al., 2021).

Following China's unilateral claim to the Natuna Block, President Jokowi visited Hangzhou, China, in September 2016 to engage with President Xi Jinping. During the meeting, the two leaders reached an agreement on three key areas of cooperation, namely (1) enhancing trade relations by reducing the trade deficit between Indonesia and China, (2) increasing investment in infrastructure and manufacturing in both countries and (3) encouraging Chinese tourists to visit Indonesia as part of efforts to promote cooperation in the tourism sector (Harnifah, et.al., 2021).

In 2016, Indonesia entered into a collaborative agreement with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) policy program. This partnership involved the provision of financial resources and labor transfer from China to facilitate the development of several infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing Indonesia's political economy. The BRI is in accordance with President Jokowi's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) policy, which aims to harness the considerable potential of the maritime sector and elevate Indonesia to the status of a politically and economically robust middle power in the Asia-Pacific. Within this framework, Indonesia and China have established 28 cooperation agreements, which amount to a total value of US\$91 billion, equivalent to over Rp 1.288 trillion (Sebayang, 2019).

In 2017, a bilateral meeting was held between President Jokowi and President Xi Jinping during the Belt and Road Forum (BRF) international cooperation meeting (Setkab RI, 2017). The purpose of the meeting was to discuss strategies aimed at enhancing bilateral economic cooperation between Indonesia and China. As a result of the meeting, the Chinese government agreed to provide market access for a range of Indonesian livestock and agricultural products. The bilateral economic cooperation approach taken by Jokowi is one of the peaceful efforts with a non-confrontational approach toward China in addressing the South China Sea dispute. At the same time, the achievement of cooperation agreements with

the formation of various MoUs and agreements between the two countries that are mutually beneficial aims to foster commitment and mutual trust to maintain regional stability.

In addition to augmenting economic collaboration with China, the Jokowi government is also persistently forging ties with the US. Indonesia's accession to the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), initiated by the US, was formalized in 2022. This communication is a subsequent action to Indonesia's pledge, made during the ASEAN-US Special Summit 2022 in May 2022, following a meeting between President Jokowi and President Joe Biden. The IPEF member nations serve as crucial trading allies for Indonesia, thereby rendering the IPEF a valuable asset for Indonesia's economic prosperity (Wardah, 2022).

Former Indonesian trade minister Muhammad Lutfi has delineated four fundamental principles that should be highlighted in the cooperation framework. These principles are as follows: Firstly, the IPEF must generate tangible and mutually advantageous cooperation. Secondly, it should be inclusive and accessible to all countries in the region. Thirdly, the IPEF must not engender novel development challenges for regional countries. Lastly, it should encourage synchronization between the IPEF and other regional frameworks (Wardah, 2022).

Indonesia's participation in the IPEF is a strategic move in line with its national interests. This attempt aims to achieve a balance in the interests of cooperation in the economic field between China and the US, involvement in the formation of policy frameworks and norms-setting, or cooperative mechanisms for developing countries in the region, and encourage the centrality of ASEAN in accordance with the AOIP (Hutabarat, 2022).

In addition, Indonesia has played a pivotal role in the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) bidding process. Significant advancements have been achieved under the leadership of Indonesia, including the endorsement of the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)

and Economic and Technical Cooperation (ECOTECH) chapters. Indonesia is presently engaged in negotiations for broad economic agreements, such as the Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), the Free Trade Agreement (FTA), the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), and the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) (Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, n.d.(a)).

However, during Jokowi's tenure, Indonesia has recognized the heightened level of competition among major powers in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically in the context of the South China Sea dispute. This situation could potentially result in an unstable multipolar environment concerning neighboring countries, because if the escalation of disputes between major powers occurs, the consequences are not limited to the disputing countries or the entire region but encompass the globe (Busynski, 2013). Given that the Indo-Pacific region is an international trade area, the countries of this region also greatly influence the global economy. Therefore, Indonesia, which has not been able to control the great powers that exist alone, feels the need to influence and shape the countries involved in the region to unite on the basis of increasing trust among one another (Delanova, & Yani, 2021). This is not by favoring or excluding certain major powers but by trying to involve all major powers in regional strategic affairs to create regional stability.

2) Multilateral Approach: Strategy of Institutional Interaction

As opposed to the SBY administration, which prioritized ASEAN in its multilateral strategy, under Jokowi, Indonesia's multilateral strategy to engage with great powers through the use of regional multilateral institutions is not limited to ASEAN, but also encompasses the Indo-Pacific. During the initial stages of the administration, Indonesia's efforts in dealing with regional geopolitical challenges through multilateralism seemed comparatively subdued in comparison to its preceding administration.

However, over the course of time, the Jokowi administration demonstrated its proactiveness in multilateral affairs. Indonesia endeavors to strengthen regional collaboration encompassing domains such as the economy, sociocultural affairs, security, and maritime affairs. Through the utilization of forums, Indonesia can employ diplomatic strategies to enhance regional cooperation, thereby facilitating a connection between developing and developed nations (Puspitasari, 2019). Under Jokowi's government, Indonesia still encourages ASEAN's role in conflict resolution. ASEAN has become a platform for engaging in multilateral diplomacy and acts as a buffer against great power politics. Through ASEAN, Indonesia continues to play an active role as an honest broker in maintaining peace in the South China Sea region. Various initiatives and innovations continue to be rolled out by Indonesia to create a regional security structure and achieve its national interests.

In 2016, at the ASEAN-China Foreign Ministers Meeting in Laos, Indonesia successfully spearheaded the issuance of the "Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full and Effective Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties (DOC) in the South China Sea", which contained an update on the commitment to fully and effectively implement the DOC by ASEAN and China. Then, Indonesia also played an active role in initiating and agreeing to two interim measures in an effort to resolve the South China Sea dispute, namely (1) the Joint Statement on the Application of the Code for Unplanned Encounters and (2) the Hotline of Communications, which aims to be a "hotline of communications among senior officials of the ministries of foreign affairs of ASEAN member states and China in response to maritime emergencies in the implementation of the DOC" (Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, n.d.(b)).

In addition, Indonesia has also twice hosted "the ASEAN-China Joint Working Group (JWG) on the Implementation of the DOC in the South China Sea", once in June 2014 and once in February 2017, in Bali (Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, n.d.(b)). In the forum, Indonesia played an

active role in the negotiation process of drafting the COC Framework. The meeting also successfully agreed on the Bali Approach, which became the basis for accelerating the COC Framework discussion. Finally, on May 18, 2017, the COC Framework was successfully approved at the "14th ASEAN-China Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) on the Implementation of the DOC in the South China Sea" in Guiyang, China (Sekretariat Nasional ASEAN, 2017). After several years of little progress, discussions and negotiations on the COC were resumed during Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023. The 38th ASEAN-China JWG and DOC forum held on May 8-10, 2023, in Jakarta encouraged the agreement of maritime cooperation projects in the South China Sea and several senior officials' meetings on the implementation of the DOC and joint working group meetings of the DOC for more advanced COC negotiations (Xinhua, 2023).

The collaborative efforts among ASEAN member states have helped Indonesia prevent any dominant power from establishing hegemony in Southeast Asia (Sangadji, 2023). This was primarily executed by integrating the US and China within ASEAN's regional institutions, including but not limited to the ARF, the EAS and the ADMM. The objective is for these establishments to entice the dominant nations to adopt the "ASEAN Way", strengthen their engagement in the organization, and embrace the ASEAN program as their own (Sangadji, 2023).

Since becoming president in 2014, Jokowi and his foreign policy team have had a straightforward calculation on how to safeguard Indonesia's strategic interests amid escalating tensions among major powers in the Indo-Pacific region. It was recognized early on that Indonesia could not adopt a passive or apathetic stance toward the rival ambitions of great powers seeking to strengthen influence over the region (Jemadu & Lantang, 2021). Hence, Indonesia encourages cooperation in various forums. Through the EAS, in 2015, Indonesia emboldened EAS countries to reach a consensus on the implementation of the EAS Statement on Enhancing Regional Maritime Cooperation as an effort to increase dialogue and cooperation in the maritime

sector through the development of a sustainable maritime economy, marine connectivity, cooperation between research institutions, and overcoming cross-border challenges.

Furthermore, at the fourth EAS Conference on Maritime Security Cooperation in Chennai, India, on Feb. 6-7, 2020, Indonesia encouraged the EAS to strengthen maritime cooperation related to maritime security, maritime safety, regional blue economy transition, and the Indo-Pacific Oceans initiative, including India's desire to enrich regional maritime architecture in the Indo-Pacific Region (BPPK, 2019). Meanwhile, as an effort to maintain regional stability in 2016, Indonesia initiated the issuance of the Joint Statement of the Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States on the Maintenance of Peace, Security and Stability in the Region (BPPK, 2019).

Motivated by apprehensions regarding establishing the AUKUS security alliance and the bolstering of the QUAD, consisting of Australia, the US, Japan, and India, in 2017, the Indonesian government proposed creating an Indo-Pacific cooperation framework known as the AOIP. This proposal was made in response to the escalating tensions among major powers in the region and was intended to serve as a means of minimizing these tensions (BPPK, 2019). The establishment of the AOIP is also to reaffirm "an ASEAN-centered regional architecture that is open, transparent, inclusive and rules-based", based on ASEAN centrality (BPPK, 2019).

As the proponent of this concept, Indonesia has undertaken various initiatives and negotiations to encourage ASEAN countries and their partners to embrace and endorse the concept as an outlook for regional cooperation. Indonesia employs not only bilateral diplomacy but also the ASEAN regional platform to gain support from all relevant parties, including major global powers. Optimally utilizing the existing ASEAN mechanisms could potentially serve as the most effective approach to convene the major powers, providing a shared platform for dialogue rather than engaging in power-based politics that may result in destabilization.

In this regard, Indonesia intensively promoted the AOIP at formal and non-formal meetings at the ASEAN level, summits and formal consultations (Kurmala, 2018). Diplomatic efforts were made by diplomats, foreign ministers, and even President Jokowi, who directly approached ASEAN to convince member countries and partners about this concept. At the 32nd ASEAN Summit on April 27-28, 2018, in Singapore, President Jokowi attended the forum and conveyed ideas about developing the Indo-Pacific region that received support from Vietnam and Thailand (Liputan 6, 2018).

Furthermore, during the 33rd ASEAN Summit plenary session in Singapore, President Jokowi again conveyed the development of the concept of cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region. President Jokowi emphasized that the Indo-Pacific concept was fundamental for ASEAN to remain relevant and maintain its centrality and that to maintain ASEAN's centrality, the EAS was the only appropriate platform for discussing this concept (PANRB, 2018). On the sidelines of the 33rd ASEAN Summit, Jokowi held a bilateral meeting with the Vice President of the US, Mike Pence, to discuss increasing cooperation between the two countries and maritime security strategies (Hasan, 2018). Then in his remarks at the 13th East Asia Summit on Nov. 15, 2018, in Singapore, President Jokowi again presented the Indo-Pacific concept and emphasized that developing Indo-Pacific cooperation did not require establishing a new institution. Nevertheless, it can be implemented through deepening cooperation between EAS-participating countries, and the basic principles of the Indo-Pacific concept are cooperation, inclusiveness, transparency and openness, not rivalry (Riana, 2018).

In preparing the draft paper of the Indo-Pacific concept, known as the "ASEAN Collective Concept: An (Indo-Pacific) Outlook", Indonesia has held a series of bilateral consultations with ASEAN countries and partners. On March 8, 2019, in Chiang Rai, Thailand, the ASEAN SOM Retreat was held to discuss that concept and finally approved the AOIP as an outlook that could guide regional cooperation. In addition, this meeting also successfully agreed on four forms of cooperation in the Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,

namely strengthening maritime cooperation, joint connectivity, the 2030 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and cooperation in the economic and other fields (Acharya, 2019). Therefore, these points became the basis for Indonesia to play a role in actively building cooperation, especially to realize international cooperation in the maritime sector in accordance with Indonesia's principles of unity and Indonesia's free and active foreign policy in promoting interest values (Delanova, & Yani, 2021).

On March 20, 2019, the Foreign Ministry held a "High-Level Dialogue on Indo-Pacific Cooperation: Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous and Inclusive Region". Ministerial-level participants and senior government officials hailing from a diverse range of countries, including Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, China, India, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, New Zealand, Philippines, South Korea, Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the US and Vietnam were present at the event. This endeavor constitutes an additional effort by the Indonesian foreign minister to advance the country's "concept" among the ASEAN nations and their associates. During the meeting, the foreign minister issued a cautionary statement regarding the ongoing strategic rivalry among dominant global powers, which has posed a significant threat to the persistence of peace and stability within the Indo-Pacific region. Consequently, it tends to hinder the progress of social and economic growth. Therefore, it is imperative for countries within the region to collaborate toward the common goal of fostering peace through the establishment of an Indo-Pacific cooperation framework with positive cooperation to build mutual trust rather than inciting competition and conflict (Marsudi, 2019).

Furthermore, during the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting (AMM), which took place in Bangkok, Thailand, on June 21-22, 2019. The Indonesian foreign minister once more highlighted the significance of the AOIP in addressing regional dynamics. After dynamic discussion at the 34th ASEAN Summit held on June 23, 2019, in Bangkok, the AOIP was officially ratified as a guiding principle to facilitate ASEAN's engagement and cooperation with the broader Indo-Pacific region. Subsequently, the AOIP was

deliberated in greater detail during the 14th EAS held in Bangkok on Nov. 4, 2019. According to Retno Marsudi, the EAS presents a suitable pathway for advancing economic collaboration within the Indo-Pacific region. During her speech, Marsudi sought to convince the ministers of the EAS that the AOIP was not to create a new mechanism and replace existing ones, but rather to enhance cooperation with existing mechanisms (Weatherbee, 2019). As a result, the EAS leaders expressed their welcome and support for the AOIP and enthusiasm for any subsequent discussions on collaboration with the EAS.

According to President Jokowi, the main idea behind the AOIP is the preference for open, transparent, and inclusive cooperation among regional countries for mutual prosperity. Since the AOIP is a convergence of many concepts of cooperation, this outlook focuses on achieving the common interests of all stakeholders involved and creating a sustainable synchronization of regional cooperation (BPPK, 2019). In this way, the interdependence network formed between countries can foster the trust that can encourage the growth of mutual restraint of countries for unnecessary escalation of power politics that can destabilize the entire region. In other words, AOIP is one of Indonesia's ways to encourage peaceful conflict resolution through cooperative relationships based on mutual trust rather than military force. The attainment of comprehensive security stability in this dynamic region is contingent upon the commitment of every country to the peaceful conflict resolution.

Furthermore, in Indonesia's chairmanship of ASEAN in 2023, the implementation of AOIP became one of the three main pillars of discussion. At the AMM Retreat meeting on Feb. 4, 2023, it was agreed to map out concrete projects with ASEAN partners as part of the AOIP's implementation. In addition, Indonesia also encouraged the strengthening of ASEAN partnership relations with Pacific countries by establishing cooperation between ASEAN and the Pacific Island Forum and developing the ASEAN Maritime Outlook. President Jokowi also proposed the ASEAN Indo-Pacific

Infrastructure Forum as a platform for concrete cooperation with partner countries to reduce tensions in the Indo-Pacific (Ayudiana, 2023).

Moreover, Indonesia has been actively promoting various activities to implement the AOIP under the AOIP forum. These activities include the Youth Dialogue on Digital Development for SDGs that took place in April 2023, the Creative Economy Forum held in August, and the upcoming Infrastructure Forum and ASEAN Business and Investment Summit, which will be held in conjunction with the 43rd ASEAN Summit in September 2023 (Marsudi, 2023).

Based on the explanation above, it has been observed that Indonesia's significance and sway with external powers are amplified when it assumes a leadership role within ASEAN. Through Jokowi's multilateral approach, Indonesia has effectively leveraged the ASEAN platform to advance its interests beyond the confines of Southeast Asia. Beijing and Washington have highlighted the leadership of Indonesia in ASEAN as a critical factor in their engagement with the country. According to Connelly, Indonesia's prominent role in the ASEAN community can serve as a protective shield for other relatively smaller member states to assert their stance against any potential acts of aggression by major global powers. In the absence of robust leadership from Indonesia, dominant global actors, such as China, are likely to persist in exploiting the divisions within the ASEAN to advance their strategic objectives (Connelly, 2016).

Besides embracing ASEAN, IPEF, and EAS – Indonesia's mechanisms for managing regional order and great powers – Jokowi, who is seeking to position Indonesia as the "World Maritime Axis", is committed to expanding Indonesia's defense, political and economic ties with Indian Ocean nations at the bilateral and multilateral levels (Nabbs-Keller, 2020). One of the ways is through the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). IORA is an excellent platform for engaging and enmeshing Indonesia, external countries, and regional powers. From 2015 to 2017, Indonesia was entrusted to continue the chairmanship of IORA from Australia. During its chairmanship, Indonesia

focused on enhancing cooperation between IORA member states and dialogue partners on priority issues such as maritime security, the economy, and strengthening regional ties.

Indonesia employs IORA to incorporate an agenda that caters to its maritime interests. During IORA meetings, Indonesia can engage in enmeshment diplomacy. This may involve discussing a range of issues, such as the destabilization of the regional order as a result of conflicts in the maritime region, the preservation of sea tolls, and the promotion of cooperation in utilizing marine resources. Indonesia's constructive values and norms, already held in high regard in the global community, may facilitate its acceptance by superpowers seeking to engage with the country.

Indonesia's prominent role in IORA provides a strategic benefit. Due to its active involvement in the Indian Ocean, Indonesia has the potential to demonstrate its capabilities and exert significant influence in the realization of the World Maritime Axis. President Jokowi perceives the country's term as the chair of IORA as a prospect to establish the GMA as a significant connection within the Indo-Pacific region. As the chair, Indonesia is responsible for enhancing diplomacy and establishing a mutually advantageous maritime axis. Foreign Minister Retno, who serves as chair of the IORA Council, said she would "shape IORA for Indonesia's interests" (Weatherbee, 2019). This is emphasized by the theme for Indonesia's term, "Strengthening Cooperation in a Peaceful and Stable Indian Ocean".

A major achievement of the IORA Summit was the adoption of the "Jakarta Concord." Drafted in Jakarta and approved by the IORA Council of Ministers on Oct. 27, 2016, the concord outlines the specific initiatives that are to be undertaken in order to foster regional collaboration concerning the objectives of "promoting peace, stability, and prosperity" in the Indian Ocean region (Weatherbee, 2019). The IORA Concord intends to make a tangible contribution to maintaining security stability, strengthening regionalism, building cooperation, and realizing prosperity for the countries of the Indian Ocean in the long term (Indonesian Embassy 2016).

Indonesia has endeavored to engage major powers equally through cooperation in various sectors while being careful not to get too close at the expense of others. The principle of impartiality among major powers holds significant importance beyond being a mere slogan. More than just a hedge between two competing superpowers, Indonesia through various regional institutions has long taken a proactive role in building a more inclusive multipolar regional security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region with the aim of promoting confidence-building measures, preventive diplomacy and cooperative security, and a focus on developing friendships rather than identifying adversaries (Acharya, 2000).

Through the enmeshment strategy, Indonesia and regional countries, particularly ASEAN countries, seek to prevent an unstable regional order involving many forces. In this context, Indonesia tends to indirectly try to accommodate conflicting countries and countries with interests in the region into the regional institutional system. On the one hand, it also helps spread norms related to mutual restraint and increases trust between countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This engagement aims to attract major powers into closer economic and political relations with Southeast Asia and more profound political and defense relations bilaterally and multilaterally with regional countries. Thus creating a relationship of interdependence and increasing mutual interest in regional security. Furthermore, the existence of integrated relationships and forming of this network can encourage great-power countries to be involved in maintaining regional stability and security by using political and diplomatic channels.

Based on the hedging theory proposed by Goh (2005; 2007), the enmeshment strategy plays a role in increasing ASEAN's bargaining power and strengthening its centrality in the Indo-Pacific region. The inclusion of major powers in regional frameworks such as ASEAN and EAS can serve as a viable strategy to mitigate the regional dominance of such countries, which has been identified as a significant contributor to regional instability, as evidenced by the South China Sea conflict. The efficacy of integration within

regional frameworks, such as ASEAN, EAS, and IORA, is evidenced by the heightened participation of great powers in dialogue forums for regional cooperation. Also, several great powers have expressed their willingness to initiate and host certain dialogues. In this regard, regional framework forums can actually be a platform to bring great powers together (Messelaar, p.21). By including great power countries in the regional cooperation framework in the region, it will provide greater incentives for great power countries to commit to maintaining regional security stability.

According to Goh, one of the reasons why conflict escalation in the Indo-Pacific region is still relatively stable and not peaking is because of the success of keeping great powers involved in regional frameworks (Goh, 2005; 2007) (Gill, et.al, 2016). The number of regional cooperation frameworks involving great power countries, Indonesia, through ASEAN, EAS and IORA, has indirectly succeeded in forming a network of agreements in various economic, political, security, and diplomatic fields that great power countries, such as China and the US, cannot circumvent. Various forms of cooperation carried out by Indonesia with China and the US show that Indonesia looks very pragmatic but still tries to keep its distance from the two great powers to maintain a balance between China and the US (Kosandi, 2013) (Messelaar, 2004, p.21).

The entanglement and interdependence created through the enmeshment strategy will indirectly help great powers to realize that they have common interests that are not mutually exclusive, such as economic benefits from free trade and securing regional trade routes. Therefore, great powers will not be willing to incur higher costs to disrupt the status quo with great powers. As a result, great powers will adjust to a pattern of continued engagement and accommodation with the region and each other.

C. Idiosyncratic Analysis of SBY and Jokowi

Foreign policy decisions tend to come from the unique perspective of a leader, and decision-makers are influenced by idiosyncratic concepts that refer to personality factors. Therefore, it is inevitable that each leader has his/her own leadership style and produces different approaches and policy directions. To analyze why SBY and Jokowi's foreign policy strategies differ, this study will examine the idiosyncratic analysis model by looking at their personality profiles, leadership, and decision-making styles.

a) Personality, Leadership, and Decision-Making Style of SBY

In the study of foreign policy analysis, the personality factor of the leader is very influential on the behavior of the state at the international level. According to Hermann (1999), the personality traits of leaders, including their beliefs, motives, and leadership styles in making decisions, play a crucial role in state behavior (Hermann, 1999). Therefore, the different backgrounds of presidents SBY and Jokowi are one of the factors that caused them to have different leadership styles and policy directions.

Connelly (2014) posits that SBY's administration's leadership style and policy decisions were influenced by his background and political experiences at both national and international levels. SBY was born to a modest family in a rural village in Pacitan, East Java (Hisyam, et.al., 2004). A lack of happiness and fulfillment marked his formative years. Economic instability and familial disharmony resulted in a deficiency of parental warmth and affection for him. When he was in elementary school, SBY was placed under the care of his uncle in the rural locality of Ploso, Pacitan. This circumstance necessitated his being independent and precluded reliance on others. Consequently, this condition generated a feeling of vulnerability and insecurity, leading to loneliness (Fealy, 2015).

However, the circumstances he encountered played a significant role in cultivating his hardworking behavior. SBY exhibited intellectual aptitude and actively engaged in diverse social activities during his formative years; he showed great enthusiasm in engaging in numerous ceremonial activities within

the school and the local community. Notably, he frequently desired to assume significant responsibilities in various events (Hisyam, et.al., 2004). Furthermore, from an early age, SBY exhibited an aversion to violence, strongly refraining from playing in sports and games that involved potential harm to the adversaries, such as soccer or kasti ball (Hisyam, et.al., 2004). The individual's aversion to violence generates a corresponding avoidance of conflict, leading him to opt for a peaceful resolution. Likewise, his determination to break out of perceived childhood hardships shaped him into an ambitious person (Fealy, 2015).

The multifaceted aspects of SBY's personality ultimately significantly influenced his approach to leadership. The emotional personality of SBY significantly shaped his decision-making and policy formulation during his tenure, encompassing his approach to international relations and foreign policy. His strong motivation to "be somebody" (*menjadi orang*) and improve upon the circumstances of his upbringing fueled his desire to pursue a prestigious and illustrious professional trajectory (Fealy, 2015).

In addition to seeking the foremost position in Indonesia, SBY aspired to attain recognition on the global stage. This incentivized SBY to elevate Indonesia's standing in the global arena, thereby enhancing his international recognition. Consequently, SBY realized this with his foreign policy orientation, which was more outward-looking (Yu, 2019). SBY intended to enhance the country's reputation by assuming a more prominent position in the global arena and implementing policies prioritizing engagement with the international community. In addition, SBY's professional background as a military officer and subsequent political roles encompassed domestic and global spheres, which influenced his perspective to be more receptive to and understanding of international circumstances. This experience facilitated the development of his expertise in international relations, enabling him to formulate strategic initiatives to enhance Indonesia's engagement on the global platform (Fitria, 2015). SBY's demeanor as a global statesman and foreign policy scholar has altered Indonesia's foreign policy trajectory to proactively engage in international forums and collaborative efforts to address global challenges.

The non-conflict approach to problem-solving exhibited by SBY can be traced back to his childhood aversion to violence. SBY consistently prefers employing peaceful and non-confrontational approaches to resolve various issues. This is evident in his foreign policy principle of "a thousand friends and zero enemies". Concerning the North Natuna Sea in the South China Sea, it can be observed that the SBY administration did not exhibit an assertive position in opposition to China's assertions within this particular area. Despite sending a memorandum of protest to the UN, SBY was reluctant to make choices that could trigger conflict and international condemnation and prioritized a diplomatic approach to secure Indonesia's position in the international community (Messelaar, 2017). Hence, Indonesia adopted strategies that minimized the risk of conflict and international censure while prioritizing a diplomatic course of action to safeguard its international standing.

The SBY administration aimed to advance peaceful strategies and a non-coercive stance by employing the "ASEAN Way" framework (Fahmi, 2014). This approach emphasized the significance of dialogue and consensus as the most effective means of addressing conflicts. Indonesia subsequently called upon ASEAN member states embroiled in territorial disputes to foster collaboration, cooperation, and open communication with China to avert potential tensions that could escalate into regional conflicts (Fahmi, 2014). In this case, Indonesia proactively took on the role of mediator between the conflicting countries to maintain regional tranquility. Even when ASEAN encountered an impasse in reaching a unified communiqué owing to divergent perspectives on addressing the South China Sea situation, Indonesia conducted "shuttle diplomacy" and successfully brokered an agreement on the "Six-Points Principle in the South China Sea".

In addition, to ensure regional stability and security, Indonesia also emphasized what it called a dynamic equilibrium by establishing significant diplomatic relations and strengthening relations with partner countries, both developed and developing. The Indonesian government employed diverse strategic or comprehensive partnership frameworks with various countries,

including China, the US, and others (Widiatmaja & Albab, 2019). SBY asserted that Indonesia's foreign policy ought to be grounded in diplomatic principles and multilateral approaches that served national interests and encompassed broader aspirations, specifically the attainment of regional and global peace.

According to Fealy (2015), SBY lacked strength of character and confidence in making decisions. This was triggered by his insecurity, which resulted from his unhappy childhood experiences. Thus, to alleviate his vulnerability and insecurity, SBY tried to manage his fragile self-esteem by minimizing his deficiencies and seeking attention from and making impressions on others. Consequently, this fostered an attitude that wanted to be seen and praised. SBY exhibited a strong desire to cultivate an impressive image, driven by a perceived necessity to attain recognition and admiration from others to establish himself as a role model. The desire for recognition and admiration motivated SBY to aspire to assume a significant position in the international sphere (Fealy, 2015).

In the context of the North Natuna Sea, it can be observed that SBY displayed a lack of assertiveness due to his avoidance of potential conflicts that might trigger negative responses from the international community, thereby potentially tarnishing Indonesia's reputation as a nation that upheld democratic principles and advocated for peace (Fitria, 2015). Thus, SBY's leadership style demonstrated that SBY was a context-driven individual who, in taking a policy, was more risk-averse and took careful steps. In addition, the responses and policies implemented also showed SBY as an accommodative type of leader who preferred cultivating positive relationships with other countries. This approach was often characterized as "bridge-building", which seeks to foster consensus and enhance accountability (Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010).

To sum up, Indonesia's foreign policy approach under SBY was more likely to be normative and globalist. Normativity was shown by SBY's responses and policies that prioritized peaceful measures and avoid conflict, upholding the path of diplomacy, dialogue, and consensus, such as through the "ASEAN Way". Meanwhile, his outward-looking policies, which focused on

cooperation and emphasized global collaboration and cooperation, and focused on addressing global challenges through regional and international frameworks, illustrated that SBY was globalist. SBY's confidence in Indonesia and its ability to play an essential role on the international stage was driven by his perception and belief that the country had performed well under his leadership and was able to pursue its interests in global forums.

b) Personality, Leadership, and Decision-Making Style of Jokowi

In contrast to his predecessor, Jokowi's election in 2014 led to significant political changes in Indonesia's foreign policy. Jokowi's sudden rise to power represented a new model of political progress in Indonesia. Unlike his six predecessors, Jokowi did not rise to the presidency through the military or political party system. Jokowi's rise began in 2005 when fellow business leaders recruited the successful entrepreneur to run for mayor of his home city of Surakarta (Connelly, 2014).

Jokowi was born into a simple family who lived in deprived conditions. His childhood to adolescence was spent in a simple rented house on the riverbanks of Anyer, Central Java, and he even experienced eviction (Prasodjo, 2020). Jokowi acquired valuable knowledge from his experiences on the riverbank. His exposure to a modest lifestyle equipped him with effective communication skills and the ability to engage with the community. Additionally, he gained insights into various aspects of life and developed strategies to navigate complex challenges. The environment in which he lived colored his attitude in viewing the reality of life and life's journey. As Lovell says, culture and the surrounding environment can shape the personal character of individuals (Lovell, 1970). Jokowi's personality has been influenced by the circumstances of his family, leading him to exhibit traits such as diligence, hard work, resilience, assertiveness, and bravery in navigating and overcoming various challenges within the constraints he faces (Prasodjo, 2020).

Furthermore, the influence of Jokowi's father, Wijiarno Notomiharjo, considerably contributed to his character development. Jokowi regards his father as an essential factor in shaping his life. Jokowi's father imparted

significant knowledge and values to him, forming him into an individual of high moral character. This included fostering leadership qualities such as the willingness to assume accountability, demonstrating empathy toward society, displaying proactive behavior, and cultivating a sense of helpfulness within Jokowi from an early age (Prasodjo, 2020). Jokowi's display of bravery can be attributed to the influence of his father, who demonstrated a willingness to undertake risky endeavors. Jokowi was acquainted with his father as a resilient fighter who exhibited audacity in undertaking ventures.

Jokowi's father's influence on his character cultivated a staunch determination, fostering a disposition that emboldens Jokowi to engage in decisive action and embrace risk-taking. Jokowi's risk-taking courage was evident when he embarked on a pioneering endeavor to sustain his family's timber enterprise, despite lacking prior knowledge in business management (Prasodjo, 2020). He relinquished his position as a forestry scholar in pursuit of this endeavor. Furthermore, Jokowi inherited the traits of a protector and public servant from his grandfather, who held the position of a highly populist *lurah* (district head) (Prasodjo, 2020). In accordance with the assertion made by Jerrold Post, the veneration of a leadership figure for a role model can significantly impact and mold a leader's proclivity to act and adopt similar policies as their mentor. The development process experienced by Jokowi since his early years has profoundly influenced his character, which is evident in the policies implemented during his tenure. Jokowi draws upon his childhood experiences as a moral framework for informing most of his actions and policies. Subsequently, Jokowi's formative experiences during his youth significantly influenced his leadership style, characterized by simplicity and a pro-people orientation (Kuwado, 2019) (Bernstein & Harrington, 2011).

With his personal characteristics, Jokowi set a standard in his leadership that a leader must be people-oriented. Therefore, he made his foreign policy principle 'pro-people diplomacy', making the people the main national interest priority (Rosyidin & Pattipeilohy, 2020). Jokowi saw that the former diplomatic strategy of Indonesia, which was coined as "a thousand friends, zero enemies",

appeared to have created a disparity between policy and domestic interests. Under that approach, foreign policy was frequently prioritized at a high level, leading Jokowi to perceive limited advantages for Indonesia's domestic interests resulting from extensive foreign diplomacy. Therefore, during his tenure, Jokowi has not prioritized cultivating a favorable global perception. Instead, his priority lies in expediting outcomes from Indonesia's global collaborations (Widiatmaja & Albab, 2019). This has become a pattern for Jokowi in carrying out Indonesia's foreign policy under his leadership.

Then, Jokowi background as a businessman forms a mindset that tends to be oriented towards profit-loss considerations. Therefore, President Jokowi is known as a politician with a pragmatic view. For him, foreign policy must benefit Indonesia. Furthermore, the pragmatic foreign policy conceptualization of President Jokowi, which prioritizes the fulfillment of domestic needs, portrays him as a leader who possesses a strong sense of nationalism (Rosyidin & Pattipeilohy, 2020). In addition, Shekar (2018) stated that Jokowi employs the "Trisakti Soekarno (Three Power Principle)" strategy, aimed at achieving Indonesia's political sovereignty, economic independence, and cultural distinctiveness.

Shekar (2018) posits that Jokowi's leadership style is characterized by assertiveness and ambition, which are reminiscent of Soekarno's approach. Additionally, Jokowi's regional outlook is considered an outlier, similar to that of Suharto (Shekar, 2018, p. 16). In Indonesia's domestic political contestation, nationalism is often associated with the ideology espoused by the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDI-P), the party that supported Jokowi's diplomatic rise. The PDI-P's nationalist principles are then implemented by Jokowi in his foreign policy (Rosyidin, & Pattipeilohy, 2020).

Jokowi's assertive and nationalist decision-making style is realized through his foreign policy, which emphasizes three things, namely the importance of pursuing a strong economy (wealth), economic prosperity (wealth), defense posture (power), and state sovereignty (security). The belief is that national power rests on domestic capabilities. Jokowi's diplomacy focuses

on improving domestic economic capabilities. This is different from the SBY era, which saw the actualization of the national role on the global stage, determining the country's status as a global player (Rosyidin & Andika, 2017).

As a leader with a business background, coupled with a limited inclination toward foreign policy matters, it can be argued that Jokowi's current level of experience and comprehensive understanding of international politics, as well as Indonesia's global positioning, remains somewhat insufficient. Therefore, considering Jokowi's relative lack of experience in diplomacy, he may exert a different level of influence than his predecessors in shaping foreign policy. Consequently, his foreign policy advisors' involvement is significant in facilitating his decision-making process (Hermann, 1999). During his tenure as President, Jokowi has selected intellectual advisors who are well-known experts in the field of international relations, including Rizal Sukma and Andi Widjianto. These advisors were tasked with offering unbiased and scholarly evaluations of Indonesia's national interests and the evolving strategic landscape within which the country's interests would be pursued in international politics.

Furthermore, Jokowi has strategically selected proficient ministers to execute his vision and mission effectively. In his first term, Jokowi designated Susi Pudjiastuti as the maritime affairs and fisheries minister. The assertive demeanor of Susi Pudjiastuti was instrumental in aligning with Jokowi's leadership approach, characterized by a resolute stance evident in his initiatives to combat illegal fishing vessels and safeguard Indonesia's maritime territories against criminal activities within its waters (Nainggolan, 2015). Moreover, the decisive decision-making style of President Jokowi is exemplified in his foreign policy approach toward safeguarding Indonesia's sovereignty in the North Natuna Sea.

In responding to the North Natuna Sea case, President Jokowi sought diplomatic efforts but still carried a firm stance as a continuation of his consistency from the beginning to maintain Indonesia's position in managing its sea territory. Jokowi's assertive policy shows that Jokowi is a goal-oriented individual who tends to take decisive steps. This can be seen from Jokowi's

reactive attitude when he immediately visited North Natuna and held a meeting on a ship to discuss defense and economic development in the region. In addition, Indonesia also sent a memorandum of protest to the Chinese government and the UN to emphasize that China's claim to the EEZ in the North Natuna Sea had no legal basis (Indonesia.go.id, 2020) (Hastuti, 2020) (Setkab RI, 2016(a)) (Setkab RI, 2016(b)). In addition, the most prominent act of Jokowi's, which demonstrated assertiveness and bravery, was renaming the northern part of the Natuna Islands the "North Natuna Sea".

The response of Indonesia to the South China Sea dispute indicates Jokowi's expansionist leadership approach. According to Mintz and DeRouen Jr. (2010), the concept of expansionism pertains to the tendency of leaders to have a problem-solving orientation, which drives them to expand their control, resources, or territory. The Jokowi administration has demonstrated its commitment to advancing the North Natuna area through initiatives to foster community, economic, and defense growth. While SBY focused on enhancing the economy and allocating the outcomes toward defense and security, Jokowi adopted a contrasting approach. Jokowi is utilizing the World Maritime Axis policy to enhance the nation's economy by implementing maritime strategies.

Jokowi's policy approach exhibits assertiveness, pragmatism, and an inward-looking. Nevertheless, the policy also pursued an outward-looking approach.

However, the outward-looking approach contrasts with that of SBY, which emphasized cultivating a favorable perception internationally. During the Jokowi era, Indonesia has placed significant emphasis on orientations and strategies that align with its national interests. Indonesia's proactive engagement and endeavors in fostering collaboration through diverse cooperation platforms such as ASEAN, IORA, and EAS indicate President Jokowi's outward-oriented approach. Besides that, Indonesia also actively plays a role in initiating and encouraging the COC to resolve the South China Sea conflict. Indonesia also plays a role in forming various economic and security cooperation initiatives to maintain the stability of the region. Hence, interdependence can increase trust among countries, indirectly preventing

conflict escalation, even though the foreign policy orientation remains based on "no profit, no deal" pragmatism. His entrepreneurial nature leads him to be goal-oriented leader (Mintz & DeRouen Jr, 2010).

The explanation mentioned above demonstrates that a leader's personality significantly influences foreign policy. Foreign policy is shaped by various domestic actors and influenced by the international environment, but the leader plays a prominent role in its formulation and implementation. It is the leader who is in control, so the personality aspects of a leader will also influence the style and orientation of foreign policy. Therefore, when we understand international relations and foreign policy, we must understand policymakers; when we understand policymakers, we understand the individuals who make them. Robert Jervis said, "It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their image of others" (Jervis, 1976).

The importance of this individual factor implies that different leaders will produce different policies. This suggests that foreign policy results from individual policymakers' goals, calculations and perceptions (Jervis, 1976). Therefore, through idiosyncratic analysis, it is possible to gain a deeper understanding of the characteristics, tendencies, and values that influence leaders in making decisions (Hermann, 1999). By taking into account individual factors, such as personal background, past experiences, and life of the leader, the analysis becomes more personalized, which helps in understanding decisions that structural or institutional factors may not explain (Rourke). It also helps in understanding other unique factors, such as past trauma, personal relationships or strong personal beliefs of a leader.

In this sense, idiosyncratic theory offers a more humanistic explanation for foreign policy and international relations by emphasizing the importance of individual policymakers. By considering the personal and historical context that influences foreign policy, we can understand that changes in foreign policy can occur due to leadership changes. Hence each individual has different characteristics. Idiosyncratic theory can also help predict changes in a leader's

foreign policy. However, a drawback of using idiosyncratic theory is that it is difficult to collect accurate and verifiable data on the individual factors that influence foreign policy. Information about leaders' personal backgrounds, values and past experiences is often difficult to obtain and may not be transparent. Therefore, analysis based on this theory tends to rely on assumptions and interpretations of the available information. In addition, since each leader has unique characteristics and experiences, it isn't easy to generalize broadly.

Furthermore, the idiosyncratic approach that focuses too much on individuals tends to ignore other factors that may limit or influence foreign policy choices, such as structural, institutional, domestic conditions, international conditions, political pressures, and others (Mintz & DeRouen Jr., 2010). In fact, foreign policy decisions are high stakes and have great uncertainty and risk. Therefore, individuals are not the only reference in making foreign policy decisions. This is a limitation of this study; an analysis based solely on idiosyncratic theory may not provide a complete picture of the factors that can influence the actions of leaders in their foreign policy decisions. In analyzing foreign policy, it is important to consider different theoretical approaches, including structural and other approaches, to gain a more comprehensive and accurate understanding. Therefore, it is hoped that future research can provide analysis with various theoretical approaches to complement this research, such as looking at institutional, structural, domestic and international factors.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

This study discusses the SBY and Jokowi's approaches to geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, especially in the case of the response to the South China Sea dispute. Every government administration has its own way of conducting its foreign policy. Likewise, the SBY and Jokowi governments had different foreign policy directions. During the SBY administration, Indonesia's foreign policy approach was more likely to be normative and globalist. The foreign policy of Indonesia has placed significant emphasis on prioritizing international engagement as a crucial domain of concentration. Despite Indonesia's significant progress in the global arena, it has demonstrated less assertive action in numerous conflicts, especially in the North Natuna Sea territorial dispute in the South China Sea. SBY employs a "dual-track" strategy approach, namely multilateral and diplomatic policies, and unilateral measures to manage regional tensions and prevent conflicts within the region.

This study found that SBY's multilateral approach through ASEAN was more prominent, while his unilateral policy tended to be soft. The SBY administration promoted the "ASEAN Way" of discussion and consensus to address the South China Sea problem. Indonesia wanted diplomatic solutions without compromising bilateral relationships, so Indonesia's policy toward China was reflected in its efforts to accommodate the country. Indonesia established communication with China at a high level, driven by economic and diplomatic considerations, and also began to build defense cooperation. SBY's administration believes that increasing collaboration will help ensure regional stability. Instead of trying to balance regions, close economic and security cooperation can lessen regional conflicts.

Meanwhile, Jokowi's foreign policy orientation seems more assertive and pragmatic. Jokowi emphasized that Indonesia's foreign policy must have benefits for domestic needs, not just building a global image. Furthermore, the Jokowi administration's approach exhibits greater assertiveness and boldness in its

unilateralism to defend Indonesia's position in North Natuna while simultaneously adopting a more comprehensive multilateral approach to maintain regional stability. At the unilateral level, Jokowi's assertive approach could be seen from Jokowi's reactive attitude, when he immediately visited North Natuna and held a meeting on a ship to discuss defense and economic development in the region. As a signal to China of Jokowi's seriousness in maintaining the sovereignty of its territory, Jokowi is developing the North Natuna region with community, economic and military development. In addition, Indonesia also sent several memoranda of protest to the Chinese government and the UN to emphasize that China's claim to the EEZ in the North Natuna Sea had no legal basis. This is in contrast to the SBY administration, which only sent one such memorandum. Moreover, the most prominent act of Jokowi's assertiveness and bravery was renaming the northern part of the Natuna Islands the "North Natuna Sea".

However, Indonesia's assertive stance toward China has not damaged the relationship between the two countries. The dilemma regarding economic relations makes it impossible for both countries to be too antagonistic toward each other. Therefore, despite its concerns over China's actions in the South China Sea, the Indonesian government continues to expand bilateral relations with China as an important economic partner. Furthermore, under Jokowi, Indonesia's multilateral strategy to engage with great powers through regional multilateral institutions encompasses not only ASEAN but also the Indo-Pacific, such as IORA, even though during the early phases of its administration, Indonesia's multilateral efforts to address regional geopolitical challenges appeared relatively weak compared to those of its predecessor. However, over time, the administration of President Jokowi has demonstrated its initiative in multilateral affairs. Indonesia seeks to strengthen regional cooperation in various fields such as the economy, sociocultural aspects, security, and maritime affairs.

Based on the data obtained, it was also found that in dealing with great power rivalry in the region, the SBY and Jokowi administrations used hedging strategies through engagement and enmeshment by involving great powers in regional frameworks to prevent conflict escalation and ensure regional stability.

The Indonesian government has sought to foster relationships with great powers through economic and regional organizations. Through the enmeshment strategy, Indonesia indirectly seeks to accommodate countries with disputes and interests in the region into the regional institutional system while also spreading norms related to mutual restraint and increasing trust between countries in the Indo-Pacific region. This engagement aims to draw major powers into closer economic and political ties with countries in Southeast Asia and create more profound political and defense ties bilaterally and multilaterally, thus creating a relationship of interdependence and increasing mutual interest in regional security. Furthermore, the existence of integrated relationships and the formation of this network can encourage great-power countries to be involved in maintaining regional stability and security by using political and diplomatic channels.

Moreover, the distinct policies enacted by the administrations of SBY and Jokowi demonstrate how personality traits, leadership styles, and decision-making processes influence the foreign policy transition. Examining the personal traits and historical factors of leaders that shape foreign policy allows for a comprehensive understanding of how shifts in foreign policy can transpire as a consequence of alterations in leadership. The significance of this individual factor suggests that varying leaders will generate distinct policies due to the inherent differences in their backgrounds, characteristics, past experiences, and lives.

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CURICULUM VITAE (CV)

A. Personal Information

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Mariso, Kota Makassar, South Sulawesi

B. Education Background

Bachelor's : Indonesia Islamic University, Yogyakarta (2018)

Master's : Indonesia International Islamic University, Depok (2023)

C. Training/Course

1. Course on Nature-based Solutions for Disaster and Climate Resilience by United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), August 2023
2. Training on Introduction to Comparative Historical Analysis at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), August 2023
3. Training on Introduction to Climate Modelling at Universitas Islam Internasional Indonesia (UIII), August 2023
4. Training on Microsoft Office Specialist for Office Power Point 2013, Official Seal of Microsoft Certification, Certiport 2017.

D. Professional Background

1. Presenter and Participant of The 2nd Symposium on Muslim Politics and World Society at Indonesia International Islamic University (June 2023)
2. Research Assistant at Indonesia International Islamic University (August-Sept 2022)
3. Sales and Marketing Administration at Pt. World Innovative Telecommunication (Aug 2019-Feb 2020)

4. Public Relations and Marketing Communication at Sekolah Putri Darul Istiqomah Maros, South Sulawesi (Dec 2018-Mar 2019)
5. Teaching Assistant at International Relations Department, Universitas Islam Indonesia (Sep 2017-Sep 2018, and Sep 2020-Jan 2021)
6. Public Relation Intern at DPRD Province D.I. Yogyakarta (Jan 2018-Feb 2018)
7. Presenter and Participant of International Conference, Asean Innovation on Social Sciences Exhibition and Conference, University Utara Malaysia, Kedah (Oct 2016)
8. Participant of Global Citizen (AISEC) at National Taipei University, Taipei, Taiwan (Oct 2015-Nov 2015)

E. List Of Awards And Achievement

1. Awardee of Indonesia International Islamic University Scholarship at Faculty of Social Science, Program Study of MA in Political Science.
2. Microsoft Office Specialist for Office Power Point 2013, Official Seal of Microsoft Certification, Certiport 2017.

F. Organizational Background

1. Treasurer of Association of Social Science Students at Indonesia International Islamic University (April 2022-Feb 2023)
2. Public campaign of Marine Buddies community (*Social Project*) (OCT 2019-2020)
3. Secretary of Sedekah Sekitar of Indonesia Islamic University (Charity Non-Profit Organization) (May 2017-Sep 2018)
4. Head of Networking Bureau In Department of Networking and Communication Students Executive Council of Indonesia Islamic University (Nov 2016 - Des 2017)

5. Secretary of International Relations Student Association of Indonesia Islamic University (Nov 2015-Des 2016)
6. Secretary of Organizing Committee of Study Orientation for New Students, Faculty of Psychology and Social Culture, Indonesia Islamic University (Jun 2016-Sep 2016)
7. Leader of Social Project Group, Class Project Of Community Development Program and International Community (CDIC), cooperated between Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), International Relations Department of Indonesia Islamic University and Sungkonghoe University of South Korea. (Des 2015-Jul 2016)
8. Treasurer of Smart Village (*Social Project*) at Faculty of Psychology and Social Culture, Indonesia Islamic University (Oct 2015-May 2016).

G. Speciality

I have a professional background in international relations and a keen interest in foreign affairs, gender issue, and conflict resolution.

H. Publication

Research : Analisis Kebijakan Politik Luar Negeri Amerika Serikat Terhadap Demokratisasi Di Libya Pada Masa Pemerintahan Barack Obama (<https://dspace.uui.ac.id/handle/123456789/9761>)